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Abstract 
Cynics, Spaces, and Subjects: Toward a Tactical Ethics of Rhetoric explores the 
problem of ethics within the postmodern, a moment, as well as a theoretical posture, 
that leaves questions of transformative subjectivity and agency to be answered by an 
ethical "anything goes ." In response to the often destabilizing tendencies of postmodern 
ethical theory, my dissertation is a rhetorical response to claims that there are no 
foundations for ethical thought and action. I argue that rhetorical theory is well-suited 
for this task because of its emphasis on action and discourse. At the same time, 
however, I borrow some of the insights and strategies of postmodern theory--its 
penchant for space and its emphasis on the local, contingent, and tactical uses of 
discourse--to create tactical rhetorics that can help to meet the problem of ethics in the 
postmodern. These strategies are important for negotiating what is essentially an 
either/ or dichotomy in ethical theory: on one hand , we encounter the radical skepticism 
of postmodern ethical theory, and on the other, the foundational tenets of universalist 
positions. 
As I argue in Chapter One, there is a "space-between" the rather strategic use of 
this dichotomy in the rhetorical concept of kairos (timing). Kairos combines contingencies 
of context with an ethic of action. A kairotic ethics is, then, one of several rhetorical 
strategies employed to meet the problem of ethics in the postmodern. Chapters Two 
and Three are dedicated to excavating the rhetorical repertoire of the ancient Cynics, a 
roving band of philosophers who were committed to living and speaking their ethical 
stances. The tactics of parrhesia, diatribe, and exile are explored for their ethical and 
political contributions for contemporary rhetorical theory. I then examine the field of 
rhetoric and composition to trace historically how ethics gradually disappeared from 
college writing curricula as training for business and professions became vital to emerging 
American industry. In response to what I see as the field's continued ambivalence 
toward ethics, I conclude my dissertation with a pedagogical project that serves to 
revive critical ethics in the classroom. 
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Introduction 
I wish I could have slipped surreptitiously into this discourse 
which I must present today, and into the ones I shall have to 
give here, ... I should have preferred to be enveloped by speech, 
and carried away well beyond possible beginnings, rather 
than have to begin it myself. 
Michel Foucault 
The Order of Discourse 
If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, 
do you think that you would have the courage to write it? What is 
true for writing and for a love relationship is also true for life. The 
game is worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end. 
Michel Foucault 
Technologies of the Self 
1 
As I trace the beginnings of this project, to give readers some sense of the pattern 
of argument, how it has developed, and where these pages come from, I think back to 
the "salad days" of course work. Much of my work here is a direct consequence of a 
series of problems I saw emerging from my reading and writing in those courses. In 
particular, the work of Michel Foucault is perhaps most significant for its engagement 
with questions of subjectivity, agency, and later, ethics. Like most "theory neophytes" --
as the graduate director at the University of Delaware stamped on my admissions 
application-I was fascinated by the questions of subjectivity, ideology, and discourse 
raised by postmodernism and poststructuralism. 1 At the same time, I found myself 
struggling with equally important questions of responsibility and agency. What I didn't 
quite know then was that I was concerned with questions of ethics and the possibilities 
of articulating ethics within a postmodern framework. 
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Questions about agency, ethics, and the responsibilities of theory were brought 
home to me in an introductory theory seminar I took early on in my doctoral program. 
The subject of discussion was Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality wherein Foucault 
discusses, among other things, the creation of the confessional subject in Western 
history. His central thesis concerned the "repressive hypothesis," the long-held belief 
that sex was something that has not been and is not discussed. Foucault's genealogy 
reveals the complex discursive interdictions created to sustain, not silence, constant and 
exploratory discussions of sexuality. A woman in the seminar questioned Foucault's 
initial example of the discourses surrounding sexuality, prohibition, and a pathology of 
deviance. The example was the clinical examination and legal punishment of a "simple-
minded" farmhand who had "obtained a few caresses from a little girl" who later 
reported the incident to her parents (31). Foucault describes this event and the fevered 
policing that followed as a petty investigation of an assumedly innocent event. 
What is the significant thing about this story? The pettiness of it 
all; the fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, the 
inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the object 
not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical intervention, 
a careful clinical examination ... (31) 
The student in this theory seminar asked whether Foucault's rather glib use of 
this example was intended to condone this behavior as "an everyday occurrence," one 
that resulted in the unwarranted persecution of a farmhand. The professor's response 
sidestepped the problem of child molestation and directed us to Foucault's larger 
purpose, that of exposing how the confessional subject of sexuality has been catalogued, 
described, and controlled through various disciplinary techniques, and in the process, 
creating a clear identification of categories of normalcy and deviance. 
-
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In short, a discussion of ethics and the ethical implications of Foucault's theory 
were effectively foreclosed in that classroom. The message was that a discussion of 
ethics constituted an irrelevant examination into the consequences of theory, indeed even 
replicated the very discourses Foucault's work sought to interrogate for their support of 
compulsory heterosexuality and "productive" sexualities. Although his transformative 
work on systems of thought surrounding sexuality is invaluable, Foucault's initial 
examination of subjectivity and sexuality does force us to confront how such a theory 
can recast what we would now, as in the case of the eighteenth-century French 
farmhand, consider a heinous, violent crime against a child. How do we reconcile a shift 
in thinking the subject with community norms of appropriate and inappropriate 
behavior? How can ethics work within the structuralist universe created in his work? 
These questions, raised initially in the theory seminar, only became more 
pronounced upon reading "What is an Author?" in a rhetorial theory seminar. Rather 
than shying away from difficult questions of ethics and subjectivity, rhetorical theory 
engages directly with ethics in maintaining the centrality of ethos in the production, 
circulation, and reception of discourse. The construction of subjectivity in "What is an 
Author?" reduced the speaking/ writing subject to a function of discourse. The author-
function, as an example of Foucault's conception of subjectivity, operates, then, as a 
construct, a composite and conduit of the workings of discourse and power. In 
particular, Foucault asks at the close of the essay, "What matter who's speaking?," a 
question that confronts the rhetorical consideration of ethos. For the barrage of questions 
that respond to this inquiry ask about the rhetorical and ethical implications of such a 
question: Who is responsible for statements, especially when they can be abstracted to 
functions? How is ethos created in the wake of such an abstraction? What are the 
ethical and political implications of generalizing the speaker, and in the process, 
negating the identity that speaks through/ in the subject? In more precise terms, Jane 
Flax asks about the seeming contradiction of ethos and subjectivity, "Without 
½=----~--!!llll!!!!a!!!IIJ!l!!ll!l! ___ _ _______________ J___ __ 
' =--~ 
Enlightenment concepts of self, truth, and reason, what authorizes subjects to speak?" 
(197) 
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Critics are suspicious about the timing of Foucault's question, especially because 
of its implications for theorizing subjectivity. Of course, Foucault is not responsible or 
available to answer the questions raised by his work, but as Nancy Hartsock observes, 
"[S]ubjecthood becomes problematic" just when the silenced begin to speak (163). 
Hartsock' s point is well taken in her mention of resistance movements, such as the 
women's movement, that were borne of a subjectivity that took as its starting ground the 
oppression of women . To erase the importance of subject positions through abstraction 
de-legitimizes the political force they attempt to achieve. Abstracting subjectivity to an 
effect of discourse "flattens" the subject to a generalized, universal construct, a move 
that denies the creative, political ways individuals manage and resist power. 
Furthermore, such an undifferentiated theory of power assumes that it constrains and 
oppresses all in a uniform fashion. In evaluating his theory of power for women, 
Hartsock finds Foucault's position, "the perspective of the dominator" (165), to be 
incompatible for a theory of power and gender relations . Resistance rather than 
transformation is the only available position in his work. "Because Foucault refuses the 
ground of foundationalism and the 'ungrounded hope' of Rorty, he stands on no ground 
at all and thus fails to give any reasons for resistance" (170). 
Hartsock raises two key concerns in Foucault's work: 1) the political, ethical , 
and rhetorical ramifications of the subject who is an effect of discourse; and 2) the 
ultimate groundlessness of resistance. Both concerns point to the impasse that confronts 
the articulation of a postmodern ethical theory. Hartsock 's hesitation to embrace 
Foucault's theory of power and subjectivity stands as an important objection to the 
totalizing tendencies of his work, especially its extremes of subjectivity . 
More importantly, Hartsock also implicitly responds to the limits of the 
structure-agency model offered in Foucault's early work. I will directly address the 
-
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limitations of this model in the following section, but for now, Hartsock' s objections are 
a good place to start in recommending a different, and perhaps, more viable metaphor 
and model for mapping subjectivity and ethics, a model that does not concieve of 
resistance in merely reactionary terms, as the structure-agency model does. To this end, 
a move toward a spatial understanding of subjectivity and ethics might provide us with 
a more descriptive metaphor with which to conduct the present discussion. A spatial 
move may also help in my attempts to re-theorize a rhetorical understanding ethics and 
subjectivity in light of Foucault's late work on ethics and the self. However, I do not 
want to claim that Foucault's later work on ethics and the self in any way revised his 
ideas on subjectivity. 2 Rather, his later work points to the limitations of a structure-
agency model for a discussion of ethics. What I want to emphasize is that Foucault's 
early work on subjectivity marks a moment, as well as a strain, in theory that has 
profound implications for ethical and rhetorical theory. Because of these limitations, as 
well as the paradigmatic development of his thought, I both begin and contend with 
Foucault to chart some of the central concerns and contexts of my dissertation. It is also 
because, as Bernstein confers, much of Foucault's thought suggests the impossibility of 
agency (223). In effect, Foucault serves as a major "plot" on the map of my work, not 
only as a point of departure and return, but also as an extended example of the 
difficulties and contradictions inherent in a discussion of the key terms of my 
dissertation: subjectivity, ethics, and discourse. 
The anecdote I used to open this section, as well as my initial questions about the 
seeming theoretical incompatibility of ethics and subjectivity, shows how my interest in 
ethics developed from what I saw as the curious silence surrounding the ethical 
consequences of theory. In hindsight, the professor's handling of the student's questions 
about the ethical responsibilities of theory provides another important illustration and 
exigence for this dissertation. That is, the professor's refusal to discuss ethics suggests a 
certain discomfort with talking about the ethical in the public space of the classroom. 
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Because ethics is tightly bound up with associations of the personal and private, I think 
there is an implicit but demonstrated ambivalence surrounding what we generally regard 
as within the realm of personal choice and private morality. While I do not think that 
avoidance of the private was the primary motivating factor for why the class did not 
pursue the ethical implications of Foucault's concept of subjectivity and agency, I do 
think that there was perhaps a pedagogical discomfort with raising serious ethical 
questions about postmodern theory. In response to what I see as a problematic lack of 
discursive space for talking about ethics, my dissertation is, in many ways, an attempt 
to "go public" in theory and in the classroom with a discussion of ethics, to contend 
with the ethical in the public space of the classroom and in the discursive space created 
by this project. 
I. Why Space? 
Ethics in the postmodern assumes that ethics cannot stand "for all time," and 
that subjects are also situated spatially and temporally. Foucault's dynamic sense of 
the subject and discourse recognizes the long-standing assumptions of power's workings 
through discourse, but it also sees, in the revised metaphor of space, the possibility of 
"other" spaces not offered in the structure-agency model. Space, then, works in this 
dissertation as a metaphor through which to discuss ethics and subjectivity. In this 
section, I want to map out how a move toward the spatial provides, not a solution to 
the problem of ethics and subjectivity, but a method to be used in understanding how a 
structure-agency model no longer yields a complex portrayal of politics, discourse, and 
ethics. 
Upon reading The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, one can almost hear 
the philosopher banging his head against the wall in the pursuit of a new paradigm for 
thinking the subject. I see this frustration as the exhaustion of the structure-agency 
model that has been with us since the Enlightenment, a model that describes resistance 
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as a transcendence of structural determinants. Indeed, Foucault's project launched from 
this model to a large extent. While theoretically decrying the Enlightenment goal of 
transcending of social constraints, Foucault's praxis served this very goal in the attempt 
to carve out interstices of resistance. However, resistance is always implicated in the 
structures of control: "'discourse' [is] neither structure nor agency and both structure 
and agency" (Pile and Thrift 4). In other words, resistance comes from '"within,' for 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (History of Sexuality 
95). 
Gilles Deleuze illustrates the possibility of agency and conscious self-
transformation that surfaced in Foucault's later work. "The inside as an operation of 
the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is 
merely the fold of outside" (318). Foucault was attempting to find a doubling of a self, 
a self's relationship to oneself that assumes an "independent status" (320) than that of 
the outside. Deleuze observes, "[t]his is the Greek version of the snag and the doubling 
differentiation that leads to a folding, a reflection" (320). In other words, Foucault was 
attempting to rethink the metaphor of subjectivity outside of or beyond a structure-
agency model, a symbiotic and implicated process of resistance and domination. This 
later work gleans the possibility of an "undiscovered" or perhaps even "recovered" 
dimension of subjectivity, one "derived from power and knowledge without being 
dependent on them" (321). 
We are left, then, without a viable revision of the subject, but Foucault's attempt 
to find that "independent status" (320) is an important place to start, especially as his 
later work focused on the possibility of ethical agency for the self. But this struggle 
suggests the possibility that our critical fallacy has been to see agency as a static place 
within discourse. Notably, Deleuze's use of the external and internal self, the inside and 
outside of subjectivity, suggests the spatial dimension of subject formation. The 
possibility of an inside that is more than a reflection of the outside is the promise we 
must pursue in articulating a theory of ethical subjectivity. More likely, though, we will 
find that there is no certainty of an "independent status," only new metaphors and 
histories to describe it. 
Mapping allows for the simultaneous spatial and temporal deployment of 
coordinate plots. In my understanding, "mapping the subject" involves plotting the 
coordinates of subjectivity and ethics, with each of these plots rhetorically conceived. 
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As Thrift and Pile aptly observe in Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural 
Transformation, the paradigm of mapping provides a more useful and productive 
understanding of the subject and agency (5). Furthermore, it does not assume, as many 
agency theorists have, that transcendence of structure is either possible or desirable. 
"Thus the focus of an analysis of the self or body has changed from identifying their 
location on the continuum between structural and personal determination to looking at 
the ways in which subjectivity is reproduced in time and space" (5). Such a revision of 
the structure-agency model (re)casts the subject and the possibility of agency in terms of 
mobility. In the structure-agency model, we have resistance only in terms of and against 
power and oppression. Tactics for change, intervention, and critique can only be 
configured in reactionary, negative, or transcendent terms. A change in metaphor allows 
us another way of thinking the subject and the question of ethics in more productive 
terms than those in which it has formerly been cast. "The map--as allegory of space and 
time--and the subject--as allegory of place-in-the-world and limit-of-the-world--reveal 
that 'space' is actively constitutive of the practices of authority and resistance, of 
grounding meaning and re-placing meaning" (Thrift and Pile 49). 
While mapping and the spatial are the most viable models for the present 
discussion, there are problems with these metaphors. The disposition to travel and 
movement suggested by such a model may not be quite as radical or enabling as it might 
sound (Thrift and Pile 24). Citing Charles Taylor's hesitation to embrace such a model, 
Pile and Thrift observe, "[n]ot only is the language of movement and mobility ... 
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nowhere near as radical as is often imagined but it can often simply displace rather than 
reformulate questions of subjectivity" (24). This point is well taken, especially when 
such theoretical acrobatics may overlook important questions of agency and ethics 
rather than clarifying or providing forays and "exits" for practical considerations. They 
warn: "The practices of visual representation of the map serve to disguise the power 
that operates in and through cartography. Maps are not empty mirrors, that at once 
hide and reveal the hand of the cartographer" (48). Mapping subjectivity is just as 
ideological and potentially obfuscating of relations of power as the aforementioned 
structure-agency model. The metaphor of mapping, however, is still helpful when used 
critically for establishing a relationship between the foundation of time that structures 
both the structure-agency model and traditional ethics and the dimension of space that 
provides a more mutable method and metaphor for this discussion. 
Foucault's own work signaled a recognition of geography and the spatial 
conception of discourse and power. In "Questions on Geography," Foucault identifies 
the time-space dichotomy that has until recently been the dominant one for organizing 
and understanding politics, knowledges, and history. "Space was treated as the dead, 
the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, 
fecundity, life, dialectic" (70). This observation is developed in the critical social theory 
of both Edward Soja and Doreen Massey, with each critiquing and amending the 
assumptions of this dichotomy in their arguments. Edward Soja argues that it has been 
time, not space, that has been privileged in historical thought and imagination, and even 
when geography has been the "first term" of discussion, it is always conceived in 
temporal terms. Using the example of Marxist geography, Soja identifies how space 
came to be known as an inert category. Western Marxism had two key features: "an 
emancipatory interest in the power of human consciousness and social will to break 
through all exogenous constraints; and a critical inscription of this social power and 
potentially revolutionary subjectivity in the 'making of history', in historical modes of 
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explanation and interpretation, confrontation and critique" (30). Any focus on space 
was seen as a negation or avoidance of history, and consequently counter to the goals of 
enlightened struggle; geographical emphasis assumedly harbored territorialism and 
nationalism. The entrenched structure-agency model is a perfect example of the value of 
time over space; one "makes history" by transcending or becoming exterior to it. 
Mapping forecloses on this opportunity to transcend time by replacing the importance of 
space in its relationship to time, thereby locating the subject as well as her attempts at 
agency well within the very framework she seeks to escape; in short, space assumes that 
there is no "outside," only other spaces "within" that can be occupied, taken, and 
negotiated. 
One of the critical omissions in the temporal emphasis is and has been the 
relationship between the social and the spatial, an assumption that has further 
characterized space as a dead category. I think it is interesting that Soja equates the 
subordination of space in critical social theory with then current rejections of the 
relationship between environmental factors and human consciousness--in other words, a 
refusal to think of the individual in terms of subjectivity .. Soja's is an attempt to even 
the scales between the space-time imbalance, one that favors the mapping of human 
geographies . In so doing, Soja asserts "spatiality, temporality, and social being" (25) as 
the dimensions of human experience. Early twentieth-century social theory saw little or 
no relationship between "environmental causality .. . and the formation of human 
consciousness" (35). In effect, the subject of liberal humanism was not "subject to" 
constraints and causalities of space and time; in speaking and acting, the liberal subject 
transcended these conditions through personal will and rational autonomy. Because of 
this, Soja argues for a "socio-spatial dialectic" (79), an understanding "that social 
relations are simultaneously and conflictually space-forming and space-contingent" 
(126). Space is not merely the reflection of social relationships, nor are social 
relationships determined solely by space; rather, the dialectical interplay of the two give 
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meaning to space and spatial practices . Because space is social, "it can engender 
contradictions and transformational potential" (82). To this end, the spatial provides a 
more operative metaphor for conceiving agency and ethical subjectivity. 
The postmodern penchant for space should not, however, completely overlook 
the importance of time. Instead, space needs to be understood in its relationship to 
time. To this end, Doreen Massey argues that re-valuing or celebrating the spatial is not 
enough in reinscribing the spatial into social theory, a theoretical "upgrade" that Soja 
attempts. Instead, Massey interrogates the binary logic that has erected the long-
standing space-time dichotomy, arguing for a simultaneous deployment of space/ time. 
Space "is not absolute, it is relational" (261). In this way, space retains its dynamic 
possibilities because, similar to Soja's view, space is social. It is not merely a fixed place 
for social relations to take place. It is, moreover, "a moment in the intersection of 
configured social relations" (265). Massey notes that this configuration, by virtue of its 
inherently social dimension, produces conflict as well as solidarity (265). Space thus 
operates in moments of order and chaos (265); that is, order comes from the 
management and use of space, while chaos exists in the relativity of various locations. 
Without the underlying rationality of temporal organization, the spatial takes on a 
unpredictability and lack of causality endemic to spatial relations . Despite this 
"erratic" possibility of the spatial, Massey asserts that space can and does, in fact, 
operate by a logic not unlike that of time. To examine this, we need to re-think our 
approaches to the social in order to see the ways in which the spatial is involved in the 
production of history . Ultimately, Massey wants to insert a specifically political 
dimension to the spatial, a possibility that has been reserved for historical/ temporal 
readings. 
II. In Search of ... Agency: Foucault's Ethics and the Problem of Subjectivity 
12 
As Jeffrey Harpham argues, Foucault never broke free of the legacy of the 
Enlightenment. He did not resolve or synthesize the polarity created by the 
overdetermined subject of discourse and the anarchic autonomy of the free self (Norris 
qtd. in Harpham 537). This problem is clearly illustrated by reading his early work on 
subjectivity against his later work on the self. In this section, I want to "revisit'' 
Foucault's departure from questions of subjectivity and his turn toward Hellenistic 
philosophy. My point here is to show how Foucault's later work confronts his early 
constructions of subjectivity, a confrontation that helps both to situate and portray the 
political and philosophical problems of ethical subjectivity . More importantly, my goal 
is to illustrate how his work on the ancient Greek notion of the self indicates the 
historical rift that occurs between ethics and politics, a distancing that had both spatial 
and political consequences. 
In moving toward the goal of promoting "new forms of subjectivity," Foucault 
excavated the ancient Greek idea of the self (Rabinow and Dreyfus 216). But his goal 
was not to liberate the individual from the state; rather, it was "to promote new forms 
of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed 
upon us for several centuries" (Rabinow and Dreyfus 216 ). What I see emerging in this 
work is a tension between his earlier conception of the subject as a function and effect of 
discourse and the transformative self discussed in the last two volumes of The History 
of Sexuality. Once a determined space in discourse, resistance configured only in terms 
of its relationship to power, the subject needed a way out, a response to the internalized 
external that could, in some way, forge a productive political self. Thus, the problem of 
ethics is inextricably tied to configurations of the self and subjectivity (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 231). With this problem in mind, he searched for a new way to discuss and 
situate the subject. His search took him to the ancient Greeks, in particular the 
Hellenistic philosophies of the Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans. In this work, Foucault 
excavated an ethic of care for the self, one based on the self-abasing life practices of the 
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early Cynics. In The Care of the Self and his last lecture series at the College de France, 3 
Foucault articulates a theory of the self that concentrates on asceticism as a pathway to 
freedom. This theory suggests agency, or freedom as Foucault names it, in the aesthetic 
performance of ascetic existence. While such a move attempts a productive theory of 
the subject-as-self, it "complicates" politics in the aestheticization of individual control 
over the body, dietary practices, and material possessions. His focus, then, was no 
longer on the orders of discourse, but instead on how the individual acts upon himself to 
attain a state of happiness or perfection (Technologies 4). 
In The Care of the Self, Foucault outlines exactly what the care of the self 
involves. Although much of the text concerns sexual ethics, Foucault is here embarking 
on a revised conception of the subject and one that will appear in his later work in 
Technologies of the Self and the College de France lectures. According to Foucault, the 
care of the self involves the transformation of "existence into a kind of exercise" (The 
Care of the Self 49). It is a techne of becoming and continual self-transformation. 
Circulating about this transformed self, Foucault writes, is the larger practice of speaking 
and writing the self (54). The practice of reflection and record of the selfs daily toil and 
accomplishments toward the minimum, the extremes of Cynic and Stoic asceticism, tum 
this process into "the division of the subject into a judging authority and an accused 
individual" (61). In bipolar fashion, the self is simultaneously called upon to make a 
record of its habits of dress, thought, comportment, and diet and to judge this behavior. 
"An ethics of control" (65) derives pleasure and delight in keeping base desires 
"managed." A sense of domination over desire assumes a juridical model of control 
(65). Such restrictions on the self, he warns, should not be read as repressive systems of 
authoritarian restraint akin to modem conceptions of morality. Rather, for the ancient 
Greeks, ethical subjectivity "had more to do with the manner in which the individual 
needed to form himself as an ethical subject'' (67). This model did not subjugate desire 
but worked toward the formation of ethical subjectivity: "'Self-mastery' (63) was still a 
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purpose but one with a different emphasis. It did not involve the control of desire, of 
the mind's superior faculty over corporeal drive. Instead, the health and maintenance of 
the entire person, body and mind, was the goal of Greek ethics, and that each would 
work in harmony with the other. "This regimen does not require that one institute a 
struggle of the soul against the body, nor even that one establish the means by which the 
soul might defend itself against the body. Rather, it is a matter of the soul's connecting 
itself in order to be able to guide the body according to a law which is that of the body 
itself" (The Care of the Self 134). As I have been suggesting, another theory of the 
subject operates in this work: the constructed subject we are familiar with, the bare 
"function derived from the statement" (Deleuze 325) is in contrast to a transformative 
self that uses its existence as the example of freedom and ethical integrity. 
Even while he appeared to be moving toward a sort of apolitical aestheticization 
of the self, Foucault was experiencing the tension of negotiating the political and the 
ethical, two poles that were once historically aligned. We might read his turn to 
Hellenistic philosophy as a search for just how these poles disconnected from their 
initial relationship. The Hellenistic period, according to Foucault, is characterized by 
attention to action and practice, but in taking care of the self, one had to "leave politics 
to take better care of the self" (31). Ethics became, then, a means of struggle, "an 
invitation to a practice of liberty, to struggle and transgression, which seeks to open up 
new possibilities for new relations to self and events in the world" (Bernauer and Mahon 
154). 
In the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality and the College de France 
lectures, Foucault discusses not a subject of power but a transformative sel( one that 
engages in care as a practice of freedom. In what reads as an ironic turn toward the 
autonomous Enlightenment self, the subject is granted some possibility for negotiating 
subjectivity. The ethic of care of the self is not informed by a disciplinary system of 
ethics; rather, it is an ethics of self-governance. Dreyfus and Rabinow outline four 
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aspects of Foucauldian ethics articulated in The Use of Pleasure that serve as a model of 
critical ethics: 1) "the ethical substance" or the ethical problem; 2) "the mode of 
subjection ... the ways people recognize moral obligations"; 3) "the means by which we 
can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects"; and 4) "which is the kind of 
being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way" (239). This model does not 
contend with a priori truths or categorical imperatives, but attempts a process of 
examination of the process of ethical decision-making and the ways in which individuals 
are called upon as ethical subjects as well as the discourses they negotiate in choosing 
ethical stances. Rabinow and Dreyfus confer that Foucault "does not seek to 
deconstruct the subject but to historicize thoroughly the deep self in order to open the 
possibility of the emergence of a new ethical subject" (my emphasis 254). Arnold 
Davidson makes this point even more precisely but implicitly warns against reading 
Foucault's tum to the self as a continuation of his work on subjectivity: "Foucault's 
conceptualization of ethics as the self's relation to the self does not depend on any 
modem understanding of subjectivity. Writing this history of ethics is part of writing a 
history of the self" (133). 
ill. "Going Public": Habermas, Ethics, and the Public Sphere 
While this project is clearly indebted to the theoretical insights gathered from my 
reading of Foucault, Jurgen Habermas' s work on the public sphere is also indispensable 
for my discussion of how ethics circulates within a spatial and social economy of the 
public and private spheres. My dissertation responds to the separation between politics 
and ethics, a disconnection that inevitably raises the complicated relationship between 
the public and private sphere. And while Foucault stands as a major point in plotting 
the critical intersections of subjectivity and ethics, Habermas's work is vital, because it 
provides a model of the public sphere that is historically connected to communication, 
ethics, and politics. 
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In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas traces the 
changing meanings and uses of the public sphere in democratic societies. Beginning with 
the etymological trace of private and public, Habermas sets out to describe and 
historicize the bourgeois public sphere from its early, ideal formation in the eighteenth 
century through the decline of its original possibility and emancipatory potential. In its 
ideal form, "[t]he bourgeois public sphere institutionalized, according to Habermas, not 
just a set of interests and an opposition between state and society but a practice of 
rational-critical discourse on political matters" (Calhoun 9). Thus, the public sphere is 
that social space designated by rational communication and reasoned argument wherein 
"private people come together as a public" (Habermas, Structural Transformation 27). 
The public sphere underwent transformations that compromised its potential as 
a space for "debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized 
but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor" (Structural 
Transformation 27). The public sphere initially emerged as a space separate from the 
state and government and was associated with the patriarchal family and economics. 
The depoliticization of the public sphere came about gradually and due to a variety of 
causes. The most marked was the collapse of the public/ private dichotomy as private 
organizations grasped public power "while the state penetrated the private realm" 
(Calhoun 21). The state became aligned with society, and economics--"private" 
industry and labor--became a more powerful theme in the public sphere, while the 
private became primarily a space of the family, but one that was becoming more public 
in its function. Furthermore, Habermas sees the decline of critical discourse as central to 
these structural transformations. Notably, however, the decline of the public sphere can 
be reversed through the re-emergence of critical democratic discourse, a project 
Habermas takes on in a different way in Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action. 
17 
In acknowledging the impossibility of rescuing the eighteenth-century model of 
the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas focuses primarily on the possibility of critical 
discourse as a remedy for the public sphere's decline. An ethic and logic of consumption 
as well as the mass media are principally to blame for the weakening of this discourse 
and the fracturing of subjectivity that characterizes the late modern period. The result 
of such a splintering of subjectivity is a lack of focus, cynicism, and the inability of 
critique (Calhoun 24), a condition that further results in the "loss of a notion of general 
interest and the rise of a consumption orientation, ... [as a result], the members of the 
public sphere lose their common ground" (Calhoun 25). Without the possibility of 
"common ground," politics becomes entirely personalized and the intelligentsia--those 
left "to produce culture and criticism of it" --become more specialized and increasingly 
less public (Calhoun 25). The centrality of the media and the decline of critique results 
in public communication that relies solely on persuasion, rather than critical debate. A 
project of revitalization would then focus on "the struggle ... to find a form of 
democratic public discourse that can salvage critical reason in an age of large-scale 
institutions and fuzzy boundaries between state and society" (Calhoun 28). 
Transformation comes through making publicity "a source of reasoned progressive 
consensus formation rather than an occasion for the manipulation of popular opinion" 
(Calhoun 28). 
For Habermas, revitalization of the public sphere is an attempt to rejoin politics 
and ethics through debate and reasoned argument. As I discuss in depth in Chapter 
One, his move toward communicative rationality could be read as a practice of 
transhistorical communication based not in the institutions of a society but in the 
foundational principles of argumentation. Several problems emerge from such a shift, 
although I will not examine them here. But what Calhoun and the contributors to 
Habermas and the Public Sphere observe are the oversights of Habermas' s work on the 
public sphere. A few of them should be noted here because I do not want readers to 
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assume that I am working for the very goals that Habermas outlines in his work. 
Criticism of Habermas' s argument include his scarce treatment of our current moment, 
late twentieth-century capitalism, with the same critical eye with which he reads the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Calhoun 38). By categorizing and characterizing the 
public sphere as an uncritical, passive space for consumption rather than critical 
discourse, Habermas neglects social movements and agency, those "struggles by which 
both the public sphere and its participants are actively made and remade" (37). 
Furthermore, and as I argue in Chapter Three, Habermas does not consider the gender 
implications of his divisions of the public and private spheres. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of his work, Habermas's concern for the political 
and communicative ineffectiveness of the modern subject is where my inquiry begins. 
Despite my departures from his lament for the Enlightenment and its universalist claims 
of reason and transparent communication, I do find the promise of a transformative 
public sphere and the integral role of argument in it an important starting point for the 
rhetorical theory I propose in Chapter One. However, Habermas' s attempts to join the 
ethical and political remain within an economy of the public. Thomas McCarthy 
observes that Habermas' s moral theory is really a '"political morality' --of social justice 
rather than of moral virtue, character, feelings, and judgment, or of ethical life, 
community, and the good" (51). The exemptions to this "political morality" --affect, 
decision-making, and ethical life--are the very concerns of "private justices" that this 
study--at times explicitly, at others implicitly--works toward integrating and negotiating 
in the larger project of re-connecting rhetoric, ethics, and politics . 
IV. Only Connect Rhetoric, Ethics, and Space 
The spatial-temporal insights of critical social theory are important for 
understanding and reconceiving ethics. Ethics are embedded in social practices and the 
production of spaces. Thus, ethics can be conceived as spatio-temporal practices. If we 
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consider the assumption of ti.me employed by ethical absolutism, that certain values and 
ethics can stand "for all ti.me" and for all rational beings, then I think we can see the 
importance of critiquing the authority of ti.me over space as well as the temporal 
assumptions of the structure-agency model. Plotting subjectivity and ethics spatially 
provides a more active and changeable metaphor for theorizing a rhetoric of action. In 
so doing, a spatial rhetoric emerges in the mapping of these coordinates . Moreover, the 
idea of social space works to foreshadow my later consideration of ethics in the public 
sphere, a discussion that highlights the problems associated with spati.alizing ethics and 
politics in terms of sites. 
Within the field of rhetoric, the spatial dimension of discourse has long been 
recognized. In a very general sense, rhetoric is a discipline "in space"; it does not derive 
an identity based on disciplinary sites or fix itself within specific boundaries. In 
historical terms, Keimpe Algra notes that Aristotle's tapoi, the basis for invention, means 
spaces . 4 We might then read Aristotle's advice on choosing topics and the appropriate 
means of persuasion as ways of finding spaces from which to speak. In terms of 
pedagogy, Sharon Crowley describes teaching and writing as having "a certain 
locatedness . That is, both are carried on by given human beings in given communities. 
The relationships that develop between teacher and students, among students, and 
between writers and readers are always specific to a certain ti.me or place" (332). While 
she addresses the literal contexts in which communication takes place, Crowley 
conceives of these relati.onships--the rhetorical context--as inherently spatial. Nedra 
Reynolds' s understanding of rhetoric as spatial leads her to a reading of ethos as 
location. By tracing the etymological and social nuances of this concept, Reynolds 
argues for more active and transformati.ve notions of ethos, ones that "help to reestablish 
ethos as a social act and as a product of a community's character" (327). This revision 
of former conceptions of ethos foregrounds the cultural matrix in the creation of 
authoritative spaces from which to speak. Thus, a spatial rhetoric is well-poised to 
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carry on the critique of ethics and to provide a direction for developing a discussion of 
ethical subjectivity because it can account for the discursive spaces created by and in 
culture as well as offer ways of reading how ethical discourses are occupied by subjects. 
In general, argument is a key rhetorical mode used in many models of the public 
sphere and in many contemporary proposals for talking about ethics in a public way. 
That is, argument has traditionally been invoked as the dominant mode of most models 
of public discourse. Likewise, critique and argument are central to a rhetorical 
understanding of ethics and provide the rhetorical tools in most models of ethical 
discourse. However, the attempt to rebuild the ethical foundations of public discourse 
by advocating argument rests upon the unexamined assumption that there is presently a 
public space available for a discussion of ethics and politics and that argument provides 
a public way of talking about ethics. Furthermore, most proponents of argument--as the 
means of deriving ethics as well as continually critiquing the normative grounds of 
ethical claims--overlook the essentially spatial moves that their proposals enact. 
Examples of rhetoric's reliance on the assumed "goods" inherent to argument are 
evident in many recent contributions to the creation of a discourse ethics. James A. 
Herrick furthers rhetoric's importance for ethics in deriving an ethic of rhetoric that is 
suggested by the practice of rhetoric itself (133). Although he looks specifically at the 
virtue ethics of Alisdair MacIntyre, Herrick makes an important observation of rhetorical 
norms: "the adversarial nature of rhetoric actually enhances its moral character for all 
members of society in which rhetoric is freely practiced" (134). Although his 
assumptions of a free society are questionable, Herrick keeps alive the importance of 
reasoned argument in debating questions of ethics, for the "goods" internal to a dialogic 
model of ethics are derived from rhetoric . Thomas Frentz seconds the communicatory 
locus of ethics in his support of a "rhetorical conversation [that] is a narrative episode 
in which a conflict over opposing moral viewpoints re-unites the agents with their own 
moral histories, with the moral traditions of which they are a part, and--perhaps most 
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important-with an awareness of the virtues" (4). Lawrence Kimmel makes the 
strongest argument for the past and continued link between rhetoric and ethics, unifying 
these two poles in the imperative of public or community discourse: "Rhetoric, availing 
us through language of the means of persuasion, is the basic tool of practical affairs and 
is thus essentially connected to ethics" (2). Kimmel emphasizes the importance of 
reinstating community in the discussion of ethics, even as an ethic of its own. In 
response to increased privatization of the social sphere, Kimmel argues for both an ethic 
of community as well as a rhetorical understanding of argument and consensus in ethical 
decision-making. 
What all these theorists share, despite their different configurations of virtue and 
ethics, is a reinstatement of rhetoric's ethical foundations. Their examinations implicitly 
assume and create a public space in the formation of discourse communities, especially 
as their sense of "public" or "civic" hinges upon an inert or undifferentiated public 
sphere. Notably, they each allude to the current search to excavate ethical foundations 
in the creation of discourse models and the valorization of community, an emphasis that 
has carried over into composition studies and the reliance on Aristotelian models of 
civic discourse . Implicitly, their arguments advocate the reunion of ethics and politics in 
the civic sphere, with each drawing upon Aristotelian notions of public discourse for the 
maintenance of political community. In the process, their advocation of argument hits a 
snag on the problems of discussing a particularly spatial use of ethics and rhetoric: 
ethics invariably calls up notions of the public and private spheres. This snag occurs 
because ethics is traditionally aligned with the private moral decisions of individuals, 
not as Kimmel, Frentz, and Herrick argue, in the public realm of community discourse. 
Their work testifies to the recent trend to reconnect rhetoric to both politics and ethics, 
three poles that have become distanced in political discourse. Within rhetoric and 
composition studies, this attempt to link politics and ethics has often drawn upon the 
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very model of public discourse they employ in arguing for argument as a communicative 
grounding for ethics. 
Generally speaking, ethics maintains a rather ambivalent relationship with 
rhetoric and composition. This ambivalence stems from the fact that we do not yet have 
a public way of discussing ethics, especially one that does not replicate a traditional 
ethicist's emphasis on universalist norms in ethical decision-making. To understand the 
potential problems with these models, as well as their valuable contributions to building 
an ethical rhetorical theory that can meet the problem of subjectivity, we need to plot the 
central terms of this discussion--ethics and rhetoric-as a spatial rhetoric, one informed 
by an understanding of the social, ideological, and political dialectic of culture and 
space. We need also to understand rhetoric as choice, a specification that addresses the 
ethical dimension of the judgment, production, and circulation of discourse. To this end, 
I want to proceed with James Porter's articulation of the important connections between 
rhetoric and a distinctly postmodern ethics. 
Ethics in the postmodern sense, then, does not refer to a static body of 
foundational principles, laws, and procedures; it is not to be confused with 
particular moral codes or with particular sets of statements about what is 
appropriate behavior or practice. Ethics is not a set of answers but a mode of 
questioning and a manner of positioning. That questioning certainly involves 
principles--but it always involves mediating between competing principles 
and judging those principles in light of particular circumstances. Ethics is 
decision making--but it is decision making that involves question and critique . It 
is informed, critical, and pluralistic decision-making. (218) 
In Porter's use, rhetoric provides the tools for adjudicating among competing, plausible 
principles. The process of negotiation bridges the ethical and rhetorical in each act of 
discursive decision making for "rhetorical action always involves ethical judgment'' 
(Porter 221). But Porter's attempt to theorize postmodern ethics for rhetoric is only one 
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of the few recent attempts to discuss postmodern ethics for and in the field. As Porter 
makes clear, postmodern ethics retains ethical decision-making, but it also maintains a 
skeptical eye toward judgment by keeping in mind contingencies of context--or in the 
terms that I have used--spaces. In effect, the ethical turn in rhetoric-albeit an 
ambivalent one--is about the renewed relationship between discourse and action. In 
other words, because rhetoric involves the relationship between discourse and action, 
rhetoric is fundamentally concerned with ethics. One aspect of this relationship is the 
(dis)placement of the subject in "acting out" a rhetorical process of judgment. 
V. The Map 
Because my sense of ethical decision-making relies on a simultaneous 
understanding of space and time, mapping serves as the best way to describe and 
propose a way of reading my dissertation. Already, several key plots--space, ethics, 
rhetoric, and subjectivity-appear and return as I examine each in relationship to the 
other. In keeping with this approach, Chapter One, "Spatial Agents and Ethical Plots: 
Toward a Theory of Kairotic Ethics," begins where my inquiry into subjectivity ends in 
this introduction: with the problem of ethical decision-making. I begin this project with 
an eye toward negotiating a process of rhetorical decision-making in the postmodern. 
This goal serves to illustrate initially how contemporary ethical theory has been cast into 
the polarized extremes of "either" an ethics based upon foundational premises "or" 
ungrounded skepticism. In light of this dichotomy, I argue for a "space-between" the 
ethical relativism offered in postmodern theory and the foundationalism suggested by 
universalist positions, opting for the rhetorical and ethical space of a kairotic ethics; 
kairos here refers to the rhetorical process of timing, when discursive intervention might 
best be made. In the process, I will examine current investigations into ethical theories, 
an inquiry that identifies the spatial practices suggested by them and how they both 
include and exclude important rhetorical considerations. Ethics, while being read 
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rhetorically, will also be read spatially and temporally--that all attempts at judgment 
are spatial practices. Ethics becomes, then , "less about the ability to formulate rules 
than by knowing how to act in each particular situation" (Thrift and Pile 29). Notably, 
this revision of rules to a sense of timing and action resembles the rhetorical concept of 
kairos. I conclude by offering the implications and possibilities of kairos--in both its 
temporal and spatial meanings--as one possible way of both theorizing and 
understanding ethics in its relationship to subjectivity . In my reading, kairos suggests 
important rhetorical and ethical foundations that can be used in creating an ethics "in-
between." 
Chapter Two, "Cynic Rhetoric: The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance," taking as 
its starting point Foucault's work on the Cynics, argues for a rhetorical reading of the 
Cynic philosophers, and in particular, the character of Diogenes of Sinope. The Cynics 
are important for this discussion namely because little has been done to excavate what 
they offer for the history of rhetoric, even as they are currently being rediscovered in 
other fields. Furthermore, because they serve as examples of the important, 
demonstrated link between politics and ethics indicative of the public sphere in ancient 
Greece, the Cynics have resonance for our current lament for this kind of public sphere, 
one wherein the political and the ethical are closely joined through rhetoric and action. 
Chapter Two locates the Cynics within Hellenistic rhetoric, a period that has seen too 
little inquiry in terms of what kind of rhetorical repertoire developed out of this period . 
My re-reading focuses on the tactical 5 uses of parrhesia, diatribe, exile, and parody by 
the Cynics as these rhetorics acted out a uniquely Cynic ethics, one, that worked to 
bridge the connections between ethics and politics . 
Chapter Three, "Hipparchia the Cynic: Feminist Rhetoric and the Ethics of 
Embodiment," continues the discussion of exile as a critical rhetorical stance, a 
discursive position I discuss briefly in Chapter Two. This chapter sets out to reclaim 
exile as a tactical rhetorical space for a feminist ethics. Beginning with Hipparchia the 
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Cynic, I use her presence in Cynicism as the starting point for my discussion of ethics 
and the problem of embodiment. From here, I question how the specificity of 
embodiment often leans upon essentialist theories of woman, theories that also build off 
of questionable notions of the feminine and the female body that have been used to 
establish a specifically feminist ethics. While a good deal of this chapter serves to 
critique feminist ethics as it has been adopted by feminist rhetoric, I conclude with a 
case study of Fauziya Kasinga, an exile from Togo, who sought asylum from genital 
mutilation by illegally entering the United States. Her case raises important questions 
about gender as an historically unprotected category of immigration law as well as an 
example of how both ethics and the public sphere has and continues to assume male 
embodiment as the norm, an assumption that avoids "the particularities" of race and 
gender (Landes 99). 
Chapter Four, "Ethical Subjects: Composition, Pedagogy, and the Postmodern 
Classroom," examines the ambivalent connections between rhetoric, ethics, and politics 
in the field of rhetoric and composition studies. My emphasis here is clearly on 
presenting composition studies as a discipline that has been only marginally successful 
in articulating postmodern ethics for the classroom as well as the field as a whole. For 
evidence of this, I look to the field's historical reliance on prescriptive or traditional 
ethics to point out the need for a more critical ethics, one that will not repeat the 
universalist, normative foundations evident in college curricula of the early university . 
Many attempts to bring the moral and ethical into the classroom draw upon Aristotelian 
notions of civic discourse and political community, a recurring return that risks an 
uncritical use of an ancient Greek model of the public sphere which bears little 
resemblance to the public spheres available in late twentieth-century life. And, because 
ethics is currently bound up with the private sphere, an attempt to "go public" with 
ethics by setting up an Aristotelian civic community betrays the complex relationship 
that exists between public and private spheres, a complexity that was not nearly as 
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evident in the ancient Greek polis as it is today. My tentative "solution" to this problem 
is to argue for Foucauldian ethics that would help to motivate a move toward a more 
critical ethics for composition studies. 
Chapter Five, "Ethics and HIV Testing: Toward a Pedagogical Project," works 
as both a conclusion and a practical application of how I see many of the issues raised 
in the dissertation working out on the local level of a classroom. In this short chapter, I 
engage with questions of private and public spheres, ethics, rhetoric, and the ways in 
which the self turns herself into an ethical subject. To enact the complex relationship 
between the key terms discussed throughout the dissertation, I turn to the issue of HIV 
home-testing as one that works off of the relationship of the public and private spheres. 
While initially creating certain kinds of subjects--the subject of public health, of disease, 
and of testing--the call for testing both complicates and re-erects associations of disease 
and disclosure. The issue of HIV testing is both timely and important for the writing 
classroom because it simultaneously draws upon our private, even secret, associations 
of sexuality and HIV status in their relationship to the public management of disease 
and ethical responsibility. HIV home-testing is an issue that directly confronts the 
dichotomies, as well as the links between, the political and the ethical. This issue and 
my proposed treatment of it in a classroom project on the study of HIV testing 
advertising also engages with Foucault's four modes of ethical subjectivization, a pairing 
that I hope to have future students examine in their study of ethics and HIV home-
testing. 
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Chapter One 
Spatial Agents and Ethical Plots: Toward a Theory of Kairotic Ethics 
Contemporary rhetorical theory has been receptive to the discursive turn in 
poststructuralist and postmodern theory. The discussion and inclusion of thinkers such 
as Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg' s 
canon-forming The Rhetorical Tradition : Readings from Classical Times to the Present 
is certainly evidence of how major shifts in thinking the subject, discourse, and ideology 
have found their way into the field. In addition , Lester Faigley' s Fragments of 
Rationality: Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition is an argument for reading 
and repositioning rhetoric's companion, composition, in light of such philosophical 
shifts. Faigley' s text is also an inquiry into what a postmodern rhetoric might look like 
in the local space of the classroom. To this end, he looks to the directions offered by 
electronic communication for an enactment of a postmodern conception of the subject. 
More importantly, to meet the changing conceptions of the subject, discourse, and 
discursive responsibility, he draws on the work of Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard to help in the 
project of reconfiguring ethics in light of the fragmented and unauthorized vision of the 
subject in postmodernism. 
While I will address Faigley's text directly in Chapter Four, what his work--as 
well as Bizzell and Herzberg' s--establishes for this discussion is an inquiry into what a 
contemporary rhetoric informed by postmodernism and poststructuralism would look 
like. If we follow Lyotard, as Faigley does, a postmodern rhetoric resembles a blend of 
Sophistic rhetoric and Aristotelian ethics. It would dispense with foundational premises 
for rhetorical authority, replacing these with spatial or "site-based" metaphors of 
authority. A postmodern rhetoric would interrogate the value and artifice of rationality 
by "playing" with logocentric patterns of development and exposition. In contrast, it 
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would challenge the authority of discursive genres and the imposition of rhetorical 
context by creating experimental, hybrid texts. Postmodern rhetoric would value 
opinion and contingent knowledges rather than seeking "trans-discursive" truths about 
language and subjectivity. In short, postmodern rhetoric, if enacted, would dramatically 
change the way we think about language, our responsibilities to audience, and our 
conceptions of ourselves as authoritative and authorized speakers and writers. 
While I endorse the theoretical possibilities of this rhetoric, I have questions 
about how a postmodern subject can negotiate agency and resistance. If there is no 
"outside" of discourse--no stable ground on which to authorize action--how do subjects 
write or speak their way into discursive situations that require their response? Because I 
understand rhetoric as choice and action, I have serious concerns about the ethical 
implications of a rhetoric that theorizes choice and action in such a way as to make 
them inert and that implicitly sees ethics as just another discursive imperative parading 
as truth . The question of the ethical is briefly addressed at the end of Faigley's text, but 
the marginally helpful response found in Lyotard's The Differend points to the 
immediate, and in some sense, imperative need for an ethics that will guide rhetoric's 
embrace of the postmodern. To this end, I will be working toward a theoretical account 
of kairotic ethics--an ethics informed by ka.iros--that is attentive to philosophical and 
epistemological shifts produced by postmodernism, but one that will not drown in the 
extreme relativism suggested by a postmodern ethics . 
When we come to the question of postmodern ethics, we need only to consider 
the answer provided in the most general claims about postmodernism' s destabilizing 
tendencies. The end of metanarratives of truth and rationality, radical skepticism, and 
the reduction of culture and capital to the endless play of signifiers, are a few of the 
theoretical obstacles that stand in the way of creating a viable postmodern ethical 
theory. That is, the question of postmodern ethics becomes a difficult proposition in 
ethics' s historical dependence upon universal criteria for judgment. Indeed, how can the 
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question of deriving and applying principles that will dictate behavior be asked within 
the postmodern? How can judgment be achieved when "opinion politics" (Lyotard 81) 
guide discussion, when there are no available criteria for judgment? Furthermore, how 
can any viable social theory be created if it can be easily dismantled by charges of 
relativism, a consequence of contingency ethics? 
When cast in the terms of these questions, postmodern ethics stands on shaky 
ground because it assumedly stands on no ground at all; there is nothing authorizing or 
legitimating this ethics except context and situation. In contrast, traditional or 
universalist ethical theories rely upon normative, "grounded" imperatives and guides for 
ethical decision-making, and ask for consistency in applying ethical norms to divergent 
situations. I use these oversimplified definitions intentionally because they serve to 
illustrate the fundamental dichotomy existing between universalist and postmodern 
ethics. On the one hand, we have the "ungrounded," contingent judgments in the 
postmodern; on the other, we have ahistorical norms of judgment, those firmly 
authorized stances associated with the universalist position. In my view, neither 
position is tenable for creating an ethics for postmodern rhetoric. Furthermore, the 
dichotomy that structures this debate considers only these two extremes, leaving out a 
whole range of "in-betweens" that can provide important and overlooked ethical and 
rhetorical possibilities. Michael Bernstein observes a similar and "specious" dichotomy 
between the postmodern and universalist positions. "[E]ither there are universal 
ahistorical normative foundations for critique or critique is groundless. This specious 
"either/ or" closes off the topos that needs to be opened for discussion, the topos toward 
which so much of the polemic of modernity/ postmodernity gravitates" (222). 
As I contend, "this specious 'either/ or"' is a rhetorical move within theory, one 
that effectively helps to set up a "straw-man" of either postmodern or universalist 
ethics, and one that deserves a rhetorical response. Reducing ethics to a choice between 
two extremes forecloses on the possibility of something between radical skepticism and 
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universalism and oversimplifies the complexities of each. Interestingly, Bernstein 
responds to a closing off of "the tapos," those spaces between the dichotomy that need 
to be opened up for discussion. I look to that kairotic space between to create an ethics 
of rhetoric that merges some of the important insights of postmodern ethical theory with 
its seemingly polar opposite of normative decision-making. 
Choice and decision-making are central components of rhetoric. Furthermore, I 
want to retain rhetoric's historical emphasis on discourse and action in meeting the 
destabilizing tendencies of the postmodern. This task requires not only a tenable theory 
of ethics, but also a spatial and temporal reworking of the rhetorical concept of kairos to 
help meet this challenge. Within rhetorical theory, little has been done to combine 
postmodern and traditional ethics, especially into an inquiry that draws from the 
contemporary philosophical arguments put forth by Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Fran~ois 
Lyotard, two theorists who represent the extremes of the "either/ or" dichotomy and 
who are being imported into the field for what discourse models they provide. Notably, 
both are speaking in very rhetorical terms about discourse, ethics, and judgment. 
Because of this, rhetoricians are attempting to provide a way of talking about ethics and 
how the models created in their work might help to meet our contemporary rhetorical 
needs. But simply by virtue of their foundationally opposed projects, their extremely 
different proposals for ethics in the contemporary sphere point to the need for a 
rhetorical theory that opens up some other spaces-between, ones that I find are more 
sensitive to context as well as the need for action. 
In this chapter, I look at the space between the "either/ or" dichotomy to map a 
spatial rhetoric of the subject, ethics, and kairos that will work toward meeting the 
seemingly impossible and imperative task of creating an ethics of rhetoric, one that will 
"neither" wade into the extreme relativism of postmodernism "nor" the ahistoricism of 
universalist paradigms. The move toward the spatial, this new tapos, assumes space not 
as an inert category, but as those localized, lived practices that occur in social and 
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political contexts. This spatial reading of ethics understands ethics as the responsibility 
to respond both to the social order and "the social other" (Nealon 134). 
But merely endorsing the spatial over the temporal re-erects another either/ or 
dichotomy. That is, just as the false presentation of the postmodern and universalist 
postions closes off spaces, so too does the postmodern penchant for space, an emphasis 
that overlooks the importance of time in ethical decision-making. Therefore, in this 
discussion, ethics exists in both time and space. That is, ethics are temporally 
embedded in social practices and the production of spaces in discourse. They are 
historically located as well as spatially enacted. Similarly, kairos, a concept that has 
often been read as mere "timing," has much to offer this discussion in a spatial reading 
of its ethical implications as well as its possibilities for rhetorical action. In my 
discussion, kairos marks the space-between the extremes in ethical theory. 
Clearing a Space for Kairos 
A spatial rhetoric that plots subjectivity and ethics is able to examine the 
discursive implications of emerging theories of ethics and judgment, such as those 
offered by Lyotard's important contribution to this theme . But Lyotard is the "straw 
man" sitting on one side of the either/ or dichotomy; Habermas sits squarely on the 
other. In both, we meet philosophers who have a curiously rhetorical and spatial 
understanding of judgment and ethics. To illustrate the either/ or dichotomy and where 
the space-between needs to appear, I want to look at the rhetorical and spatial practices 
suggested by their work and respond to the oversights and exlusions of both. In 
particular, they both omit an understanding of time's relationship to space in conceiving 
their respective approaches to ethics. 
I. "Either'' Lyotard 
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One of the central criticisms of Lyotards's work on ethics--and one that is fairly 
obvious by now--is that judgment cannot exist in the absence of criteria, and that within 
such a suspension, the subject operates in an ethical void, one without consequences and 
-
action. To some extent, this charge is valid, but there is more working in Lyotard that 
favors judgment, and consequently, ethics, in a limited sense. To represent Lyotard, I 
look at Just Gaming and The Differend not in the goal of recommending them as a basis 
for a postmodern approach to ethics, but to illustrate what, in its extremes, yields little 
for a rhetorical theory of ethics, and thereby demands a more viable space-between. 
There is a distinct split between what Lyotard calls paganism and what I will 
call Kantianism in Just Gaming. The pagan involves judgment without criteria; affect 
and feeling are used to make decisions (16); pleasure and pain motivate judgments (48). 
Normative claims hold no validity in the pagan because they attempt to exist beyond or 
above language games. This is not to suggest that there are no rules in the pagan; rather, 
rules are determined by language games and are unique to each game. Lyotard adopts a 
Sophistic position in asserting the impossibility of judging anything but opi~on and of ... 
choosing anything but statements of opinion. In the pagan, "[o]ne does not know whom 
one is speaking to; one must be very patient; one must negotiate; one must ruse; and one 
must be on the lookout when one has won" (43). Paganism exists in the refusal to claim 
one great or master narrative before others. Instead, one adopts different orders of 
discourse ( for example, Lyotard identifies prescriptives and narratives as two genres of 
discourse). The goal of the pagan is to change games, to invent new ones (61). Like the 
Sophist, the pagan plays with the rules of language and obeys only those that determine 
different genres. For example, justice is a language game, a genre of discourse, that is 
played in the genre of prescriptives (62). Ironically, as Jean-Loup Thebaud points out in 
the close of the dialogues, "[t]he only prescriptive is that one 'ought' to be pagan ... [to] 
maximize as much as possible the multiplication of small narratives" (59), a 
postmodern ethical imperative which serves as a master narrative itself. 
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Assuming the position of the rhetorical skeptic, Lyotard attempts to continue the 
questioning process rather than to judge, but in the imperative of renewed dispersal is 
the potential for judgment. For what is unjust is "that which prohibits ... the question 
of the just and the unjust" (67) All acts of terror, annihilation, and oppression are thus 
unjust because they prohibit a kind of argument or conversation that would continue to 
allow for a sort of freedom of speech, a freedom that would allow for the splintering of 
discourses of totalitarianism and control. Lyotard also holds out the possibility of 
judgment on a case-by-case basis. As Thebaud asks, "Where do I get [this] ability to 
judge? If all opinions are acceptable, then I cannot decide?" (81). Here, Lyotard 
responds with the limited possibility of the judge in certain questions. The judge must 
interrogate which norms and conventions of opinion are embedded in the conflict. The 
judge then has three possibilities for deciding a case: suspending judgment in the face of 
conflicting opinions; deciding in favor of "heavier" opinion, of a group consensus; or 
using a "guide," a "horizon" that is not of itself a set of criteria, but, like the culturally-
situated knowledge of phronesis, acts as a guide to specific cases and judgments (82). 
By asserting an "opinion politics" in place of rational criteria for judgment, 
Lyotard hits a dangerous snag in paganism. Under paganism, justice can be determined 
as what the majority hold to be an opinion of the just. By refuting Kant's supposition of 
rational beings existing before discussion and debate, Lyotard confers that a "rational 
politics" is over; what we now have is a belief that "it is not true that a rational 
knowledge of social and political facts is possible, at least insofar as they imply 
judgments and decisions" (75). This is, of course, a dangerous proposition as the 
example of Nazism is but one outcome of an opinion politics--a politics of judgment 
that produces a consensus of the just based on opinion. While he never adequately 
deals with this possibility, Lyotard does hold out the hope that heterogeneity will 
overwhelm any totality which may arrive under opinion politics. How, then, does this 
possibility of judgment engender a postmodern ethics? 
n 
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Whenever we encounter questions of judgment, we are inevitably involved in 
deriving or assuming an ethical or normative foundation for decision-making. Ironically, 
however, this inevitability results in the use of some "quasi-transcendental" criteria for 
contingent judgment. For even as judgment takes place on a case-by-case basis, 
decisions must be made by some criteria. Lyotard's key distinction on this point is 
between the assumption of truth and unity (a linkage that forms the terror of totality) 
that underlies the Kantian Idea and the "opinion politics" that determine judgment in 
the pagan. ThroughoutJust Gaming, Lyotard attempts to "go beyond" Kant's 
formulation of the Idea, abandoning transcendent criteria for judgment. According to 
Lyotard, criteria are derived from "the discourse of truth and suppose a referent or a 
'reality"' (98). Lyotard's revision uses some sense of the Idea, one that is not, however, 
tied to Kantian formulations of a priori truths or a sense of a metalinguistic positions; 
justice in the postmodern assumes that "there is no outside; there is no place from which 
one could photograph the whole" (43). In place of a Kantian normativity, the Idea is 
used to guide judgment, a "wayfinding" that operates as an ethic (Pile and Thrift 88). 
Ethics, then, are used as guides rather than transcendental imperatives. Judgment occurs 
when the horizon of the Idea--an ethic--is used to adjudicate. To this end, L yotard 
discusses ethics in terms of the rules of language games, rules that can be changed as 
cases change . Once configured outside the game of prescriptives indicative of Kantian 
versions of judgment, ethics becomes narrativity, stories that require continued 
dispersal. Notably, Lyotard use spatial directives to orient judgment; a "guide" or 
"horizon" marks the way for judgment. 
Plurality and dispersal are the key terms of Just Gaming. In fact, the imperative 
of plurality stands as Lyotard's ethic of judgment. What becomes evident in reading 
Lyotard's "difference" from Kant is the circularity that postmodern ethics struggles to 
move beyond. The irony of Thebaud' s last remarks on the ethic of plurality is a 
reminder of how difficult it is to think an ethics that does not use some normative guide. 
-
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One of Lyotard's major contributions in Just Gaming is the offering of a different genre 
of discourse than that of the prescriptive. In place of prescriptives, Lyotard fosters a 
rhetorical understanding of the construction of truth and rationality, one that assumes 
both a discursive model of ethics and the multiplication language games, each with its 
own set of rules. These games will assumedly be played by rules that keep excess and 
abuses in check. As Best and Kellner observe, "[j]ustice is playing by the rules" (my 
emphasis 161). What is left out of Lyotard's theory, however, is any guide for choosing 
one language game over another. The guides that direct judgment in the postmodern 
work internally: that is, they determine the rules of individual games and judgment in 
particular cases. They do not, however, give import to any particular discourse over 
another. The photographic stance is a space left inoperative in Lyotard. 
In The Differend, Lyotard takes the question of ethics and judgment further, a 
move that produces an interesting discursive imperative. Whereas Just Gaming works 
with spatial concepts to direct judgment, The Differend works on an explicitly 
discursive level. It attempts to make operative a postmodern approach to philosophy, 
and as a result, falls prey to the confusion that such a task produces. While there many 
things going on in The Differend, namely what Auschwitz means for speculative 
philosophy, I am particularly interested in the discursive description and construction of 
posmodern justice as a rhetorical formation. 
A differend is "a case of conflict between (at least) two parties, that cannot be 
equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments" (xi). 
Notably, the differend is a space in discourse, an impasse, when litigants cannot decide 
on an equitable judgment because both or all claims hold equal validity. The question of 
responsibility becomes central as Lyotard attempts to derive a sort of discourse ethic, 
but one that does not reinstate normativity. Rather, we have a necessity and 
responsibility of linking phrases, of finding idioms to represent differends. In spatial 
terms, we might read this as the necessity of finding discursive spaces for 
-
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representation. Thus, discursive responsibility carries the imperative only of arriving at 
some representation to show that we have borne witness to a case of a differend. The 
moment of the differend is one of dissensus, as litigants are suspended in argumentation 
without judgment. And this is the problem in The Differend: the question of judgment 
is avoided altogether in favor of a radical skepticism. We only choose regimes of 
phrases, similar to the language games of Just Gaming, that carry their own rules that 
must be followed. Phrases, however, are not equivalent to our sense of a sentence or a 
grammatical unit of language. Phrases are akin to a rhetorical situation: "A phrase is 
defined by--as it, in fact, defines--the situating of its instances (addressor, addressee, 
referent, sense) with regard to one another. Rather than defining a grammatical or 
semantic unit, a phrase designates a particular constellation of instances, which is as 
contextual as it is textual--" (194). In Just Gaming, one could only look to the rules of 
individual language games as a guide. Our rhetorical responsibility as litigants or 
witnesses to the differend is to choose the best phrases, the best means, to represent 
cases of the differend. 
In The Differend, new rules must be found to link phrases. Phrases exist within 
genres of discourse; cognitives, prescriptives, descriptives, and ostensives are but a few 
of the genres identified. Notably, what Lyotard outlines as the necessity of linking 
phrases by following the rules of a particular genre of discourse sounds like a sort of 
structuralism in the avoidance of singular instances of discourse in favor of achieving a 
totalizing system. Lyotard's inclusive and active definition of phrases, one that includes 
anything that signifies--from a wink to tachycardia--accounts implicitly for the 
contextual matrices that accompany a rhetorical conception of the phrase. In other 
words, each act of signification participates in a network of relationships between text, 
author, audience, all of which depend on each other and which assume particular 
stances in particular acts of discourse. 
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Litigants' responsibilities or obligations refer to the imperative to find ways of 
linking phrases within specific discourse genres. Here, I think Lyotard means the 
imperative of finding a way to represent differends and competing discourses, to allow 
for the freedom of speech he alludes to in Just Gaming. Lyotard defines the unjust as 
the instance when dissensus is squelched under the silence of totality. To allow for 
differends, despite the desire to judge, is to allow for the representation of even 
"immoral" or "unethical" views. Thus, even ethics may be just another genre (117). The 
genre, rather than any meta-discursive criteria of judgment, brings forth the obligations 
(117); "[t]here is no genre whose hegemony over the others would be just" (158). 
Therefore, the rules determined by a rhetorical context (or genre) issue the imperative. 
For example, a prescriptive genre would concern itself with the ethical and normative. 
Because of this, participants can issue further prescriptives, in the cause of linking and 
creating new phrases and representing differends, not in the pursuit of issuing 
universalist imperatives of behavior or action. In other words, what is produced within 
the genre cannot be used to judge others. 
In some ways, however, Lyotard appears to be supplanting the discourse of 
truth, a master narrative assumedly external to language, with the transcendent rules of 
discourse genres, what I earlier called a sort of structuralism. Perhaps, though, this is 
the enactment of Just Gaming: that is, guides can be used and created in the pursuit of 
judgment, but these guides reflect the rules of a particular discourse, not the prettnsion 
to truth or the assumption of a metalanguage that would rule in all decisions of the 
ethical or the just. The Differend works as an attempt to disperse these narratives into 
their specific genres, a move that highlights the essentially rhetorical context of 
differends as well as the ethical imperative of "hearing" and "bearing witness" in cases 
when judgment cannot be determined for lack of any rule. 
What Lyotard presents in both Just Gaming and The Differend is a localized, 
contingent approach to ethics. What remains unclear, however, is how we are to choose 
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one genre over another, one phrase rather than another, for representing cases of the 
differend. This is, of course, the problem of relativism that plagues this "either" side of 
the ethical dichotomy. What Lyotard foregrounds, albeit unintentionally, is the 
inherently rhetorical dimension of his postmodern ethics of judgment. A counter-
statement to universalist conceptions of truth and ethics, Lyotard offers a discursive 
alternative to the demand of the normative, or in his own terms, prescriptives. In so 
doing, Lyotard examines how the genres of discourse are connected, linked together to 
find the best means of "bearing witness" to arguments and dispute. 
Furthermore, if we understand one central meaning of rhetoric as choice, then I 
think we can grant that Lyotard was working on something akin to offering discursive 
choices in the linking of phrases. If we also consider that the semantic base of ethical 
statements is based on the normative or prescriptive genre, then we need to consider if 
shifting this base to another genre by linking phrases will clear a path out of the 
universalist-relativist dichotomy. Lyotard attempts as much by supplanting the 
philosophical presuppositions that follow normative statements of "ought" and 
"should" -as well as the position from "outside" discourse that supports such 
statements--with the imperative of choice. Such a shift would offer "can" in place of 
discursive normativeness. 6 In this revision, the spatial agent is free to choose plots or 
points of entry into ethical discourse and action. Nevertheless, the move from 
imperative to choice opens Lyotard to charges of ammoralism; in short, postmodern 
ethics does not provide a tenable position that allows for the ability to judge one 
discourse of truth over another, only the reduction of imperatives to decisions and 
choices, a semantic move that harbors serious ethical implications. In other words, a 
semantic move is not enough. As I will argue later, kairos provides a stronger foothold 
for rhetorical and ethical intervention. 
L yotard ' s work exemplifies the "groundlessness" of ethics in the postmodern. I 
fear, however, that his project "to philosophize" (The Differend xiii) results in an 
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untenable ethical theory. One primary reason for this is that he does not consider 
subjectivity in relation to ethics. The subject is generally identified as the judge who 
must make contingent decisions about specific cases. Questions about what informs the 
subject's ability and authority to make these decisions go unasked. This is a significant 
space that threatens to dig up the foundations of Lyotard's "grounds" for ethics and 
judgment in the postmodern and serves as an important concern for my own attempt to 
bridge the either/ or dichotomy. 
II. "Or'' Habermas 
Unlike Lyotard, Jurgen Habermas works with a norm-driven basis of ethics. He 
defends the important tenets of the Enlightenment: progress, parity, and rationality are 
the important horizons of critical social theory. 7 We might then read the work of 
Habermas as a counter-statement to the skepticism of postmodernism. Habermas 
focuses on the process of creating and testing ethical norms and maintains some 
universalist assumptions. Also, he appropriates a vision of discursive space in the 
employment of some model of discourse and community in his theory. Working with an 
ideal model of a democratic society, Habermas posits the importance of a public sphere 
or community in questions of ethics and moral communication. Despite the renewed 
emphasis on discourse and community, however, the discourse models presented by 
Habermas overlook the important rhetorical matrix that this project must inevitably 
contend with. In this section, I want to examine the limits, liabilities, and contributions 
of Habermas' s work on the discourse ethics, especially the assumptions of space that 
support his ideal of the public sphere as well as what spaces are left inoperative and in-
between. 
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas observes the 
"performative contradiction" (80) of what he terms the "fallibalist" or skeptical 
position. The skeptic, as we know from the example of Lyotard, would assert that there 
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are no grounds to moral principles. In the process of arguing against the possibility of 
normativeness, Habermas cleverly identifies that in the process of constructing an 
argument, a speaker must presuppose the structure of argument. Thus, when the skeptic 
claims that there are no valid universals, she uses a structure of argument that uses 
grounds, a rhetorical move that implicitly testifies to the possibility of establishing 
grounds . There is, then, a "common ground" that can be found in the structure of 
argument; that is, the skeptic assents to grounds by negating their possibility. The only 
alternative for the skeptic, in refusing a foundationalist position, is silence. 
Habermas creates a procedure for testing the validity of ethical norms. He is 
quite adamant that his theory of the discourse ethic is not about generating ethical 
norms; rather, his goal is to find a means of testing them. "Practical discourse 
[communication about moral justification] is not a procedure for generating justified 
norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and 
hypothetically considered for adoption" ( 103). Judgment is possible in Habermas's 
moral universe because "effective communication" helps a community to achieve a 
criteria of some valid universals. Norms may be justified through a process of guided 
argumentation, but only when agreed upon by all affected by such norms. All 
participants of the discourse on norms are assumedly responsible and truthful (87). 
In effect, the discourse ethics is a type of "conduct" to be observed in the 
discussion of ethical norms. Speakers are under contract, by virtue of their 
responsibility to the social whole under democracy, to maintain the process of a 
discourse ethics (163). The logic of argumentation is the rule by which consensus will be 
achieved; the logic of argumentation is proven as the "facts of reason" (95) that help in 
justifying norms because they assumedly pre-exist discourse by forming the formal 
structure for the proceedings. Thus, reasoned argument comprises the ideal speech 
situation of the discourse ethics in which each participant has the opportunity to speak 
and contribute to the matter under discussion toward the goal of consensus . Maxims 
41 
generated by debate must be submitted to all others to be agreed upon and adopted for 
universal law (67). In this configuration, agreement is the first goal of argument, making 
consensus the goal of communicative action (134). Paradoxically, "the force of the 
better argument" must be unforced . Effective communication will eventually yield 
objectivity and impartiality as all possible objections and considerations are 
entertained. Habermas argues that "the proponents of discourse ethics rely on a type of 
argument that draws attention to the inescapability of the general presuppositions that 
always already underlie the communicative practice of everyday life and that cannot be 
picked or chosen like makes of cars or value postulates" (130). Argument, as a form of 
communicative action, "presuppose[s] those very relationships of reciprocity and 
mutual recognition around which all moral ideas revolve" (130). Argument, then, 
becomes both the practical enactment of communicative action and its foundational 
tenets. The "goods" inherent to argument transcend the subject of argumentation to 
serve as the process of negotiation as well as its goals. In other words, universal validity 
is found in argument, its rules , its presuppositions, and its rational conclusion of 
consensus. 
Even while he offers the ideal speech situation as a model of the discourse ethics, 
Habermas concedes that as an ideal, it is--to employ a geographical marker--a "road," a 
guide or means to a better end of ethical justification. This is an interesting and 
necessary concession about the ideal speech situation. Nevertheless, it is somewhat 
counter-productive in that the discourse ethics only works productively in the ideal. In 
other words, Habermas defends the discourse ethic as a valid model of discourse, one 
with fundamentally pragmatic uses and applications. His concession about the ideal 
seems more a conciliatory address to critics who might notice the impossibility, and 
consequent invalidation, of a theory of communicative action than a considered 
opposition. In short, while professing pragmatics, Habermas' s discourse ethic might 
prove to be hopelessly utopian when read rhetorically. 
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What strikes me as particularly interesting is Habermas's reconfiguration of 
argument as a process of reaching consensus, one that relies on "good" reasons and 
evidence to support claims. The assumption that all involved can speak to the 
justification of norms in the respectful, turn-taking ideal speech situation seems to 
overlook the very nature of argument as an often combatative process. Underlying 
Habermas' s theory of communicative action, furthermore, is the assumption of language 
as a transparent, non-ideological medium for transmitting ideas. This is not to suggest 
that Habermas is not aware of the ideological and rhetorical force of arguments; rather, 
he takes the political backing of arguments into consideration as he attempts to create 
an almost "rhetorically-free" theory of argumentation. While positing the validity of a 
theory of communicative action, he notes the negative appeal of a communication based 
on "strategic action," arguments that attempt to convince and persuade. In fact, 
Habermas is quite aware of argument as a rhetorical mode of discourse. He attempts to 
separate his sense of argument from Tugenhat' s equation of "argument as will 
formation" (72). In so doing, Habermas avoids politics in creating the discourse ethics. 
His presuppositions of argument are based on an ideal of neutrality and rationality, and 
the consensus assumedly derived from argument remains equivalent to rationality. By 
virtue of their place in this implicit demarcation, arguments that attempt coercion and 
persuasion might be seen as irrational and unreasoned. 
Habermas' s ideal speech situation, wherein participants adhere to the principle 
of discourse ethics, does not identify speakers in any concrete way, a consideration that 
contemporary rhetoric takes into account as the location of subjects in relation to 
discourse and audience. Habermas assumes that all participants have the means of 
communicating in a fair and equal way. What Habermas overlooks are the very real 
conditions of very real speech situations. Real speech situations are peopled with 
subjects who are constrained by the material positions of race, class, gender, and 
sexuality, to name but a few of the vertiginous (em)placements subjects occupy. More 
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importantly, Habermas does not account for the problematic of subjectivity and issues 
of authority that determine who speaks and who gets heard. Iris Young continues this 
critique of Habermas's blindness toward the rhetorical and material context of 
communicative action. She argues that dominant groups have exclusive access to 
interpretation and communication. The faceless mass that is the communicative society 
does not take this into consideration. Communicative action will, then, regardless of 
what is decided upon engagement, take on the values, norms, and ideologies of the 
dominant group. Their experience is thus presented as the norm and standard for 
humanity (Young 59). In terms of justifying norms, the norms derived from 
communicative action will merely reflect the values and assumptions of the authoritative 
group. 
In rhetorical and spatial terms, Habermas overlooks ethos, the location of the 
subject within discourse (Reynolds). Furthermore, arguments do not always hold as 
their goal consensus, nor do they always take place with each participant taking their 
tum. Real speech situations often contend with many opposing views, many of which 
are voiced more loudly than others. In the case of argument, dissensus is often the end 
product of agonistic proceedings. With the neo-Kantian equation of rationality and 
consensus, Habermas overlooks the possibilities of growth and the productivity of 
exchange when outcomes only yield dissensus in the emotional and unreasonable 
meeting of opposing views. Indeed, the very definition of productivity in communicative 
action is the continued movement in the direction of objectivity and impartiality. 
In my reading, I see Habermas risking the potential harm that the excesses of 
reason can produce in his reduction of a process of justification to the rules of logic.8 For 
example, Habermas, in refuting the performative contradiction of the skeptic who must 
use the rules of argument to argue against foundationalism, bases his refutation of this 
position on "petitio tollendi," a move in logic that "show[s] an opponent that he makes 
performative use of a tollendum, that is, of the very thing he wants to negate" (95). In 
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the abstract, the performative contradiction of modus tollendum makes perfect, logical 
sense, but in the rhetorical dimension of argumentation, it falters as the basis for 
engaging the skeptic in argument. On this point, I am merely attempting to point out 
that Habermas depends upon a highly rational organization of the rules of discourse, a 
dependence that overlooks the often messy and "irrational" basis from which many 
disputants would argue. The separation of structure from the content of argument 
inevitably bypasses the important, symbiotic relationship these two aspects of discourse 
share . I am not entirely sure we can abstract discourse, itself a highly arbitrary and 
vague signification system, to the rules of formal logic. Indeed, a rhetorical reading 
would disallow this very prospect in the assumption of language as a transparent 
medium of signification. 
Where Habermas succeeds is in his persistent attempts at placing questions of 
moral value and ethics within a social and communicative matrix as well as in the 
creation of a "logic of values" (Perelman 152). Both attempts desire to make of formerly 
"irrational" decisions of value the property of a democratic polity. 9 From the point of 
view of a rhetorician, however, he elides important questions about the "substance" of 
language. In so doing, he treats language as an objective system whose genre of 
argumentation houses the essential formula for reasoned argument. To understand 
where this sense of language comes from, we need to consider how Habermas interprets 
the role of capitalism in postponing the ideal outcome of the ideal speech situation . 
Mark Poster reads Habermas' s Communication and the Evolution of Society as a 
critique of capitalism. Habermas envisions a space ''beyond capitalism" (466) where 
communicative action will engender freedom and the deferred goal of the ideal speech 
situation. Further assumptions of this discursive space are that "(s]peaking is an effort 
to communicate and this implies ... that what the speaker says is comprehensible, that 
what the speaker says is true, that the speaker is sincere, and that the utterance fits into 
the normative context" (464-465). For Habermas, even in cases where the speaker 
45 
intends to deceive, the goal for a participant in the discourse ethics is the ideal of truth 
(465). Even as he understands that the ideal speech situation is hardly ever met in real 
conversation, Habermas defends that the inability to reach this ideal provides proof of 
the "distortions introduced into speech by social modes of domination" (465). To 
facilitate this ideal, Habermas posits the public sphere in which the conditions for 
communication and exchange are encouraged . 
In spatial terms, Habermas attempts the creation and management of a public 
sphere wherein communicative action can take place. As I have already unpacked, this 
space is created "in space," without an account of the legitimate constraints of real 
argument, not to mention the problematic assumptions of truth, rationality, and freedom 
that support such spatial practices. The "distortions" Habermas tries to weed out of 
communication ignore the socio-spatial dialectic that is culture. If we recall Edward 
Soja' s articulation of the symbiotic relationship between the social and the spatial, we 
can find further evidence of Habermas' s attempt to make of the public sphere-in 
separating social and rhetorical realities from the spaces in which they exist--an inert, 
apolitical, and ahistorical space. We might, then , read Habermas's lament for the public 
sphere as an attempt to move beyond the spatial problematic of capitalism. Soja 
identifies capitalism as the hierarchical management, fragmentation, and parceling of 
both work and class spaces (92). These spatial practices produce the networks 
favorable to "the penetration of state power into everyday life" (92). Even though he is 
attempting to recreate a liberal-democratic space of discourse, Habermas' s spatial 
contribution to a viable discourse ethics avoids the material constraints of capitalism, 
those distortions that may provide ways of managing more operative and politically-
viable spaces. 
What Habermas re-introduces to the debate on moral theory is the importance of 
the public sphere as a space for a discourse on ethics; "the public sphere is the crucial 
domain of interaction which mediates between the macropolitical institutions of a 
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democratic polity and the private sphere" (Benhabib 12). It can be an important space 
for local politics, a launch for community involvement before it attempts to resist or 
enter the larger macro-political spheres. It is a space for organization, discourse, and 
foundation. For our understanding of rhetoric and ethics, the public sphere recalls the 
importance of community. Lawrence Kimmel argues that the framing of moral choices is 
not a search for absolute imperatives, but like the goal of the discourse ethics, is a search 
for as well as an understanding of communal and contingent values. Civic participation 
is crucial to discussions of ethics. "Community becomes the space and language, the 
connective tissue of ethics and rhetoric, thought and action" (Kimmel 2). Kimmel' s 
rhetorical understanding of community and discourse leads him to argue for the re-
institution of an ancient public sphere, a place, like the Athenian polis, that would allow 
for open debate and discussion on ethics with the ethical practice of discourse that is 
rhetoric. 
Although I will not be discussing the communitarian position in this chapter, 
what I want to emphasize is the important revival of community in ethical theory, a 
move that inevitably creates spaces and spatial practices that must be maintained and 
managed within the models of democratic society offered here. Also of importance are 
the political implications of spaces and their management in light of and in reaction to 
an increasingly global sense of community. While his sense of community is similar to 
Habermas's concept of the public sphere, Kimmel's is aligned more closely with that of 
another prominent position within contemporary ethical theory, that of the 
communitarians. Foremost, however, is Kimmel' s understanding of rhetoric as the 
discursive foundation of community. In both the post-metaphysical universalist and 
communitarian positions, there is an important equation of discourse and community, a 
linkage that rhetoric, as Kimmel observes, has historically understood as fundamental in 
questions of justice and ethics. Communitarians wish to recall the Greek model of 
community in their theory of virtues. They find in the Enlightenment "the formalist, 
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ahistorical, and individualistic legacies ... which have led to the decline of community as 
a way of life" (25). In their recall of an ancient model of community, communitarians 
lament the rise of technology and capitalism that has led to the decline of civic 
participation and a splintering of foundational communities. 
Furthermore, Habermas' s vision of public discursive space assumes a fairly 
"public" agenda. In other words, discussions more often concern questions of civic 
virtue rather than more intimate investigations of personal and private ethics. Notably, 
the personal or private spaces of ethics are associated with "feminized" spaces of the 
home. While this point will be discussed further in Chapter Three, Benhabib' s 
observation of this exclusion points to the need for the creation of another kind of space, 
one that includes both private and public concerns, and one that provides us with a 
general definition of the model of space most amenable to discussions of ethics. 
"Discursive space," a model I have used throughout this discussion, is not to be 
"understood agonistically as a space of competition for acclaim and immortality among 
a political elite" (Benhabib 105). Rather, this space must be "viewed democratically as 
the creation of procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and by 
collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation" --a procedure that also 
needs to include a way of discussing private associations of ethics in a public way 
(Benhabib 105). I want now to examine the implications of the spaces created by 
Lyotard and Habermas, respectively, as they highlight the need for a space-between a 
highly subjective relativism and a foundationalist position grounded too firmly and too 
confidently in assumptions of rational discourse. 
III. Habermas and Lyotard: The Rhetorical Implications of Ethical Space 
A consistent, implicit metaphor in the theories of Habermas and Lyotard is that 
of space; that is, the creation of ethical spaces for discursive exchange or the use of 
spatial directives that will guide judgment. Lyotard uses the "guide" as a means 
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toward making ethical judgments, while Habermas' s discourse ethics assumes a public 
space that will facilitate this kind of discourse. But as David Harvey argues in The 
Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, the 
management of both space and time is a political act and must be understood in concert 
with the material changes and conditions that surround such management. While the 
management of space and time is subject to the hegemony of capitalism, spatial and 
temporal practices can reflect and aid in social practices, especially in the creation of 
more democratic practices and spaces for resistance . We need, then, to recognize that 
the meaning of space is contestable and that all attempts to stabilize and situate it must 
be addressed as ideological and political uses of space and the social life it attempts to 
manage. To this end, Doreen Massey understands the management of space as 
"attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time" (5). She 
comments that this impulse is "normal" for it betrays our need to deal with the 
"mobility and contingency of space-time" (5). 
Even as he draws upon models of discursive rationality and ethics, Habermas 
separates time from his examples of discursive space. For Habermas, time is an 
assumption that goes without any examination in terms of how the discourse ethics will 
proceed. I do not want to suggest that Habermas is completely ahistorical; rather, his 
procedural rationality ignores temporal concerns of how public spaces are mediated by 
a logic of time. 10 David Harvey observes this logic of time in terms of capitalism, noting 
shifts in commodity production as they reflect the rise of technology. Increased 
mechanization and technological advance bring with them a shift in our sense of time as 
the nature of commodity production, circulation, and appeal becomes instantaneous. 
The result is the simultaneous enactment of space-time. In the realm of ethics, such 
ephemera creates "' a temporariness in the structure of both public and personal value 
systems' which in turn provide a context for the 'crack-up of consensus' and the 
diversification of values within a fragmenting society" (Toffler as qtd. in Harvey 286). 
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The crisis of modernity--accelerated by the postmodern tum--is, then, in what Harvey 
calls space-time compression. This crisis is experienced as the "shrinking" of world 
markets and communities into a "global village," coupled with a sense of having lost 
time in the rapid mechanization of contemporary culture. The continuous present of 
postmodern time results in a curious lack of history. Commodities are manufactured in 
an ahistorical matrix, a system of production and exchange that is far removed from the 
consumer. Ironically, Habermas, working clearly in the tradition of critical theory, 
"simulates" this ahistorical quality of the postmodern in his creation of discursive 
procedures "in space" that do not acknowledge historical and temporal context. 
Habermas's remedy for this current situation is the study and re-valuation of the 
public sphere. This space operates on the socially agreed-upon concepts of consensus 
and rationality. At its root, his idea of a public sphere is a democratic discursive space. 
As Harvey observes, the modem goal of liberty and freedom, as evinced in the examples 
of Jefferson's Homestead Act and the architectural designs of Corbusier, find their 
enactment "through the construction of a highly ordered and rationalized space" (271). 
For critical theory, there is "the danger of confining the free flow of human experience 
and practice to rationalized configurations" (Harvey 253). 
If social life is to be rationally planned and controlled so as to 
promote social equality and welfare of all, then how ... [ can] 
social interaction be planned and efficiently organized except 
through the incorporation of the ideal abstractions of space and 
time as given in the map, the chronometer, and the calendar? 
(253) 
In Habermas's ideal speech situation we meet "the ideal abstractions" of subjects, social 
spaces, and time. The equal distribution of time to each member of the discursive 
community, as well as the assumed equality of all who participate, results in the 
ahistoricism of rationalized space. In its ideal state, the ideal speech situation as a 
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discursive space leads to a "pulverization" of totalized space into more democratic 
portions; that is, everyone gets a space in which to speak. Habermas' s model of ideal 
speech is consequently an ahistorical model of discourse in its bureaucratic 
rationalization of discursive spaces. Nevertheless, Harvey confers that the goal of equal 
distribution and participation born of the Enlightenment also helped to forge the space 
of revolution. The concomitant rise of capitalism and liberalism did not engender such 
egalitarian results, however. Capitalism led to a commodification of space and, later, to 
the production of oppressive space, as in the extremes of rationality that organize and 
distribute space and spatial practices as well as the fundamental inequities in labor and 
production forged by capitalism. By insuring all an equal space in the ownership of 
space, capitalism mediates this democratic entitlement and forges inequities among 
apportioned spaces (Harvey 258); we need to think only of the spatial practice of 
ghettoization to find an example of this. 
Harvey's reading of capitalism and liberalism offers a consequential, 
historicized, and material reading of the liberal discursive spaces created in Habermas. 
In effect, the totalizing tendencies of the public sphere, wherein the ideal speech 
situation can take place, fulfills the prophecy of inequity and oppression. A recall of Iris 
Young's critique of the hegemony of the elite in communicative action is useful here; those 
with the means of communication, and in an expanded reading, those with the 
ownership of space, will create the conditions for democratic polity, one that, of course, 
favors their maintenance of power. 
The postmodern penchant for fragmentation and the dispersal of totalizing 
discourses might initially look like a remedy to the hyper-rationalization of social 
spaces. Lyotard's response to the latent terror of totalization is the increased 
fragmentation of dominant narratives. "Little narratives" must be allowed to speak; 
this is the ethical imperative of Just Gaming. The political implications here rally 
around the local and often marginalized narratives that are allowed to disrupt 
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hegemony. As a discursive spatial practice, postmodernism further pulverizes space, 
but not into democratized and equally valid portions for a rational politics (Harvey). 
Rather, Lyotard's sense of space focuses on localized narratives as a reaction to the 
globalization and totalization of master narratives, including the homogenizing 
tendencies of ethical thought. In some sense, L yotard does bring in the element of time in 
his rejection of ethics as a normative base that can stand "for all time." By dismantling 
the narrative of ahistorical, transcendent norms, he opts for the contingent cases of 
judgment that occur at certain moments in time. But while time--as the aleatory and 
contingent response to representing differends--is sensitive to the impossibility of 
ahistorical norms within the postmodern, Lyotard leaves out a vital consideration of 
history. Thus, Lyotard's contribution to ethics does not provide a description or 
strategy for when one must do more than represent differends, when one must, because of 
immediate temporal and historical circumstances, respond with action. Without this 
dual sense of time as the temporal and the historical, Lyotard leaves out the component 
of action for ethics. With the emphasis on local resistance in postmodernism, and the 
consequent invalidation of universal criteria for ethical judgment, the question still 
stands as to how can we achieve an ethics. Harvey observes that such a project 
becomes even more difficult in the postmodern, because of capitalism's persistent 
spatialization of time: "Time and space both get defined through the organization of 
social practices fundamental to commodity production" (239). The social struggles over 
the management of space and time are constantly destabilized in reaction and resistance 
to capitalism's equation of space and time. "As a consequence nobody quite knows 
what 'the right time and place for everything' might be" (239) because of a constant 
instability between the dialectic of capitalism and social practices. 
Attempts to create an ethics that responds to both the perceived need of 
contemporary culture as well as the philosophical and historical considerations and 
reconsiderations of ethical theory have provided important models. These paradigms 
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work to create spaces of discourse and community, and in so doing, employ discourse 
models that, while important for discussions of philosophy, do not consider the 
rhetorical and political matrices and implications of such projects. Furthermore, in 
"neither" Habermas "nor" Lyotard do we meet a consideration of subjectivity. In his 
emphasis on narrative and judgment, Lyotard never addresses or explains his own 
understanding of the subject in relationship to judgment. Habermas' s ideal speech 
situation assumes that disembodied, equal participants have equal access to this 
discourse. Thus, a revision of kairos for rhetorical theory must not only consider space 
and time as simultaneous "events" but also the role of the subject in ethical rhetorical 
action. In both Lyotard and Habermas, the subject of ethics is either construed as a 
function of discourse in a universe void of legitimation, or as the agent who, with the aid 
of community, discourse, and consensus, can derive some universals to negotiate the 
relativism of modernity. In my revision, the subject who struggles with a vertigo created 
by the postmodern condition can find strategic points to enter conversation and 
argument and can make opportune uses of space and time. 
Toward a Kairotic Ethics 
Action involves character, which involves choice--and the 
form of choice attains its perfection in the distinction 
between Yes and No (shall and shall-not, will and will-not). 
Though the concept of sheer motion is non-ethical, action 
implies the ethical, the human personality. 
Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of Religion" 
In a world where there are no absolute rights and wrongs 
and in which for every issue there are reasonable, 
contradictory positions, how can the rhetor and his 
audience arrive at the best probable judgment? 
Michael Carter, "Stasis and Kairos: Principles of 
Social Construction in Classical Rhetoric" 
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Kairos is an important concept that directs our attention to situational contexts 
for rhetorical action. In combination with my spatial reading of this concept, the 
temporal, historical, ethical, and rhetorical foundations of kairos provide another space 
to consider in forming an ethics of rhetoric. . "As the principle of timing or opportunity 
in rhetoric, kairos calls attention to the nature of discourse as event rather than object; it 
shows us how discourse is related to a historical moment; it alerts us to the constantly 
changing quality of appropriateness" (Miller 310). The dichotomy in ethical theory 
either overlooks or ahistoricizes time or offers models of discourse that do not provide 
the most effective or rhetorically viable means for ethical rhetorical action. My rhetorical 
response to the gap created by this dichotomy is the in-between space of kairos that 
provides some "horizon" for guiding ethical action in its original emphasis on time and 
history. That is, kairos traditionally concerns questions of when might be the best time to 
speak or enter discourse. It also focuses on historicizing its own normative basis while 
paradoxically maintaining a relativistic posture. Nevertheless, little has been done to 
continue and extricate this important and elusive concept. 11 
I think we can retain some normative foundation for ethics without adopting 
universalist or ahistorical positions. With the similar goal of an ethics in-between in 
mind, Best and Kellner argue for the importance of retaining some universal norms, such 
as human rights. However, they do not ground this norm philosophically; rather, they 
argue for historicizing important norms, offering a unique temporal foundation for some 
positive values. They also identify that ethics, as a discursively and socially 
constructed body of values, issue from specific struggles rather than assumed attributes 
of human essence (242). Kairos helps to negotiate this space-between the relativist-
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universalist dichotomy in its unique ethical foundation of the imperative to act and 
respond to both historical and temporal context. My use of temporal here refers to the 
moments in discursive context that demand response; historical retains kairos' s
sensitivity to socially-established and historically-located norms that must be 
recognized in decisive, discursive action. Thus, my use of kairos draws upon the crucial 
distinction that historicizing suggests: that is, our examination of how subjects are 
called upon to occupy certain ethical positions as well as how the subject must 
adjudicate among competing claims, must include how this process takes place at 
specific moments in time and in specific cultural spaces. In other words, the guide of 
"human rights" might operate as a normative horizon in ethical judgment, but we must 
understand this imperative historically rather than as a trans-historical truth. 
The concept of kairos comes to us primarily from the Sophists. 12 Kinneavy finds 
traces of it in Hesiod's proverbs, but credits Pythagoras with the development of its 
ethical complexity "linking it closely with the basis of all virtue, particularly justice, and 
consequently civic education" (81). Gorgias and later Sophists further developed its use 
and complex meanings. In a purely stylistic sense, kairos refers to improvisation. In its 
various uses, kairos generally refers to timing, and an oversimplified definition might 
place it as "saying or doing the right thing at the right time," but further studies have 
established the complicated implications and meanings of this term. For example, 
Tillich defines kairos as a moment of time approaching "fate and decision" (129). It is 
also "capacity and precept" (Untersteiner 197). Kairos marks the "ripeness or fitness of 
the occasion; it is a 'crisis situation' that demands decision" (Kinneavy and Eskin 137). 
Kinneavy adds further Plato's amendment to kairos as "proper measure and right time" 
(88). Dale Sullivan defines it in three ways: 1) "as poetic timing"; 2) "a point of 
indecision"; and 3) "an irrational power" (319). In brief, Sullivan identifies a kairos "of 
inspiration, of stasis, and of dynamis of power" (319). Kairos sometimes means "' a 
lethal place in the body"' (Race qtd. in Sullivan 320). While the term clearly operates 
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under several nuances of meaning, it takes as its common denominator the emphasis on 
decision, occasion, and a sense of time. Sheard, adding a specifically ethical 
connotation to the term, finds that "kairos is akin to exigence and provides a method for 
deciding courses of action and for deriving probable truths in a relativistic world" (292). 
Generally and historically associated with timing, as in the right time to speak or 
intervene in discourse, kairos also has a spatial dimension. The rhetorical concept of 
kairos introduces the crucial aspect of space/ time into this discussion of ethics; it is "the 
sum of contexts, both spatial and temporal" (Sheard 29). Carolyn Miller identifies that 
kairos' s spatial dimension comes from the root of opportunity, "in the Latin porta, 
'entrance' or 'passage through' (313). The original Greek uses of kairos, in archery and 
weaving, refer to a 'penetrable opening, an aperture"' (Onians qtd. in Miller 313). Kairos 
is "a critical point in time and space" (Carter 102). Kairos allows us to look at the 
ethical situation and the subject who attempts to operate as an agent as an essentially 
ethico-rhetorical one. It also allows us to configure ethics spatially and temporally: that 
is, kairos is a response to problems that occur within specific historical moments and 
locations, that operate under moral and value assumptions of that context, and that 
come from the culture and moment from which they generate. In this way, 
considerations of time, of kairos, are inextricably bound up with questions and 
judgments of value (Sheard 296). Kairos may help to bridge a space-between the 
either/ or dichotomy by initially positing the possibility of agency and a tenable ethics 
that resists the lure of relativism, and further, by disrupting the monologic vision of 
postmodern theory that sees the subject as political and ethical nomad. Furthermore, 
kairos provides the tactical and rhetorical exigencies to act in discursively opportune 
moments by creating spaces for intervention and critique. 
In my reading, kairos is an essential component of ethics and justice. Aside from 
Sheard, however, the ethical implications and foundations of kairos have yet to be fully 
addressed and examined for what space-between they might provide. Because it 
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depends upon recognizing situations and contexts, kairos is also an epistemological 
concept. James Baumlin sees kairos as the "epistemological counterpart of decorum" 
(179). Pythagorean doctrine developed the closely related concepts of the dissoi logoi 
and kairos. According to De Vogel, "kairos implied an ethical system based on the belief 
that certain types of conduct were by nature appropriate" (qtd. in Sullivan 318). As 
"an essential aspect of determining justice" (De Vogel qtd. in Sullivan 318), kairos takes 
on its ethical implications through Pythagoras who, drawing upon the dissoi logoi, made 
it the crucial moment of choosing a break in antithesis. 
The dissoi logoi holds that "all things are composed of opposite qualities" 
(Untersteiner 304), of opposing logos. These opposing logos create a unity. Because 
neither logos of the antithesis can be an absolute claim of validity or truth, in the sense 
that both can be opposed and equally valid and true, choosing one logos over another is 
a rhetorical act (Carter 106). Untersteiner's reading identifies kairotic judgment as 
nonrational. According to Gorgias in the Funeral Oration, judgment is the crucial mid-
point between thought and action which occurs not from a "'logical law but from the 
persuasive force of logos which is released in the instant of the decision which has as its 
object ... the right thing at the right moment'" (177). In another instance, Gorgias calls 
the antithesis between the chaos and order the tragic. The instant of decision creates a 
"third space" which describes the decision of choosing one of the antithesis "while 
knowing that opposite term is by no means destroyed" (176). While formerly conceived 
as a primarily temporal concept, kairos here takes a spatial turn by becoming a space in 
time when action creates a space between the dialectic. Thus, kairos is a lateral move 
toward the space of action. Because of its immediacy, it destabilizes temporal logic by 
carving a space for action, a move that collapses the space-time dialectic into a 
simultaneously enactment of space/time (Massey). 
In terms of a kairotic ethics, Pythagorus gives further evidence of the irrational 
dimension of kairos by again referring to the dissoi logoi. The irrational lay in "the theory 
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that good and bad coincide, 'so that for some it is good, for others bad, and for some 
persons, sometimes good, sometimes bad'" (Untersteiner 305). Kairos determines the 
good and bad as virtues, not their inherent truth as virtues. "'Allis noble at the right 
moment'" (306) exemplifies Gorgias's conviction that timing is what defines actions and 
words as virtuous. Furthermore, the opposites of good and bad are easily convertible 
into one another in Gorgian kairos. The result of such relativity is Gorgias's belief that 
virtue could not be taught, a position in opposition to that held by most of the Sophists; 
others felt that good and bad are different qualities which can be defined beyond their 
kairotically-construeted meanings. Gorgias attempted "to preach" an awareness of the 
moments when choosing virtue over excess would be fit and right, focusing on "practical 
training" of the means of arousing the desire for virtue (Untersteiner 182). Gorgias, 
according to Untersteiner, did not deny "supreme ethical law" but was attempting to 
question and weaken the supremacy of absolute ethics. If we follow Untersteiner's 
defense of Gorgias, we find that ultimately the philosopher's tenuous position as an 
ethical relativist has a pedagogical purpose. For Gorgias, kairos was "the 
epistemological function of stirring up those conflicts which made objective knowledge 
impossible" (239). Thus, we need to understand Gorgias's relativist position as one 
possible interpretation of the ethical in kairos, not as the only way of using it as a means 
of guiding ethical action. Appropriately, kairos should be viewed as an epistemological 
concept that changes its varied meanings depending upon historical context and 
rhetorical purpose. 
Ethical kairos and the paradigm of the dissoi logoi, especially as developed by 
Gorgias, is open to charges of extreme relativism, not unlike those weak and somewhat 
untenable links evident in L yotard' s theory of judgment. Indeed, Gorgian kairos leads us 
to question what, then, is to guide our decisions besides the occasion, the historical 
moment, and subjective response. Furthermore, we encounter an ethical snag of basing 
justice and ethics upon the contingent circumstances of historical context and subjective 
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opinion, a base that could engender an opinion politics, a problem observed in Lyotard. 
Nevertheless, Untersteiner defends a specifically Gorgian kairos by noting that Gorgias, 
unlike Isocrates, did not think that "for the purposes of persuasion, any means is good" 
(199). 
But Gorgias does not go so far. Since he laid the emphasis on the 
'tragedy' of things, on the eternal drama [between chaos and 
order], this imposed the responsibility of the irrational 
judgement of [kairos] without allowing any surrender during 
the duration of the tragic tension to an alternative chosen by 
following the utilitarian impulse, and released from the dialectic 
of the 'tragic.' But this dialectic cannot be overcome because it is 
rooted in Being (199). 
Untersteiner suggests, albeit unclearly, that within the constant antithesis between chaos 
and order (justice and injustice, good and evil), the "irrational rupture" (Sullivan 320) in 
the conflict is the choice between conflicting opinions, and in the choice of one, "the 
opposite ... is by no means destroyed" (176). Consequently, the antithesis continues 
and a third term operates as the kairotic space of decision, the paradoxically rationally 
irrational moment of decision that is determined by the circumstances, and because 
choices are given value in specific circumstances, the negation of the other is by no means 
absolute. It is important that Gorgias sees kairos as a responsibility of judgment, an 
occasion for action that recognizes that the good in one circumstance may be evil in 
another, and in choosing one or the other, its opposite will still be valid. This "value 
contingency" describes the dialectical "tragedy of things," the awareness that both good 
and evil, justice and injustice can be defined as such within contextual spaces of time. 
The tragedy is that one must know how to use space/ time and fulfill the responsibility 
to respond to the occasion with action and decision because there are no absolute values 
that can be universally defined. They can, however, be guided by historicized norms 
that can help in forming and informing ethical decision-making. 
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Notably, the charge of skepticism that so often follows Lyotard's advance 
toward an ethics of judgment mirrors that which follows Gorgian epistemology. I think 
Untersteiner's defense of Gorgias is worth another look as we attempt to construct an 
ethics in-between. 
Gorgias is not a skeptic nor a relativist but a tragic philosopher 
and an irrationalist. Knowledge of the power possessed by the 
irrational constitutes the victory of the tragic. Man cannot resolve 
the antithesis . His thought discovers only the opposite poles in 
all propositions which try to explain reality philosophically. The 
reality reached by dialectic expresses only aporiai : this is the 
conclusion of Gorgias himself , who makes us feel above all the 
drama of the continual clash and counterclash of the extremes, 
into which every attempt to arrest the mobility of physis is 
resolved. In the increasing intensity of a close-locked struggle all 
human experiences, taking dramatic form, are brought to a 
standstill in the face of reason, which can no longer decide 
anything and therefore ends by denying on a rational basis every 
relationship between man and man, and finally all coherence 
within the individual himself. (160) 
We find echoes of this very position in Lyotard's interrogation of claims to progress and 
rationality. What we do not find in Lyotard 's relativist position is the importance of 
decision and action so central to kairos; suspending judgment in favor of representing 
differends--not unlike the Sophistic dissoi logoi--is the only discursive action taken in 
Lyotard' s postmodern ethics. What is significant in Gorgian kairos, moreover, is the 
weight given to an epistemological basis for kairotic action . But even as he defines this 
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action as irrational, Gorgian kairos has an underlying logic of its own in the process of 
rhetorical decision-making. What is "irrational" is the recognition that in choosing a 
space between the extremes, between two opposing logos, the"not chosen" is never 
negated. Unlike the speech situation proposed by Habermas, one that relies on rational 
beings and their commitment to the truth, kairotic speech situations are aware of this 
fundamental chaos of reality, what Gorgias calls the "tragedy of things," and in this 
awareness, do not assume a static truth underlying logos, but instead, heighten their 
consciousness of the historical and political moment to gauge the best opportunity for 
action. 
In cases of judgment, particularly for the Pythagoreans, "[j]ustice was defined as 
giving to each according to merit, that is, generously to those who had worked hard and 
parsimoniously to those who had shirked" (Kinneavy 87). Here, kairos concerns "merit" 
in distributional justice. While this example does not constitute a developed theory of 
ethics and justice, the criteria to be used for judgment--whether in a public court of law 
or in the everyday--depend, then, upon the criteria of judgment and must be derived 
from those situations. This latter point, however, leads us right back into the problem of 
criteria. We are still left to respond to the question of how we determine the grounds for 
judgment beyond highly localized and "hyper-spatial" guides for judgment. The 
solution to this problem is not necessarily in kairos, however, but in a more developed 
description of the subject's relationship to space and time. 
I. Kairos as Relative or Relational? 
Kairos is fundamentally a relative concept; that is, it works in response and 
relation to a specific context. But its "relativity" does not make it equivalent to 
relativism. "The relativity of kairos indicates that a circumstantial change can alter the 
evaluation of a rhetorical context" (Schwartzman 8). In other words, what is right at 
one time may not be in another; the rhetorical value of speaking at a particular time 
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increases or decreases depending on when a speaker chooses to intervene. Ironically, 
Roy Schwartzman's "A Re-examination of Kairos: Implications for Moral Accountability 
and Rhetorical Criticism" argues for an enhancement of kairos' s relativism, finding that 
most scholarship conflates two different senses of kairos as "the right time" and "just in 
time." Schwartzman attempts to tease out the more relativist implications of kairos, 
concluding that "the relativity of kairos raises some problems. If there exists no absolute 
standard for rhetorical timeliness, how can speakers be held accountable for their acts? 
Without clear standards for determining when to say what, there seems no way to judge 
a speech-act as just, unjust, appropriate, inappropriate" (10). Schwartzman is much 
more comfortable than I am with this prospect of radical contingent judgment. Because 
of this "discomfort," I want to work toward highlighting kairos as a principle that does 
retain some historicized normative foundations. 
Schwartzman' s emphasis on kairos as a relativist concept hinges upon 
distinguishing between eukairos which carries "normative overtones" of performing an 
action at the right time (2) as distinct from kairos which means "just in time" (3-4). It is 
also not to be confused with to prepon, a related concept which "represents the formal 
aspect of the epistemological context expressed in kairos" (Poulakos qtd. in 
Schwartzman 2). What Schwartzman does here is to suspend temporarily the 
epistemological grounding of kairos as "at the right time" to open up a more relativistic 
reading that is divorced from transhistorical rhetorical and ethical norms of "rightness ." 
By separating the epistemological foundation of kairos from its discursive "effect," he 
creates a space for a relativistic reading of kairos, rather than focusing on the 
philosophical foundations that inform judgment. As a result, the ethical outcome of this 
reading invests rhetors, not the philosophical and epistemological foundation of kairotic 
decision-making, "with greater moral responsibility" (12). What Schwartzman 
implicitly does here is shift kairos from questions of ahistorical prescriptions for when a 
discursive act should be taken to that of the subject's role in making such choices and 
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actions. In Schwartzman' s interpretation, the rhetor is responsible for judging 
circumstances because she is ultimately responsible for discursive acts. Schwartzman 
makes this move in his reading of Nietzsche's very rhetorical understanding of the 
responsibility to respond and act in situations and at times which require moral courage. 
For Nietzsche, freedom is construed as a moral responsibility to recognize what a 
situation calls for as well as when the moment demands that an individual act (11-12). 
Thus, the recognition of the responsibility to respond is with the speaker for "Nietzsche 
asserts that such ... failures [to act at the proper time] result from waiting passively for 
permission to act'' (12). 
What Schwartzman brings to kairos is a focus on the subject's ability to "adapt" 
to a given context and act appropriately (4) because the "absence of absolute standards 
... invests a speaker with great moral responsibility" (11). Thus, kairos is both the 
opportunity and the demand to speak, a space that must be seized to enter discourse; 
this interpretation of kairos highlights the importance of kairotic agency. It also serves to 
free ethical decision-making from the pure "determinism" of situations and contexts 
(16). The tacit assumption working in this configuration of kairos is that rhetorical time 
concerns choice and rhetorical space concerns action. Schwartzman' s shift from 
situation to a rhetor' s moral responsibility creates, however, an undifferentiated and 
somewhat unexplained vision of the subject and rhetorical agency. Since his 
understanding of kairos as a viable rhetorical concept hinges upon rhetorical and ethical 
agency-an emphasis I would like to retain for this discussion-his important reading of 
moral responsiblity needs a more developed understanding of the subject. Thus, in 
working toward a kairotic ethics, I think we need to understand kairos' s relational 
capacity without leaning too heavily in favor of its relativist implications as well as to 
develop a description of the postmodern subject that does not assume an 
overdetermined position or oversimplify the subject's approach to agency. 
63 
II. Strategic Vertigo: (Re)Placing the Subject of Ethics 
For kairos to emerge as an important concept for contemporary rhetorical theory, 
especially theories that respond to the ethical demands of discourse, questions of 
subjectivity must also be addressed insofar as they include some consideration of how 
the subject is constructed in relation to the discursive agency suggested by kairos. 
Schwartzman's work makes clear that merely shifting the responsibility of decision and 
action to the subject to endorse a relativistic reading of kairos does not fully engage with 
the implications of subjectivity and ethical decision-making. For if, as Schwartzman 
argues, there are no absolute criteria for judgment, then what authorizes the subject to 
decide and act? 
In my view, retaining kairos' s important considerations of timeliness and 
historicization as well as its spatial implications for creating a relational but not relative 
theory of ethical rhetorical action also calls for some address of just how the subject 
works within this discursive matrix. Schwartzman' s argument for the rhetor' s moral 
responsibility does not consider the problematic descriptions of subjectivity provided by 
Foucault or other poststructuralist theorists who are suspicious of any theory of 
subjectivity that does not describe and account for how choice and intervention are to be 
understood. More importantly, Schwartman does not describe or clearly articulate how 
moral responsibility authorizes intervention into a relational kairos. 
Foucault's work is useful for highlighting what adjustments must be made to a 
theory of ethical subjectivity. As I discussed in the introduction, Foucault's early 
thinking on subjectivity left out the transformative and congnizant moments that occur 
within subjectivity. His later work suggests something akin to agency in theorizing a 
transformative self, one who cannot escape moral subjectivization but who does not 
necessarily have to be determined by it. His analysis of the four modes of 
subjectivization-that is, the four means by which a subject is called upon to be an 
ethical subject--are an enactment of how ethical subjectivity is performed. This shift in 
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thinking the subject opens up a range of possibilities for thinking an ethics that does not 
pretend to ahistorical or absolutist foundations. What Foucault's late interest in ethics 
brings to this discussion is an understanding of ethical subjectivity that is not merely 
determined or determining. In other words, his own struggle to articulate an ethical 
subject that is not merely a function of discourse opens up a discussion of the ways in 
which subjects are indeed determined by ethical discourses as well as how they resist 
the (em)placements created by these discourses. In many ways, Foucault's articulation 
of the construction and resistance of an ethical self offers a description of the subject's 
relation to kairos. 
In my reading as well as my use of space/ time, the subject, while not able to 
transcend historical circumstances for a photographic stance "outside" discourse, can 
choose discursive action at certain spaces in time using historicized norms as guides in 
ethical decision-making. The subject has the transformative potential of the agent, but 
only in terms of a revised concept of space and time in the kairotic action of choice. The 
ethical subject under absolutist ethical models creates agency by "transcending" time or 
drawing upon norms that stand "for all time"; space here is inert and relatively 
unimportant. The spatial moves of postmodern or relativist ethics situate ethics in the 
"ungrounded" spaces of the local and contingent without a full consideration of time 
and historicization of some valid and valuable norms. What the either/ or dichotomy 
ignores is the creative and cognizant moments available to "vertiginous subjects," 
opportune uses of space and time that transform subjects into spatial agents. I want to 
admit, then, a description of ethical subj~ctivity that works in tandem with a kairotic 
ethics and one that helps to envision the possibility of temporal and tactical agency. 
The subject, like kairotic ethics, can be understood spatially--as having an inside 
and an outside, a "fold" that has an inside preserved by notions of the individual and 
an outside created in the external world and the discourses that create subjectivity 
(Deleuze). The self operates as a boundary between these spaces. But neither the 
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outside nor the inside is a monolithic space with uniform discourses and possibilities for 
agency. There is continual conflict between the inside and the outside that keeps their 
"fixity" or stability indeterminate. According to Kathleen M. Kirby, political and ethical 
commitments are determined by the material spaces of everyday life, "like bodies or 
countries, ghettos or suburbs, kitchens or boardrooms" (175). Discourses of agency are 
"spatial networks" (174) that offer many, sometimes conflicting "directions" for action 
and resistance. Building on the political possibilities of space offered in Adrienne Rich's 
"Notes Toward a Politics of Location," Kirby argues that the spatial orientations 
between the inside and the outside should not be strengthened or 'naturalized' as 
boundaries because this reification suggests inclusion and exclusion as well as an idea of 
the subject as an effect of the outside. She argues that "[w]e must neither collapse the 
distinctions between all the forms of space that shape our being nor entirely disengage 
them; rather, we need to work towards describing occasions on which they converge and 
reasons for why they diverge" (189). 
Kairos descibes, then, both those "occasions" when speakers enter discourse and 
the way subjects choose one discourse over another as a result of negotiating the spaces-
between the inside and the outside of subjectivity. The intersections, overlap, and 
tensions between spaces may prove disconcerting, however, for the subject who, through 
the process of rhetorically investigating ethical choices, finds competing claims on 
subjectivity, such as those made between the "kitchen [and] boardroom." So while there 
is no way of "firming up" the ground beneath subjectivity, there is a way of situating 
subjectivity in relation to kairos. My use of "strategic vertigo" describes an approach to 
the competing and often contradictory demands made on subjects. "Strategic" suggests 
action and planning; vertigo is the ongoing travel that occurs within the spaces of 
subjectivity, between the inside and the outside. In relation to kairos, strategic vertigo 
enacts the subject's position to a discursive situation and demands a strategic 
intervention, a moment in time when discursive action is demanded or needs to be 
constructed. It offers a description of the subject in relation to kairos, a consideration 
that has not been made in reconceiving kairos for rhetorical and ethical theory. Thus, I 
am not asserting a theory of subjectivity, rather a way of illustrating a speaker or 
writer's response to rhetorical situations. Strategic vertigo characterizes the spatial 
directive available in a relational approach to kairotic ethics. I want now to consider 
how to create strategies for adjudicating among competing ethical claims and what 
normative grounds can tentatively "stand firm" for a kairotic ethics. 
III. Ethics and The Space-Between 
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As a principle for guiding ethical decision-making, kairos maintains the norm of 
"demanding" some kind of discursive response, even that of silence; it is also contingent, 
presenting itself as an "opportunity" of a particular situation (Miller 314). But kairos is 
not merely responding to cirucumstances. Carolyn Miller's reading of kairos reminds us 
that kairos is not just a response to context; "we should remember that an opening can be 
constructed as well as discovered" (313). Thus kairos is not just a response to a 
situation; it can be a logical, timed intervention of "taking a space" or a stance. For 
example, Miller draws upon John Swales' s model of scientific research papers wherein 
writers use the '" create-a-research-space' model" that demonstrates a creative kairos 
(319). This model involves finding "a gap" or "a space" in the current research and then 
using that space as the exigence of one's discussion or research. While this is a model 
that is used across the disciplines, the "create a space" model provides a means of 
authorizing entry into a discussion. 
Notably, what authorizes an intervention into discourse--in either an academic 
article or an "unjust'' rhetorical context--is not only the responsibility of "bearing 
witness" to other voices in the debate, but also choosing and constructing a rhetorical 
space that demands recognition and response. Authorization comes from knowledge of 
the issue or the context that a speaker or writer is attempting to enter. Thus, the 
67 
possibility of action and choice is negotiated within the rhetorical context and may be 
created on occasions when someone must speak; this retains the relativistic notion of 
kairos. However, unlike the positions created in the either/ or ethical arguments 
examined earlier, kairos does not merely describe differends--arguments upon which no 
decision can be made for lack of an agreed upon rule of judgment. Unlike a differend, 
kairos demands action and response in either choosing a side in the differend or by 
creating another space that will allow for a break in the antithesis. Kairos allows for this 
space by appealing to a historicized norm to guide judgment and decision. In contrast 
to the discourse ethics and its transparent, hyper-logical sense of langauge, kairos is 
rhetorical context, and as such, demands recognition of both the logical and irrational 
basis used to organize and authorize other voices. But similar to Habermas' s emphasis 
on the communicative procedure of testing ethical norms, kairos is social and responsive 
to discursive demands and draws upon temporally located or historicized norms to 
guide when might be the best time to intervene or create a space. Because of the way in 
which it creates a space-between the either/ or dichotomy as well as its rhetorical and 
ethical emphasis, kairos works to fill in the topos left between these extremes. 
What Habermas and Lyotard each share is the desire for an ethical (re)tum in 
contemporary culture as well as a means of conducting a discussion of ethics in a social, 
political, and public sphere. While their attempts have wrestled with finding a rational 
and democratic means of achieving this goal, rhetoric has been offering "irrational" 
strategies to deal with the problem of ethics, the subject, and discourse. Ultimately, a 
kairotic ethics unfolds a map for a discussion of an ethical subject, one situated in a 
space-between the entrenched poles of universalism and relativism. The difference here, 
I think, is that kairos puts us closer to a more viable ethical horizon by offering a means 
of adjudicating that relies foremost on the imperative, not to philosophize, but to act. 
Considering that my project attempts to work the space-between the relativist 
and universalist dichotomy, we need to return briefly to the historical uses of kairos to 
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reach a more tenable theory of discourse and ethical action. For the Sophists, there 
exists an important link between being and knowing. Since both ontology and 
epistemology were considered relativistic in nature, their concept and use of kairos reflect 
this. The basis of a Sophistic ethic, one grounded in the awareness of antithesis, the 
constant agon between opinions, beliefs, and truths, also includes the attempt to deal 
with a relativistic universe in the best means possible. While he sets out to defend 
Gorgian kairos and ethics as an irrationalist philosophy, Untersteiner does not attend 
effectively to the problem of relativism that plagues a practical enactment of this sense 
of kairos. 
Michael Carter's work on kairos is important to re-establishing the link between 
kairos and balance, a link he makes in drawing on the work of Richard Enos. Kairos, in 
Carter's essay, is "the principle of conflict and resolution" in Gorgian rhetoric (102). 
The antithesis of the dissoi logoi is not, then, merely a struggle between opposing forces, 
the conclusion forcing the prominence of one over the other; rather, it forms a synthesis, 
a static harmony of inextricably bound opposites, the existence of which defines the 
other. Carter's review of the historical traces of kairos highlights the influence of 
Protagoras who "suggests that despite the inevitably contingent nature of knowledge, it 
is possible for the rhetor to achieve orthon, a kind of knowledge that approaches 
universal truth. The object of rhetoric ... is to determine which argument most closely 
achieves orthon, that is, which has the greater probability of truth within a community of 
listeners" (103). Selecting the best argument, the most probable, is not an easy task, one 
that relies on the rhetorical concept of kairos, "a harmony of the conflicting elements" 
(Untersteiner 72). "It is the role of the rhetor, then to guide the auditor toward 
discovering which one of these alternatives is the more probable ... kairos keeps this 
decision from being completely arbitrary by providing an ethical basis for the decision" 
(104). The ethical basis is in finding a means of acting on the stasis of the antithesis. It 
also relies on the imperative of a response to the arguments, "to break up the opposing 
69 
elements that form a rhetorical situation" (Kinneavy cited in Carter 104). The emphasis 
here is on the ethic of action, of the force with which the rhetor will choose a stand, a 
position from the antithesis (Carter 104). Thus, the "guide" toward judgment is both 
the rhetor who directs and the "harmony of resolution" that comes from decision--one 
that is further guided by a relational understanding of historical and rhetorical context--
and that focuses on the argument that bears the greater probability of truth. 
The active component of kairos is developed by Carter's reading of the 
Pythagorean doctrine that made of the antithetical forces the generative paradigm of the 
universe (102). Another perspective worth entertaining is that of Plato; even as he 
criticized the Sophists for what he read as a dangerous ethical relativism, he employed 
kairos in the development of his own ethics (Kinneavy 88). "Plato used the concept of 
proper measure and right time ... [to] construct the doctrine of virtue as the mean 
between two extremes (excess and deficiency)" (Kinneavy 88). Despite the major 
philosophical differences between the Sophists and Plato, the development of the mean 
comes from the Pythagorean doctrine of balance between antithesis, and one that is 
continued in Aristotle's ethics. What remains significant, however, is the continued 
development of kairos in classical rhetoric as well as its implications for deriving a 
kairotic ethics within the postmodern. 
To adopt kairos as a way of mediating and adjudicating competing ethical claims 
is to foreground, to use a well-worn phrase, "a politics of location" (Rich). In my 
configuration, kairos is a space in time, an irrationally rational aperture created by a logic 
and ethic of action. We cannot avoid that the spaces that prove opportune and the 
actions to intervene in a moment of ethical suspension are rhetorical as well as political 
contexts. These contexts bring with them the risks of choosing one ethic over another, 
and in so doing, actively place oneself within or without a particular group or 
identification that shares the same values. Consequently, ethical stances may involve 
social exile, the result of taking a stand or operating outside of an accepted ethic and the 
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group that supports it. There is, then, a politics of ethics that must be considered in 
using kairos to determine questions of action and value, a point I will consider further in 
Chapters Two and Three. 
If kairos is a means of adjudicating among competing ethical claims, then the 
ethical imperative of rhetoric is in creating spaces, spaces of action and decision 
informed by the better of probabilistic arguments. A kairotic ethics is about finding and 
creating spaces in time, about determining what should be done in the face of a given 
controversy. Kairos is thus a tactical exigency, one that has important implications for a 
theory of ethical resistance. As Michel deCerteau outlines, spaces are the operative, 
creative loci where people negotiate the fixed, inert categories of place. Strategies 
concern the operative ways individuals manipulate place; tactics, the means of the 
weak, involve space. Subjects take "narrative actions" to organize space (116); they act 
productively in the management and narrating of new spaces as a reaction to the 
institutional determination of places. Tactics of space deal with time and opportunity. 
Like the dissoi Iogoi that demands resolution of the antithesis, tactics "boldly juxtapose 
diverse elements in order suddenly to produce a flash shedding a different light on the 
language of a place and to strike the hearer" (37). Like kairos, tactics are, then, a means 
of dealing with time and opportunity as well as a means of resisting the political 
impositions of place. 
I think deCerteau' s configuration of space and place has important implications 
for kairos, especially in developing kairos as a tactic for ethical decision. What I want 
briefly to emphasize here is the fundamentally, and overlooked, political dimension of 
kairos as well as the tactical management of spaces in time that create an ethics of 
resistance. Notably, David Harvey recalls the revolutionary potential of space as it was 
organized by democratic thinkers. Quoting Ozouf, Harvey notes the transgression of 
exlusionary spaces in the creation of revolutionary space during the French and 
American Revolutions: "the revolutionaries 'saw space and time as an occasion' to 
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construct a ceremonial space that was the equivalent of the 'time of the Revolution"' 
(257). Harvey blames capitalism for exploiting and de-politicizing these democratic 
spaces, but his description of those opportune moments and spaces relies on a kairos of 
action. Furthermore, Harvey brings to kairos the important political potential that 
revolutionary and even impudent uses of kairos develop. The following chapter will 
examine the ethics and tactics of resistance embraced by the ancient Cynics, a nomadic 
group of philosophers who provide an example of how a kairotic ethics works within a 
political framework. 
K.airos recognizes that ethical choice and action occur at specific moments--as 
rhetorical time. K.airos focuses less on the rational account of deriving an ahistorical or 
universalist ethics and more on the discursive spaces available at moments when a 
speaker or writer might best intervene. Rhetoric, as both the method and the context of 
discourse, and kairos, as the concept of creating spaces in time, offer tactics to negotiate 
the space-between an either/ or dichotomy for thinking ethics. The latter in its 
awareness of qualitative time and action, and the former in its political, discursive, and 
social foundations, provide a working context for a theory of an ethical subject. In this 
configuration, the subject-as-agent makes use of spaces in time to create moments of 
exigence. Guided by the ethical and juridical backbone of kairos, the subject looks for 
"signposts" of the mean and the resolution of decision among vertiginous positions. In 
so doing, the subject asserts a location, a space that while active and contradictory, 
provides some ground from which to act--even if for the moment. 
Chapter Two 
Cynic Rhetoric: The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance 
I will not serve that in which I no longer believe whether it call 
itself my home, my fatherland, or my church: and I will try 
to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can 
and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I 
allow myself to use--silence, exile, and cunning. 
Stephen Daedalus, 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
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Like his mythical namesake, Stephen Daedalus chooses "other" arms that will 
free him from the conventions of a politically and artistically suffocating Ireland, opting 
for the hostile position of one who either chooses or is forced into taking a position on 
the outside, an exile, one who must use "cunning" arts for expression. In this way, 
Stephen shares a discursive position with the Cynic philosophers of fourth-century 
Greece. And like the Cynics, he chooses weapons that place him in the paradoxical 
position of one who struggles with the very culture from which he attempts escape. In 
choosing the position of exile, the artist as well as the philosopher reconciles herself to a 
place outside the familiarity and safety of home, city, country, and national affiliation. 
Exile, however, can be an operative space. In the case of the Cynic and his philosophy, 
this location--beyond the safety of citizenship and its attendant rights and privileges in 
the polis-offered freedom for resistance. Through recovery of the examples and tactical 
rhetorics practiced by the ancient Cynics, we can understand their philosophical and 
political tenets, a project that will yield a number strategic positions for both rhetoric 
and ethics. 
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This chapter is an attempt to recuperate Cynic rhetoric and ethics, an 
investigation that points to the historical linkage between these terms. My purpose in 
highlighting this connection is not to transplant this linkage to our own historical period 
as a remedy for the gradual divorce of rhetoric and ethics, a topic I dealt with more 
thoroughly in Chapter One. Rather, my purpose is to understand better and historically 
how ethics, politics, and rhetoric functioned in Cynicism as interrelated poles rather 
than, as in the contemporary case of our culture, as distinct, competing concepts. To do 
so means that I will also be reading how the ethics and politics translated into rhetorical 
tactics. The Cynics provide a model, although not necessarily one we can fashion for 
our contemporary needs, of a public discourse on ethics. In particular, a rereading of the 
Cynics provides an important but overlooked history that harbors some strategic ethical 
positions for rhetoric. In the Cynics, we find the possibilities of rhetorical resistance as 
well as spaces and places from which speakers and writers who remain at the margins 
can launch critique, those minority voices that get subsumed and silenced under the 
monolith of majority "conversation." This is an important "tradition" of Cynic 
rhetoric; it operates always from the margins, taking its model from their forced or 
chosen exile. It foregrounds the political by calling attention to the inequity in both 
speech and discursive situations. Cynic tactics are impolite and disruptive, for, as 
Hodge and Mansfield confer, "if you are a minority, you have to shout to be heard" 
(199). It disperses the centrality of logic in philosophy and rhetoric by operating by a 
logic of its own, one that uses parody and satire to question accepted norms. It uses the 
body and accounts for desire in constructing its ethics; it is, as Edward P. J. Corbett 
describes, a "muscular" or a ''body" rhetoric (105). It is a "closed fist" rhetoric that is 
at once persuasive and potentially coercive in its "ethos of action" (99). 
The Cynics' remains survive in the the anecdotal history of Diogenes Laertius. 
While they did write prolifically in various genres, only the Cynic epistles remain 
available, and even these are of questionable authorship. 13 In a figurative sense, the 
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letters form a palimpsest over which later Cynics left their signature, until the possibility 
of identifying "single" or "true" authors becomes impossible. Consequently, with only 
the trace of earlier writings and a predominantly oral tradition, assembling a definitive 
history of Cynicism becomes nearly impossible. For earlier scholars, this proved to be a 
weak point in ascertaining the legitimacy of Cynicism as a philosophical school. 
A.A. Long places Cynicism under under the historical rubric of Hellenistic 
philosophy and considers it the minor ,forerunner of Stoic and Epicurean schools. Long 
suggests that Cynicism is the foundation of Stoic philosophy into organized principles 
(8). Such critics as Dudley discuss Cynicism as an anarchic array of contradictory 
tenets, and for this incongruity, cannot be taken "seriously" as a Hellenistic philosophy. 
In terms of Cynic rhetoric, the same omissions apply. George Kennedy's A New History 
of Classical Rhetoric contains a chapter specifically on Hellenistic rhetoric with _ 
discussions of Stoic and Epicurean branches; he does not mention a specifically Cynic 
rhetoric. I attribute this omission to the lack of extant manuscripts to corroborate a 
definitive rhetorical doctrine. Since Cynicism is not generally considered a philosophical 
or rhetorical "school," such omissions are inevitable. 
Nevertheless, the advent of poststructuralism and the recuperation of Nietzsche 
have recently brought philosophers "back" to the Cynic legacy of negation aad their 
quest to enact "the transvaluation of all values." Leif E. Vaage and Horst Hutter 
examine Cynic practices with a contemporary understanding and appreciation of the 
subversive potential of this legacy, especially as it provides an alternative voice in the 
philosophical tradition. R. Bracht Branham' s "Defacing the Currency: Diogenes's 
Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism" is the most fully articulated, serious engagement 
with Cynic rhetoric. Consequently, I will be drawing upon his identification of Cynic 
tropes and strategies. Unlike Branham, though, I will attempt a more integrated 
discussion of Cynic rhetoric and the attendant political and ethical motives that 
underscore their rhetorical repertoire. I want to note here, however, that the subversive 
qualities of Cynic rhetoric--its experiment with exile, its tactics of parody, play, and 
diatribe--share some ground with radical literary strategies associated with 
postmodernism. Because of this and the critical trend to celebrate the relationship 
between Cynicism and postmodernism, I will be examining these tactics guardedly to 
avoid celebrating rhetorical tactics that must be read with a keen eye to the specific 
historical, political, and rhetorical contexts in which they surfaced. 
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Cynicism is, however, a recuperable tradition, one that with closer scrutiny offers 
the contemporary reader creative links with an ethical past as well as important legacies 
of rhetorical tactics. The Hellenistic period has often been bypassed as a period 
meriting little scholarly inquiry because classical rhetoric and philosophy look to Plato 
and Aristotle as the touchstones of tradition (Long). Cynicism is also often read as the 
precursor of modem Christianity, a move that further occludes some of its singular 
contributions, but one that paradoxically provides evidence of its emerging importance. 
With their emphasis on the ethical practice of askesis or acesticism, the Cynics could 
quite easily be (mis)read as early Christians. Indeed, the image of the exiled 
philosopher, preaching to those who would listen, wearing the pauper's garb of a single 
cloak and carrying a staff, recalls descriptions of Jesus Christ and the first apostles. 
While both share some philosophical ground, the association of the Cynicism and 
Christianity--in the facile description of Cynicism as a model for Christianity--overlooks 
the layers of historical and cultural change that find their way into the (re)writing of the 
narrative of Cynicism, especially after the arrival of Christianity in the ancient world. 
For example, we find in Epictetus's Discourses of the first century AD an interpretation 
of the Cynic way of life that is clearly influenced by Christianity. "For this too is a very 
pleasant strand woven into the Cynic's patterns of life; he must needs be flogged like an 
ass, and while he is being flogged he must love the men who flog him, as though he were 
the father or brother of them all" (Book III, 50-55; 149). The Christian imperative to 
forgive one's persecutors is not a distinguishable tenet of Cynicism of the fourth and 
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third centuries BC. However, some of the basic tenets of Cynicism are analagous to a 
Christian ethic of suffering and redemption. Antisthenes, the "first" Cynic, considered 
"painful effort and sturdily borne vicissitudes ... [to be] a path to arete (virtue)" 
(Rankin 134). Antisthenes, unlike the early Christians, concerned himself with virtue in 
an ethical sense for its own end, as opposed to the Christian emphasis on forgiveness 
for redemption and salvation in the afterlife. 
In tracing the relationship of Cynicism to other philosophical and rhetorical 
schools, we can identify some interesting and important legacies. In my view, the Cynics 
present us with an interesting merger between the historically-opposed fields of rhetoric 
and philosophy in their enactment of theoretical principles. Theoretically, they merge 
the Socratic emphasis on ethics with the Sophistic emphasis on action Garratt 50). H.D. 
Rankin identifies further influences of the Sophists in the Cynic endorsement of 
"naturalism" and their support of pan-Hellenism (183;187). Notably, Antisthenes was a 
student of Gorgias and later of Socrates. The figure of Diogenes of Sinope stands, 
however, as the key figure of Cynicism. Other notable Cynics include Crates, Menippus, 
Bion, and Hipparchia, the subject of Chapter Three. 
At their best, the Cynics are a model of Benhabib's "social critic" (227) whose 
critical stance requires "a necessary distantiation of oneself from one's everyday 
certitudes" (227). The process of "distantiation," of finding a space and a means of 
challenging "the certitude of [the critic's] own way of life" will yield alternative 
tradition(s), culture(s), and societies because, like the Cynic's impudent stance, these 
traditions cannot form "without interaction, collaboration, confrontation and exchange" 
(my emphasis, Benhabib 227). And like the exile and expatriate, the social critic has a 
vocation to continually "leave home" to find the distance, the space, to learn and to 
teach, but this distance is always in relation to a perceived interior; there is ultimately, 
and paradoxically, no "pure" space of exile. 
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By virtue of the ethical imperative of discursive agency, Cynicism negotiates 
multiple rhetorical spaces, and in so doing, fashions an arsenal of "hit and run" tactics. 
Positioned on the outskirts of culture, the Cynic parrhesiast---one who speaks openly and 
at great risk--creates the space to speak out. Coupled with their emphasis on ethics and 
action, Cynic tactics, along with others of their repertoire, have a transformative effect. 
Diogenes of Sinope is the most famous embodiment of the ethical and rhetorical 
imperative to find a space on the "outside" of the polis and speak out (of turn). 
Hounding the Polis: Diogenes of Sinope 
On being asked by somebody, 'What sort of man do you consider 
Diogenes to be?' 
'A Socrates gone mad,' said he. 
Diogenes Laertius 
Above all, Cynicism, as embodied in the example of Diogenes, was the 
enactment of tenets of action, of ways of living. Using Diogenes of Sinope as a singular 
representative of Cynicism, I want to trace some of the beliefs and motives behind 
Cynic action in the rhetorical repertoire employed by them. To understand it fully in its 
history and its implications for rhetoric, we must "read Cynicism off" the anecdotes, 
practices, tactics, and insights unearthed through excavation. Unlike their predecessors 
the Sophists, nothing remains of their philosophy of language, although their tactical 
rhetoric, as well as their connection to the Sophists, provides some reliable clues. 
Furthermore, since much of the extant work on the Cynics attempts a stable, coherent set 
of philosophical and rhetorical principles, many historians and philosophers have either 
minimized their significance or homogenized their theory of action into a neat bundle of 
easily identifiable and over-simplified tenets. However, the creativity and contradiction 
endemic to historiography affords us multiple readings and uses of Cynicism rather than 
-
attempting a positivist reading of a strange and divergent history. Foremost in my 
reading, as well as in the school of Cynicism itself, is the importance of contradiction 
and how antithesis can provide productive tensions in any rhetorical dicta. 
Born in and later exiled from Sinope, a coastal city of the Black Sea, Diogenes 
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( 404-323 BC) remains the most notable, and in many readings, the most infamous Cynic. 
In fact, it is mostly through what little survives of him and his life that we know about 
Cynicism. While the details of his exile remain somewhat occluded, either Diogenes or 
his father was found guilty of theft in "adulterating the coinage" (Lipsey 52). Most 
accounts corroborate that a crime did take place; whether Diogenes or his father was 
found guilty of the crime remains unclear. Roger Lipsey suggests that Diogenes's crime 
was a "misinterpretation of the Delphic oracle that urged him to make his reputation by 
'giving a new stamp to the common currency' --advice that in later years he would 
vigorously follow but in his youth may have taken materially" (52). In his later years, 
Diogenes would intepret the oracle's advice to the imperative of "reminting the coinage." 
In its figural enactment, "reminting the coinage" became the mantra of Diogenes and his 
followers as they attempted the transvaluation of values. Tied to their almost complete 
emphasis on the ethical, changing the value of cultural currency through the public 
indictment of corruption and excess became one of the central tenets of Cynicism. 
"Remint the coinage" became the Cynic slogan, and it meant an open attack on accepted 
ideas and conventions. 
The result of Diogenes's crime, however, was exile from Sinope, and exile in 
fourth-century Greece meant that the privileges of citizenship--the right to vote and to 
speak freely on politics--were stripped from the citizen. Notably, relatively few persons 
held full citizenship in ancient Greece. While the requirements varied between them, 
most individual city-states mandated that a citizen had to be a free-born, propertied 
male; women, slaves, and exiles were excluded from the political polis. Consequently, 
without the rights of citizenship, the exile became a political pariah. This point will 
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become increasingly important as I trace the tactical rhetorics adopted by the Cynics 
later in this chapter; for now, though, it is important to note that political stature--at 
least in conventional terms--was not available to the exile, whether that position was 
chosen or imposed. Nevertheless, Diogenes used the stance of exile to launch the 
invective of cultural critique for which he is remembered. Although he wandered freely 
throughout Greece, he spent most of his time in Athens, where he found an audience for 
his caustic diatribes against the excesses of wealth and the hypocrisy of political 
leaders. 
After demanding to work as a student of Antisthenes, Diogenes coined this 
branch of "Socratic sophistry" after kynos/kyon-or the dog. Diogenes gained renown for 
his public displays of Cynic naturalism in shameless exercise of his bodily functions 
which enacted the "doglike" lifestyle to which he and his followers had professed 
allegiance. Laertius provides numerous examples of Diogenes's shamelessness as well 
as accounts of his witty repartee with outraged Athenians who recoiled from these 
displays. Once, when observed masturbating in the marketplace, he wished "it were as 
easy to banish hunger by rubbing the belly" (71). He lived in the agora, using only a tub 
for shelter. For possessions, he had but few: a worn cloak, a staff, a small wallet, and 
if needed, a few eating utensils. He relied only on the generosity of the Athenians for his 
daily bread, who, in return, appeared to maintain a benevolent tolerance for his antics, 
the way a community will simultaneously abhor and protect its mad: Laertius recalls 
Athenian courtesy in replacing Diogenes's tub when a group of students destroyed it. 
Because their philosophical tenets were part of a larger topoi of action, Cynicism 
operates more as a motivated rhetoric than a philosophical school. In short, it is 
because their philosophical principles rested upon action rather than abstraction that an 
organized body or philosophical school becomes difficult to organize and study. In one 
memorable example of this, Diogenes, in response to the stated impossibility of motion, 
proceeded to stand up and walk to oppose such theoretical argumentation (Dudley 21). 
80 
Thus, foremost in Cynic thought is the commitment to "the shortcut to 
philosophy," whereby all who were interested in discoursing and acting upon 
philosophical principles were invited to do so. This shortcut could be accessed through 
action rather than philosophical doctrine. In another connection with the Sophists, 
Branham observes that Isocrates "also shunned theory as remote from the exigencies of 
moral experience" (338). Thus a second tenet of Cynic thought is the principle of action 
and living. The emphasis on action rather than dialectic and introspection, publicized 
an ethos of the individual, one that was open to every weakness of hypocrisy. Branham 
reiterates the active imperative that underscores the Cynic's skepticism of abstract 
argument for "the test of truth is less a matter of logical finesse than of the philosopher's 
ability to practice persuasively what he teaches" (337). 
In addition to maintaining the importance of an ethos of speaking and action, the 
Cynics's free distribution of practice was an attempt to democratize "the good life" that 
might be demonstrated by Cynic practice. Foremost they held the belief that virtue 
could be taught, mirroring the trend of Hellenistic philosophy to appeal to a group 
beyond those enclaves of classical philosophical schools (Long 6). At the same time, 
this "open admissions" policy toward philosophy helped to democratize education to 
all who were interested, men and women alike. They argued that the excesses of 
materialism in wealth and gluttony were social evils to be avoided. The stark examples 
of an unequal polis, one wherein the slave and freeborn could not share a common sense 
of freedom and justice, were used in reasoning for a skeptical view of civic participation. 
The Cynic political stance attempted to operate on the fringe of political culture rather 
than in its center to highlight the exclusions of the polis and the rewards given the 
corrupt. Unlike Aristotle, Diogenes "attacked the city-state as an institution by 
advocating an ascetic life based upon 'human nature,' the rationality of which was at 
variance ... with the practice of Greek society" (Long 4). As a consequence, Diogenes 
positioned himself in antithesis to civic conventions of democracy, a move that 
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indirectly drew attention to the contradictions of democracy that existed within the 
polis, even in the example of the exile himself. Cynic action and asceticism was an 
attempt to balance inequities and to provide an example of the ethical life. Freedom, the 
supreme "good" of Cynicism, was from the possessions of nation, material excess, and 
social convention. On the level of the everyday, the Cynic rejected the standards of 
propriety that banned him from eating or bathing in public, to name but two of the often 
exercised liberties of the Cynic way of life. 
In the Cynics, and more specifically in the characters of Diogenes, and later, 
Crates and Hipparchia, we find a radical ethic of the political put into rhetorical 
practice to test the limits of a philosophy of action. As Donald Dudley indicates, 
Diogenes's ideal state is one in which weapons would be considered useless and coinage 
was to be abolished in favor of bone currency (36). This ideal community would rely 
further on the good and virtuous. Other systems of exchange would also be 
transformed; women were to hold equal status with that of men. While this may seem a 
gratuitous admission on the part of the Cynics, they were one of the only philosophical 
schools that allowed women to participate. As Dudley qualifies, 
It seems almost certain that the Republic of Diogenes, like that of Plato, 
dealt with the position of women. They were to wear the same dress as 
men, and to exercise nude in public, as at Sparta; they were to be held in 
common. The only marriage he recognized was the union of the man who 
persuades with the women who lets herself be persuaded. And for this 
reason he thought that children should be held in common. If Philodemus 
is throughout drawing on the writings of Diogenes, we gather that 
intercourse was to be permitted without restriction of place, person, or 
sex. It goes without saying that all distinctions of rank and birth were to 
be abolished. Such appears to have been the 'ideal state' of Diogenes. 
That it might be realized he carried on a violent opposition, not merely to 
the customs and conventions, but to the ordinary business of existing 
communities. (Dudley 37) 
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Diogenes's ideal community upholds the eradication of economic privilege and 
the support of communal culture. His goals of economic and class emancipation struck 
right to the root cause of basic inequity: to end equality alter the economy of exchange. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most strategic for my purpose of excavating an ethics and 
practice of resistance, the Cynics demonstrated a public exercise of resistance to social 
conventions. In flouting the norms of acceptable conduct, Diogenes and his followers 
sought not only to shock members of the polis from complacency and acceptance, but 
also to force a critique of accepted norms. 
As a wandering band of philosophers, the Cynics rejected firmly-entrenched 
notions of nation and allegiance to city-state, exploiting their positions as exiles by 
endorsing a cosmopolitanism reminiscent of the Sophists. Laertius recalls Diogenes's 
idea of commonwealth: "[t]he only true commonwealth was, [Diogenes] said, that 
which is as wide as the universe" (75). In this way, their work, while masquerading as a 
benign philosophy and chronicled in history as an aberrant philosophical school, was a 
highly political movement against the abuses of social and economic excess as well as a 
critique of Greek life and its governance. "This was the gist of his [Diogenes's] 
conversation; and it was plain that he acted accordingly, adulterating currency in very 
truth, allowing convention no such authority as he allowed to natural right, and asserting 
that the manner of life he lived was the same as that of Heracles when he preferred 
liberty to everything" (73). 
Dudley calls the Cynics and their radical practices of resistance, at their best, a 
form of "benevolent anarchy" (37), but clearly not a viable political system (37). What 
we cannot overlook is the potential of such "anarchic" practices, albeit within certain 
constraints. We need also to consider the political climate in which such practices begin 
to take place. Cynicism finds its exigence in Antisthenes and Diogenes, the latter of 
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whom was born shortly after the Peloponnesian War. With the increasing complexity of 
everyday life and the negotiation and emergence of democratic communities, a post-war 
Greece saw the gradual divergence of politics, philosophy, and economics, three poles 
that were once intricately connected in public life (Botsford 415). Also at this time, 
Periclean law afforded citizenship only to those having Athenian parents (416). With 
Alexander's expansion of the empire later in the fourth century, we find a gradual 
decline of city-states and local politics. Such a shift gave some influence to an increasing 
focus on the individual, rather than the individual's responsibilities to the polis, one who 
needed to replace a democracy built on genial humanism with a practical philosophy to 
negotiate a hostile world. In my reading, Cynicism is situated within this change, 
especially in its practical attempts to draw attention to the increasingly isolated poles of 
the economic, political, and philosophical--or in the terminology with which I began, the 
ethical and political. And while my historical sketch is an oversimplification of the 
political changes of the fourth century, I am attempting to give some account of the 
rhetorico-political contexts Cynicism had to negotiate. Furthermore, the historical 
narrative of this century is not nearly as tidy as I am making it; Greek governments, 
which varied among city-states, balanced between oligarchy and democracy, and at 
different times, weighed heavily in favor of one or the other. What becomes most 
strategic in this political philosophy, however, is the rhetorical legacy left by the Cynics. 
As R. Bracht Branham asserts, the sheer legacy left by the Cynics is demonstrated proof 
of their rhetorical force (127). 
Nevertheless, in the example of the Cynics, and in particular, Diogenes's rather 
"mad" refusal to conform, we confront the limits of valorizing the kind of behavior that 
we would today classify as simply socially unacceptable, not politically radical. 
Because of this, we should keep in mind both the structure of the Athenian polis and the 
historical context in which these behaviors appear. In other words, we would not now 
endorse public masturbation as a radical rhetoric or an ethical stance. Invoking the 
84 
obscene has limited, although practically useful, potential; I think we need to consider 
always the kairotic opportunities within which these tactics may be useful and when they 
may be labeled obscene or insane gestures that are disregarded as such. Therefore, I 
present these anecdotes about Diogenes to show to what extent his socially-
unacceptable behavior was the performance of philosophical doctrine by a man we 
would generally consider quite sane. At the same time, I do not want to discount the 
models of moral courage they provide for our contemporary scene. I think a legacy of 
Cynic ethics and tactics circulate in contemporary life, but they take more socially-
acceptable, less "scatalogical" forms. To give evidence of this, I conclude this chapter 
by providing one example of how the Cynic tactic of silence is appropriated by a 
marginalized group to give a more productive, less easily-dismissed example of Cynic 
rhetoric. 
Resistant Rhetorics 
The Cynics used a wide range of rhetorical tactics in their political practice. 
Parrhesia, diatribe, chreia, satire, and parody and schema (skhema) are the predominant 
modes employed in Cynic rhetoric. Branham adds that they also used epistolary forms, 
memoirs, lectures, treatises, and symposia in their repertoire, not unlike most 
philosophical schools of the day, as well as adding new, hybrid forms. 
[T]he Cynics struck out in new directions both by transforming 
the traditional material of myth in burlesques and parodies and 
by renovating traditional forms such as the proverb (or gnome), 
to which they gave a Cynic stamp that would remain a 
permanent feature of aphoristic writing. But they didn't stop 
there; they also developed new or marginal forms in both prose 
and verse as well as the peculiarly Cynic mixture of the two 
associated with Menippus (and Lucian) .... turning low or extra-
literary genres such as the will or the diary into full-scale literary 
productions with satiric motives. (333) 
85 
For my purposes, I would like to read rhetorically what Branham identifies as 
"literary." What both Branham and Vaage skirt in their analysis of Cynicism and its 
attendant tactics is the inherently rhetorical and political purposes of the Cynic 
repertoire . Even though both are discussing Cynic rhetoric, the implications garnered 
from such analyses remain "textual," in the sense that the possibilities of transgression 
stay within an economy of genre; I want to locate the possibilities of transgression and 
resistance textually and culturally--to take the rhetorics they read a bit further. 
However, I do not want to suggest that neither addresses the political matrix of 
Cynicism. In fact, both argue Cynicism and its tactics are transgressive modes of 
engaging with popular audiences to question and critique social norms. To this end, I 
want to take their initial, and quite engaging, analyses of Cynicism to the next level of 
rhetorico-ethical strategy, especially in terms of what rhetoric and composition can gain 
from studying these "tactical rhetorics" as we wander through our classrooms, much like 
the fourth-century Cynics, and attempt to give students some range of operative 
political stances from which to speak, write, and critique. To focus only, then, on the 
transgressive literary practice evinced in Cynic rhetoric elides what I see as a more 
expansive, lateral move toward the rhetorical and ethical. 
It is in the pairing of their verbal and visual tactics that the Cynics find their 
rhetorical efficacy. In effect, their rhetorical practices as well as their corporeal 
enactment of their political stances foreground what Elspeth Probyn discusses as the 
"the politics of articulation ... the articulation of where we speak from" {510). By 
engaging in the "rhetorical rights" available to only freeborn male citizens (Flynn 103), 
the Cynics transgressed the limits of their assigned places in the polis as exiles, 
articulating an identity of exile in the discursive act of speaking "out of place." 
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Parrhesia, the practice of free and open discourse, is of the highest order in Cynic 
rhetoric. Coupled with Diogenes's philosophical belief that '"the most beautiful thing in 
the world ... [is] [f]reedom of speech" (Laertius 71), parrhesia was the tactic that forced 
the possibilities of agency and resistance. 
I. Parrhesia 
Despite its multiple uses and changing contexts, 14 parrhesia generally means 
freedom of speech, the practice of frank and open discourse. In a negative sense, it 
means a license of tongue or "loose-tongued" (Isocrates Busiris). It is often used to 
implore students and speakers to speak openly and without reserve during discussions 
of philosophy (Isocrates Antidosis ). While they employed parrhesia in a pedagogical 
sense of constructing an environment wherein all would feel free to speak, without 
ideological impediment to silence or constrain speech, the Cynics more often used this 
tactic in an overtly political sense to speak openly to leaders and others with power to 
note their hypocrisies and excesses in government, especially when deeds did not 
conform to the stated goals of the democratic city-state. For example, several stories 
circulate concerning the meeting of Alexander and Diogenes and help to illustrate 
political parrhesia. As Laertius relates, "When he was sunning himself in the Craneum, 
Alexander came and stood over him and said, 'Ask of me any boon you like' To which 
he replied, 'Stand out of my light."' (41). In this example, we meet the Diogenes who is 
not afraid to banter with the likes of Alexander, opposing power with courage. In this 
way, parrhesia becomes a political practice used to question and critique not only social 
injustices and unethical practices but the political authority of leaders. It is, then, a 
more politically and rhetorically situated practice than Vaage would have us read. He 
asserts that in its multiple uses, parrhesia was either "tasteless talk" (28), and at its best, 
"highly spiced [talk] ... with wit and denunciatory verve" (29). 
Thomas Flynn, in "Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at the College de 
France," observes that parrhesia was the right of every Greek citizen; for the exile, the 
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loss of this right proved to be a painful exclusion from democratic politics (Flynn 105). 
In effect, exile stripped an individual of his political rights within a democracy; I use the 
masculine pronoun exclusively here because citizenship rights, such as voting and 
parrhesia, did not extend to women, slaves, and exiles. These exclusions carefully 
sidestepped the concerns and voices of those a patriarchal majority did not consult in 
distributing power in the polis. Thus, the advantages of citizenship were available 
largely to the wealthy, educated-male elite. As the basis for power increasingly weighed 
in favor of wealth in the later fifth and early fourth centuries, power within the polis 
became increasingly negotiable . Those who were formerly excluded now, because of the 
commensurate rise of democracy and an emerging capitalism, were allowed positions of 
power. With the shift from birth to capital, came the emerging Greek democracy. 
Nevertheless, as Flynn observes , "democratic parrhesia was criticized by the aristocracy 
in fourth-century Athens because it gave freedom speech to the masses" (106). This 
contradiction between the goals of the democracy and the desires of those with power 
was "not only an expression of class interest; it revealed a perceived structural 
incompatibility between parrhesia and democracy that challenged Greek political thought 
for generations" (Flynn 105). Appropriately, however, the Cynic ignored the constraints 
of this speech situation by exercising his right to parrhesia. 
Thus, the right of parrhesia becomes more and more valuable as the Greek world 
moved from a democracy back to an autocracy in the Hellenistic period . First with . 
Philip and then with Alexander, the freedoms afforded to a democratic polis withered 
under the expansion and consequent colonization of the empire. While the study and 
use of rhetoric did not wane during the Hellenistic period, George Kennedy notes the 
opportunities for deliberative rhetoric were scarce (81). With the rise of autocracy came 
the consequent decline of democratic venues for rhetoric. This change marks an 
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important break with a previous tradition of rhetoric that had its origins in the 
democratic government. Notably, the public discursive space of parrhesia transformed 
into the spaces of law courts as forensic rhetoric grew in popularity and practice 
(Kennedy 81-82). As a result of such social and political change, parrhesia was exercised 
under increasing censure. Greece's changing political context only drew attention to 
restrictions on speech and civic participation. Nevertheless, the Cynic practice of 
parrhesia continued to outrage and incite throughout the Hellenistic period and was 
carried on through such notable Cynics as Crates, Hipparchia, and Bion. 
Thomas Flynn's chapter in The Final Foucault stands as one of the few 
investigations of parrhesia. In it, Flynn examines parrhesia as a philosophical practice of 
truth-telling, whereby a speaker had to meet specific rhetorical conditions for parrhesia. 
These included belief in the truth being stated and the fear of violence due to speaking 
(103). Moreover, Flynn's work attempts to explain the influence of Cynicism on 
Foucault's late turn to the aestheticization of the self. Because of this focus, Flynn's 
account addresses the philosophical imperative to live a true life by practicing parrhesia 
as a means of accounting for oneself and telling the truth of this self. In my view, Flynn's 
work is necessary to understanding Foucault's appropriation of Cynic doctrines, like 
parrhesia, as well as his turn to the self in and as a result of discourse. 
According to Flynn, with Plato's influence, parrhesia, as a political virtue 
available to all, became more and more the property of philosophy, and under this 
rubric, carried an assumed air of the "apolitical." Flynn is not suggesting that Plato 
ignored the politics of parrhesia in appropriating it for philosophical reflection and use. 
Rather, Plato was quite aware of the problems and vicissitudes of allowing all to speak 
in a democratic forum. Indeed, Plato's ideal state differed greatly from that of Diogenes: 
A sort of eugenic policy of the Republicreplaces Diogenes's rejection of rank and birth in 
assigning social roles. Where freedom is the greatest good for the Cynic, efficient 
management of the polis according to those best suited for specific positions is the goal 
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of the Platonic state. 15 Plato feared that the masses would not think in terms of "what 
was best for the polis" (Flynn 105) but of "the desires of the crowd" (105). In 
paternalistic fashion, he attempted to appropriate the cultural and political agency 
afforded to citizens--the wealthy as well as the poor--by taking parrhesia under the wing 
of philosophy. As Foucault suggests in his reading of the Republic (Book VIII), parrhesia 
took on the cast of an ethical rather than political virtue, a process that invariably takes 
freedom of speech out of the realm of public property to the private word of 
philosophy, one contained by either free or pay schools. Such a move diffuses some of 
the political charge of parrhesia by putting it indirectly in the service of autocracy. 
But the transitional position lies in his [Plato's] continued 
respect for parrhesia as a personal attribute of character despite a 
basic distrust of 'democratic' parrhesia. The focus of parrhesia is 
no longer the citizens or even the politeia but the soul (psyche), 
especially that of the prince, which, because it is educable, is 
capable of moral transformation to the benefit of all. The 
objective of parrhesia is the formation of a certain way of acting, 
of an ethos of the individual . (Flynn 106) 
By erecting this dichotomy--between ethical and political parrhesia--Plato redefines 
parrhesia as a metaphysical pursuit, one that concerns itself with the soul. Foucault's 
identification of this split develops the association of the ethical parrhesiast as a truth-
teller, but one who is concerned with the confession of philosophical truths, rather than, 
or in place of, the political, "in that [he] is concerned with practical reason (phronesis), 
with the truth and with the soul" (108). Foucault then draws a Platonic "aesthetic of 
existence" (109), the life lived by the ethical parrhesiast who must live according to the 
imperative of giving "an account of oneself so as to lead to care for oneself" (108). "The 
art of existence [then becomes] ... truth-telling" (109), an ongoing process of "giving 
account" of the self. This move deepens the rift between a "private" ethic of parrhesia 
and a public ethic of political agency in parrhesiatic discourse. 
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Although he does not examine the power-knowledge connection in creating the 
schism between ethical and political parrhesia, Foucault does provide us with an 
important understanding of what Plato infuses to the parrhesiatic tradition. What I am 
arguing, however, is the inherently rhetorical formation that this split undertakes. What 
we gain from Plato's use of parrhesia is an "aesthetic vision of truth" (Flynn 113). "The 
Socratic parrhesia of harmony between one's logos and one's bias exemplifies such an 
aesthetic vision of truth. It is a truth one does or lives rather than says. And the living 
realizes a certain style, not a general rule or norm" (113). This is an important 
qualification of the ethical turn for parrhesia--a Socratic legacy of the ethical tied to 
action--and one that is clearly operative in the Cynic development of the ethical life. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on the private and aesthetic experience of truth 
(re)constitutes "the (moral) subject" (Flynn 107) and its relation to truth-telling. On the 
surface, this practice avoids the political matrix of risking all to speak out in the polis; 
instead, it highlights the possibilities of parrhesia in the transformation from public to 
private. 
As Foucault argues, separating knowledges and discourses helps to create and 
maintain systems of exclusion and control. In the case of parrhesia, we have this 
dynamic working on multiple levels. In the successful attempt to move parrhesia from the 
democratic forum by appropriating it to a privatized sense of an individual ethics, the 
ethical imperative to speak out within a public forum is diffused, especially as this 
demand comes more and more under the purview of a highly centralized government 
and a wealthy ruling class. Flynn suggests that this is exactly what Plato wanted to do 
in his fear of what "the desires of the crowd" would give life to. Foucault's 
interpretation, moreover, erases the public sphere by "privatizing" parrhesia. 
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Nevertheless, I agree that Flynn's reading is an important and necessary one in 
coupling a theory of the agent--whether that is in an aesthetics of existence or in a 
political imperative to exercise freedom of speech or silence--with an ethical imperative 
to act, either wit.hin the polis or in the experience of living an ethical life. Foucault's 
oeuvre can be read as the assumptions that underlie the creation of subjectivity and the 
problems inherent in devising any theory of an ethical subject. His work is, then, the 
theoretical precursor to a theory of agency that is sensitive to the construction of the 
subject within discourse. As Flynn notes of his final remarks in the College de France 
lectures, Foucault was attempting to historicize and construct "a freedom of resistance" 
(116) based on a belief in (retreat to?) "individual responsibility" (114). However, as I 
have argued throughout, the separation of the ethical and political has not been 
satisfactorily (re)joined in discussions of rhetoric, especially in the sense of finding a 
range of tactics that can be used to confront dominant discourses. Foucault's reading of 
the Cynics leaves out an important aspect of political parrhesia, especially because the 
Cynics attempted to join the political and ethical in their "social" work. The following 
works as an attempt to heal this rift. 
It should not be any surprise that Diogenes was the most outspoken of the 
Cynics in his formal and public denunciations of political leaders and what he assumed 
were their inherent abuses of power. An example from Laertius relays that when 
brought before Philip and asked who he was, Diogenes replied, "' A spy upon your 
insatiable greed"' (45). Laertius notes that for this act "he was admired and set free"' 
(45). And when witness to a thief being dragged away by officials of a temple, he yelled 
out to them, "'The great thieves are leading away the little thief"' (47). This impudence 
was originally the practiced privilege of the select group of Athenian citizens who used 
this right when necessary to denounce political leaders and their practices. It appears, 
however, that Diogenes was beyond retribution for "speaking out of turn" in his blatant 
use of a right that was not available to the exile. Moreover, his critiques centered on 
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political figures of the day; Laertius tells us that far from being persecuted for speaking 
out against leaders such as Alexander and Philip, he was rewarded with his life by 
escaping their wrath. Most likely Diogenes remained unscathed by political leaders 
because in his role as a public spectacle, he escaped punishments, the same way that 
children and the insane were exempt from legal and political responsibility. 
Cynic opposition works rhetorically as an "impudent kairos," one whereby a 
context demands the continued opposition to accepted norms. In use by the Cynics, 
kairos becomes the power to create situations wherein the Cynic could speak . By 
devising an almost "violent" set of tactics with which to critique culture and its icons, 
Cynic parrhesia distinguishes itself as an consistent ethical imperative to take a side in an 
argument, not as a statement of beliefs, but rather as an uncomfortable reminder of 
opposing views. As Vaage confers in "Like Dogs Barking: Cynic Parresia and 
Shameless Asceticism," "Cynic parresia [sic] was distinguished less by its specific 
content and more by its relation to the socio-rhetorical situation in which a given 
statement was uttered. In the mouth of the Cynic, parresia meant saying whatever 
whenever in such a way as to provoke the consistent sensation of 'boldness ."' (27). 
While I think that both content and form were important to the Cynic method, the 
Cynics are remembered for the rhetorical tactics that grabbed the attention of audiences 
and converted some into taking up staff and cloak. Like the Sophists, they 
demonstrated that truth was the sum of contingencies, and that ethics had to be defined 
in particular situations under specific constraints. Flynn argues that "parrhesia seeks the 
political conditions and the ethical differences at work in the question of true discourse" 
(106). A qualification must be made here, however, for Cynic kairos: "true discourse" is 
not dependent upon a Platonic sense of truth. Rather, a Cynic kairos seeks frankness 
and freedom rather than truth in its search for the opportunity to speak effectively. This 
qualification highlights the rhetorical nature of Cynic exchange by foregrounding freedom 
rather than truth. In effect, the Cynic took inventory of the rhetorical situation and 
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rejected any and all constraints, including political ones, spurned onward by an ethical 
imperative to speak, to remain visible in the polis. Moreover, parrhesia called attention to 
unjust rhetorical contexts by highlighting those who were not invited to speak and then 
speaking in these spaces. Because it "stole" rhetorical situations, parrhesia demanded 
concomitant tactics that met its insurgent potential; diatribe was one of these. 
II. Diatribe 
The ethical imperative of Cynicism is discursive agency, those rhetorical 
strategies that "interfere" with hegemonic discourse and attempt to disrupt the 
oppressive constraints of determined and determining discourses. One recent example 
of these strategies is Julia M. Allen and Lester Faigley' s article, "Discursive Strategies for 
Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of Argument," wherein the authors identify the 
ways excluded groups have created discursive strategies for social change, moves that 
seek some sort of agency from dominant discourses. They contend that writing 
instructors misrepresent the "real speech situations" to and of which marginalized 
speakers are subjects by identifying argument as the legitimate and recognized means of 
harnessing agency in "unjust" rhetorical contexts. In response, they examine the 
successful and strategic ways that speakers and writers have either subverted rhetorical 
norms or created new languages as a means of achieving agency, and by extension, 
political and rhetorical purchase in and against dominant discourses. Whereas parrhesia 
seeks the conditions for a contestory discourse, diatribe is a specific tactic that 
intervenes in the real speech situations of everyday life. Kennedy identifies diatribe as 
"informal preaching" whereby the Stoics (after the example of the Cynics) "lived in 
poverty and wandered from city to city inveighing against the stupidity of social 
conventions" (92). In particular, diatribe was one of the ways the Cynics spoke in the 
polis. 
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In my reading, diatribe works in two ways: as a description of the "real speech 
situations" that speakers must negotiate and a tactic that is used to "break into" a 
conversation or argument that does not allow certain participants to enter. Ironically, 
the very foundations of democratic discourse in the ancient Greek public sphere 
precluded the possibility for many speakers to participate because of the requirements 
necessary for political participation. As a result, the Cynics, as an example of those 
who were not invited to participate, "broke into" the political conversation in impolite 
ways. Diatribe is an argumentative tactic that calls attention to the inevitable exclusions 
of critical democratic discourse and responds to its exemption in disruptive ways. 
Nevertheless, I do not want to suggest that their voices were either listened to or heard. 
In contrast to Hodge and Mansfield's claim that "if you are a minority, you have to 
shout to be heard," there is also the possibility that shouting will make you "not heard," 
and thereby diffuse the political efficacy of diatribe. I turn now to Jurgen Habermas' s 
proposal of critical democratic discourse for a better sense of how both the democratic 
polis of the fourth century and our contemporary public sphere are supposed to operate, 
to situate the effects of this tactic within a rhetorical and political matrix. 
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Jurgen Habermas outlines a 
procedural approach to communicative rationality and its uses for testing ethical norms. 
In doing so, he advises a rule of conduct, also known as the discourse ethics, for testing 
the validity of normative claims. The model of argument advocated is the ideal speech 
situation. In general, the ideal speech situation moves toward the goal of consensus. In 
basing its practice on mutual respect, the ideal speech situation emphasizes rational 
argument and tum-taking in discussion. In many ways, the ideal speech situation holds 
the same goals as the Greek polis--even though Habermas is not taking ancient Greece as 
his model--the ideal speech situation engenders the conditions for democratic, discursive 
participation. Even though the Greek polis assumed that its approach to democracy 
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allowed for fair and rational debate on matters of civic importance, the Cynics testify to 
the inevitable omissions that occurred. 
Aside from the contradictions and shortcomings that survive in any attempt at 
democratic discourse, the premises and practices of this ideal speech situation point to 
a critical omission of democracy in general: By making all voices equal, differences are 
erased; dissent is streamlined into the "larger" goal of consensus. In terms of producing 
social transformation and agency through reasoned argument , Allen and Faigley assert, 
"we do our students and ourselves a disservice by pretending that facility in the 
construction of logical argument is all that will be necessary to shift entrenched social 
structures" (168). As is evident in the ideal speech situation, agency is available only to 
those who are skilled in argument. What the conduct of ideal speech and its democratic 
foundations forget is that not all participants, even in the insurance of voice, will be 
listened to and heard. 
In his "neutralization of differences," Habermas ignores what Seyla Benhabib 
calls "the concrete others" in discourse, those disputants whose race, class, gender, or 
sexuality can be "read off" of them and given "use-value" in the current discussion as 
they attempt to enter conversation. Furthermore, the ideal speech situation takes place 
in the public sphere that, while a potentially transformative space for civic 
participation, works to maintain "the political regulation of civil society" (Landes 95). 
This "regulation" can be read in a variety of ways. But within a sphere where consensus 
and rationality are the rule, there is reason to believe that "political regulation" will 
merely replicate existing power structures, rather than upset or transform them . As Iris 
Marion Young identifies, the means of communication are always held by dominant 
groups (59); any consensus reached by this group will inevitably reflect dominant views 
and power positions. Her point is well taken; for if the ideal speech situation leads to a 
just outcome, then what conclusions can be drawn from real speech situations, such as 
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those that often occur in a democratic culture--in both the fourth century and the present 
moment? 
The Cynics adopted what Michael Walzer calls "insurgency tactics" to deal with 
the inequities fostered by political and economic systems. According to Walzer, 
insurgency is "the acting out of a new dialectic, which denies conventional definitions of 
good behavior and seeks to make the 'helpfulness' of ... bureaucracy the starting point 
of a new politics of popular resistance and self-government" (152). Insurgency is not 
revolution, however. It is more limited and more immediate "precisely in that it seeks no 
more unity, but calls instead for the multiplication of diverse and independent unities. 
And it begins this process with a modest but urgent demand for a share right now in the 
management of this community" (152). 
Diatribe is thus an insurgency tactic that in its disruptive and misbehaved way 
highlights the political dimensions of exclusionary speech situations by making agency 
available through ''bad" discursive behavior. According to Demosthenes, in using 
diatribe, a speaker should employ "abrupt and pungent" (13) diction, as well as 
dramatic expressions of "puzzlement" (13). Its success at directing attention to the 
speaker and her message comes from its "habit of indignation" (13). It is tactical 
because it works by surprise and "spontaneity by never preparing the reader [or listener] 
for what is coming; it expresses pity, conviction, disbelief, distress" (13). As George L. 
Kustas discusses in Diatribe in Ancient Rhetorical Theory, diatribe resists one complete 
definition, as it changes form throughout history. It is also a multi-dimensional genre 
that describes both the subject matter and the means of presenting it. In its early uses, 
diatribe concerned a single speaker or writer who responded to a moral or ethical 
subject, much like a sermon or lecture. As Demosthenes defines, "Diatribe is an 
extension of a moral sentiment so that the ethos of the speaker may abide in the mind of 
the listener" (7). Diatribe is also a hybrid genre, employing several features to illustrate 
its indignant tone. It often makes use of a "fictitious interlocutor who raises objections 
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and is answered" (11), what in more formal terms is called asyndeton. In the process, 
" ... it makes provisional concession of an opponent's point and uses techniques of 
invective and innuendo to discredit [others]" (13). 
Because it responds to the intensity of feeling created by ethical themes, diatribe 
does not operate by formal rules of logical argument. "We are not asked to follow a 
train of argument which will end by including us within its syllogistic embrace" (Kustas 
15). Instead, it works to reveal the "logic of emotion" (15), making use not of formal 
rules of composition but a repertoire of disruptive tactics. Ultimately, ethos is its driving 
force, relying almost entirely on the rhetorical space available and authorized through 
sincere indignation and outrage on a moral question. Nevertheless, diatribe cannot be 
reduced to an emotional outburst. Rather, it gains character by appearing improvised in 
its emotional foundations; in reality, it carefully calculates the opportune time to launch 
an impudent statement or reaction. Thus, we can distinguish diatribe by its concern for 
ethical issues and questions of "ethical behavior" (14), as well as its disruptive, 
rhetorical management of a logic of emotion in the use of hybrid genres. And while its 
forms and contexts change in the history of rhetoric, I want to retain its specifically 
Cynic uses as "a discourse of an especially invective manner" (16), what we might also 
call "a rant" in its tendency to "engage people's feelings and change their lives" (38). 
While we should consider the Cynics' s impudent statements examples of 
diatribe, I find more immediate, compelling examples of this tactic in contemporary 
political life. Benjamin DeMott's "Seduced by Civility: Political Manners and The 
Crisis of Democratic Values" provides an excellent case in point. In response to the call 
for civil, "polite" public discourse by what he deems "the leader class" -from Supreme 
Court Justices to Law Professors to President Clinton--DeMott observes the trend of 
incivility in public discourse as an aggressive, angry response to "leader class" power 
and moral decay. According to the privileged, "Citizens are shouting too much, as on 
Geraldo and talk-radio. They've forgotten how to listen and respect and defer" (11). 
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DeMott argues that the new incivility needs to be recognized as "a flat-out, justified 
rejection of leader-class claims to respect, a demand that leader-class types start 
looking hard at themselves" (14). DeMott also sees the "civility boom" as an indicator 
of a "rising establishment impatience with the notion that, on these shores, class 
interests stand in ever sharper conflict" (116). 
In some ways, the cry for a more civil discourse is not far from Habermas' s hopes 
for communicative rationality in the public sphere. Even though he--and !--would 
defend the value of real argumentation rather than rant, Habermas' s assumptions of 
equal access, equal entry, and following the conventions of tum-taking resemble the 
"civil sphere" described by DeMott and assumed by the "leader class." However, the 
"leader class" emphasis on civility overlooks the importance of "fairness, justice or 
decency among the privileged" in favor of "getting along," and thereby parting company 
with Habermas on this emphasis (16). That is, civility is upheld at the expense of real 
argumentation and justice. DeMott's examples of incivility range from the tactical use of 
the talk-show to changing voter opinions of government officials' perceived ethical 
integrity. Citing a University of Michigan study of voter opinion, DeMott finds that 
with each notification of both government and corporate excess and abuse at the 
expense of "persons of modest means or inferior coiffure," voter faith in the elected is on 
a rapid decline (14). 
I read DeMott' s descriptions of incivility as timely examples of diatribe. Like the 
Cynic's refusal to remain quiet and orderly in public discourse, Americans' s impudence 
is read by DeMott "as a protest by Americans outside the ranks of the publicly 
articulate against the conduct of their presumed betters" (12). Notably, and to refute 
those examples of incivility used by the leader class, DeMott interprets examples of 
incivility provided by the leader class-Farrakhan, Buchanan, and domestic terrorism-
as examples of arguing off the point. DeMott reads these examples as part of a larger, 
seductive ploy by the civil to align incivility with the un-American and aberrant. His 
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citation of voter response and talk-show rage show a very different picture of those 
"outside the ranks of the publicly articulate" who comprise a steadily growing "uncivil" 
public (12). In addition, the theme of uncivil protest shares its habit of ethical 
indignation with diatribe. In the polls DeMott studies for evidence of voter incivility, the 
questions asked of respondents deal implicitly with moral and ethical concerns. Finally, 
diatribe and incivility are both rude "attitudes" adopted by the excluded who develop 
tactics as a means of protection against the deceptive claims of "the leader class" (14). 
Thus, crucial to our understanding of diatribe is its essentially political character. 
In the discussion that follows George L. Kustas' Diatribe in Ancient Rhetorical Theory, 
the participants attempt to define exactly what a diatribe might be as it includes so 
many genres, almost expanding it beyond definition. In the process, they rest on 
diatribe's social and political distinctions that make it something separate from mere 
literary strategy. As Kustas notes, "[b ]ecause of the plasticity of the form, any 
definition would have to include the speech of the lower class" (36), those "others" who 
are generally denied agency and access to the public sphere. Notably, he alludes to the 
Cynics as "street speakers" who used diatribe to enter political discourse from their 
position as exiles. Another respondent clarifies that diatribe might be understood as 
"the emotional expression of a counterculture" (37) attempting to express "a sense of 
conflict, struggle, tension that would result from and reflect actual political crises and 
class conflicts" (37). Because of this connection to the social and political context of its 
production and circulation, diatribe concerns the formation of identity in its emphasis 
on foregrounding conflicts. In effect, diatribe is about the struggle for recognition 
(Walzer 153). In this way, diatribe also involves the search for agency, one that accesses 
a discursive "way out" for marginal members of culture. 
My endorsement of diatribe does advocate the kairotic use of "bad" rhetorical 
behavior. My point in excavating this concept is that diatribe may offer a way of being 
seen and heard to those voices that are erased by the goal of an ideal speech situation. 
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DeMott's observation of leader class contempt for the "rant" of the excluded is one 
effective enactment of diatribe. Michael Walzer remarks that the promise of such tactics 
insure "a kind of permanent insurgency, generating marginal but never major 
disturbances" (152). This, I think, is the strength of Cynic diatribe: It does not pretend 
to some universal concept of revolution or collapse into liberal notions of equal voice 
because it recognizes that speakers are located differently and in relative positions of 
power. Therefore, it sustains its insurgent potential by staging brief "hit-and-run" 
tactical advances. For the Cynics, diatribe works in the rhetorical and political exercise 
of parody, "feigned dialogue" with real and imagined opponents, and the use of 
anecdote to illustrate the consequences of political views and ethical behaviors. 
Cynic diatribe provides us with a name for the insurgent political practices that 
generate from the ethical imperative to speak and be heard. Moreover, it recognizes 
that minority voices often get subsumed under the monolith of majority conversation. In 
its recognition of the contradictions latent in the democratic society and its speech 
situations, diatribe describes the real speech situation of silence, exclusion, or noise. At 
the same time, it provides the rhetorical approval to enter this conversation by 
temporarily authorizing a particular style, a way of attempting agency and resistance, 
even in the realistic promise that it may not be heard . 
III. "Serious Laughter'' 
Laughter and humor can temporarily destabilize traditional genres and rhetorical 
situations by opening up the possibilities of inversion and critique. Such tactics 
undermine the rather straight-faced, logocentric norms of classical philosophy. 
Disruptive and misbehaved, the Cynic rhetor, using not only a bag of tricks that include 
rhetorical tactics--such as parrhesia and diatribe-but also a parody of philosophy, 
-
.. 
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makes the audience laugh at him, in the hopes, perhaps, that they may come to laugh at 
themselves and their artificial reliance on social customs and conventions. 
Branham argues for Diogenes's attempts to subvert traditional philosophy by 
infusing it with laughter, parody, and a mocking use of the syllogism: "jokes--a parody 
and a pun-are decked out in the trappings of formal argumentation" (344). Further 
examples abound in Laertius: when answering the arguments against doing everything, 
including breakfasting, in public, Diogenes responded with the witty inversion of 
syllogistic logic. '"If to breakfast be not absurd, neither is it absurd in the market-place; 
but to breakfast is not absurd, therefore it is not absurd to breakfast in the 
marketplace'" (Laertius 71). Drawing upon the work of Bahktin and Mary Daly, 
Branham cleverly associates the Cynic penchant for hilarity and outrageousness in jokes 
and laughter with their resistance to "the authority of society to dictate thought and 
behavior ... [by] resistance to the social control of cognition" ("Utopian Laughter" 
342). 
Diogenes begins his critique of Plato and, by extension, philosophy, using it, in 
effect, as a "straight man" for Cynic laughter. Laertius recalls a humorous example. 
"Plato had defined Man as an animal, biped and featherless, and was applauded. 
Diogenes plucked a fowl and brought it into the lecture-room with the words, 'Here is 
Plato's man.' (43). Inverting the causal logic inspired by cognitive custom, Plato 
addressed Diogenes as he was washing lettuces and said to him, "'Had you paid court 
to Dionysus, you wouldn't now be washing lettuces,' and that with equal calmness 
made answer, 'If you had washed lettuces, you wouldn't have paid court to Dionysus"' 
(60-61). And like their philosophical cousins the Sophists, the Cynics employed eristic 
reasoning in arguments against social conventions, focusing on witty inversions of 
syllogistic logic to win an argument rather than attempting to support a particular truth 
(Dudley 29). In the clearest example of Diogenes's departure from Plato's metaphysics, 
we encounter Diogenes' skepticism in the debate of ideal essences. "As Plato was 
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conversing about Ideas and using the nouns 'tablehood' and 'cuphood,' [Diogenes] said, 
'Table and cup I see; but your tablehood and cuphood, Plato, I can nowise see.' 'That's 
readily accounted for,' said Plato, 'for you have the eyes to see the visible table and cup; 
but not the understanding by which ideal tablehood and cuphood are discerned" 
(Laertius 55). Lacking the intellectual faculties needed to comprehend essences, 
Diogenes must bear the insult to his drive for the practical and earthly. While these 
examples do not translate easily into a statement of Cynic ethics, they do, however, 
identify a departure from Plato's metaphysics which, in turn, would presume 
transcendental moral and ethical essences. What we get here, rather, is a gleaning of 
Cynic principles, ones located firmly in the material conditions, those drapings of the 
everyday that demand ethical action. I will return to Cynic ethics later, but for now it is 
important to note the dichotomy between Plato and Diogenes, as well as the 
development of a Cynic imperative, an ethic, of application. 
Jokes, parody, satire, and laughter are the tactics of Cynic rhetoric. Irony also 
works to make jokes effective, especially when joking and humor are used to temper or 
disguise political critique. This tactic is called spoudogeloion--or "serious laughter." 
Hodge and Mansfield have written on the use of humor as a tactic of resistance. While 
they are concerned mainly with humor's "tactical value" (197) in the anti-nuclear 
movement, their work offers important insights on reading the Cynics' contribution to a 
rhetoric of laughter. The Cynics also make operative Elspeth Probyn's search for a 
transformative theory of the self, one that puts "oneself to work discursively without 
taking oneself too seriously" (505). 
According to Hodge and Mansfield, humor serves several purposes: to form 
solidarity; to work as "a shield that protects critics from being punished for their 
truths"; and to facilitate the acceptance of ideas (197). Seldom do any of these 
purposes work singularly; they tend to work simultaneously. The joke, in any of its 
various genres, multiplies its success in the effectiveness of irony; in other words, how 
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well the rhetor has juxtaposed competing meanings. Similarly, jokes are when a "public 
level of meaning is yoked to and opposed or subverted by another set of meanings that 
are excluded from the surface of the text, repressed" (200). Like the subtext of Cynic 
laughter, the joke works at the moment when its "repressed" text(s) come through (as) 
the opposition to "public" meanings. The body also plays a role in creating laughter, 
mediating between verbal and visual texts (199), the "opposing [or complementing] 
discourse" (199) that works in tandem with the body. In their reading of Freud, Hodge 
and Mansfield extract the "libidinal depths" (208) evinced in the joke. Notably, the 
Cynics, and especially Diogenes, expressed libidinal desire in public ways, making, at 
the same moment, a joke of himself, his actions, and the conventions that govern 
appropriate behavior. What is laughable here is the subversion of cultural norms that 
work in opposition to the repressed subtext of libidinal desire. This appropriation of 
humor has obvious political overtones. Hodge and Mansfield coin the intersection of the 
body, laughter, tension, and resistance a "political somatics" (200). This is an 
important term for its expansive understanding of the political matrix of tactical 
rhetorics and the use of the body, and one I will return to in Chapter Three . 
Political somatics describes the operative stances taken in cultural critique. 
When we throw this "political body" into the ''body politic," we find several 
connections between Bakhtin's carnival and the Cynic's radical parody, connections that 
reveal an ethical foundation for the Cynic's use of humor as a rhetorical tactic. Carnival 
and parody serve as transgressive modes that degrade "the prevailing hierarchies and 
institutions [and] its dominant forms of expression" (Platter 202). In his work on 
Rabelais, Bakhtin identifies the genres that allow for the critical upheaval that is 
carnival. The heteroglossia of the novel provides a "self-consciousness" that engenders 
parody (Platter 204). Menippian satire is named as an ancient precursor to the work of 
Rabelais as well as a "tradition of laughter" (204). 
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Notably, Menippus of Gadara (third century BC) was a Cynic who wrote 
scathing political satires. Laertius tells us that "[t]here was no seriousness in him; but 
his books overflow with laughter" (103). The genre for which he is named admits "a 
variety of different voices to produce a text that is polyphonic" (Platter 209). In this 
way, the Cynics provide an historical legacy of laughter coupled with an ethico-political 
imperative that foreshadows Bakhtin 's theory of carnival, providing an important 
critique of not only fixed genres , but also of political hierarchy. As Branhham notes , 
Menippus's works are lost, but his legacy as a "parodic elaboration" (Unruly 14) in 
Lucian's satires survives as the legacy of Cynic laughter. Lucian is responsible for 
"publicizing" Cynic satire through the literary stereotype of the "unruly jester" (14). The 
jester is, like his predecessor the Cynic, an agent of critique, one who is often beyond 
punishment because his words are conveyed with humor. As a clown, the Cynic is 
permitted license that ordinary citizens are not allowed. As Platter suggests, satire 
employs "the language of carnival in a manner that simultaneously destabilizes the 
ruling hierarchies and can be co-opted by individual citizens in their pursuit of 
individual distinction" (207). 
Joel C. Relihan's Ancient Menippean Satire discusses the legacy of the genre in 
predominantly literary terms. Essentially, satire, as well as the other parodic genres, 
works to undermine the artifice of genre and to expose the "ridiculousness of speaking 
or writing in verse" (20). He also discusses the philosophical project at work in the use 
of satire by noting the genre's confrontation with language. Relihan finds in the satire a 
mode that denies claims to knowledge and truth, while also maintaining the inadequacy 
of language to adequately convey either of these things (20; 28). I disagree, however, 
with Relihan' s assertion that the genre "keeps rhetoric and persuasion at a 
minimum"{35); that is, satire is fundamentally a persuasive genre. In both form and 
content, satire questions authority, but not just literary authority. In the case of the 
Cynics, satire goes even further to undermine and indict popular values and blind 
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adherence to convention, including political, ethical, and philosophical convention. By 
operating in the "double" meanings contained by the parodic, Menippean satire relies on 
the logical and creative work of the audience to complete its message. With wit and 
humor, the Cynic persuaded his audience to imperatives of action. 
Parody is the larger category that houses Menippean satire, diatribe, and chreia. 16 
Satire, however, is not as explicitly in the service of ethical and moral ends as other 
genres. 
Menippean satire, like verse satire, has origins in diatribe. The 
genre teaches commonsense values (the horror of pride and 
presumption, the folly of dogma and theory, the joys of the 
simple life), but only through the example of the embarrassment 
of the preacher who tries to establish such common sense 
logically as ultimate truth. Menippean satire parodies the 
diatribist; in it, the catechizer is catechized. (184) 
Satire, then, parodies the instructive genre of diatribe in a larger attempt to "dethrone" 
philosophy and philosophers (Relihan 45; 185). Early satire of the Hellenistic period 
often took the form of dialogue; many were in parodic imitation of the serious 
philosophy of Socratic dialogue. Relihan notes that Menippean satire was greatly 
influenced by Plato's "literary forms and techniques of persuasion as its interest in the 
question of literature to convey philosophical truths grows" (185). But as Plato's place 
as the font of Western thought became more entrenched, he became the ''butt" of satiric 
attack (185). 
Menippean satire is a hybrid genre that made use of seemingly disparate genres; 
fiction, nonfiction, verse, and prose were all drawn upon in the creation of satire. Plots 
often followed a pattern of fantastic journeys to another world, but with hyperbolic 
allusion to contemporary myths (Relihan 180-183). Highly ironic, satire operates 
through the juxtaposition of genres and themes; notably, "the combination of the moral 
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and the erotic" found a mode of representation here (34). This is an important facet of 
Cynic rhetoric: their ethic of the body; we need only to consider Diogenes's 
masturbating in the marketplace in resistance to standards of propriety to find the 
mixing of didacticism and sexual function, perhaps even a reduction of "the moral and 
erotic." Furthermore, satire destabilizes traditional notions of authorship by offering 
"no consistent point of view" (23); in fact, the author/ narrator was himself often the 
object of parody. Replacing erudite arguments about truth with phronesis (practical 
wisdom), diatribe "thumbs its nose at pretenders to the truth by a denial that anything 
other than common sense is valuable or applicable" (29). 
Platter's discussion of Bakhtinian carnival in Aristophanes points to some 
interesting parallels between the root-level uses of laughter and the comedic in both 
Bakhtin' s configuration and the Cynics'. Parody, furthermore, is the genre that provides 
polyphony, or in my terminology, the "self-consciousness" to undermine its claims to 
authority. Parody, according to Platter, "doubles" as it takes something being parodied 
from one context to another;."the parodic stand[s] in dialogic relationship" (210) to the 
other. "It is therefore no longer possible to consider the original as existing 
unconditionally and its claim to absolute authority is seriously undermined" (210). We 
see the disruption of parody at work in Diogenes's example of Plato's man. Using this 
rhetorical trope to "tum" Plato's philosophical project toward the face of Diogenes's 
laughter, Diogenes sets the dialogic in motion, and at the same time, attempts to 
undermine the absolute authority of Plato's metaphysical suppositions. The language of 
parody suspends the carefully reasoned arguments of philosophy. "When it [satire] 
begins, the ordinary requirements of reason are suspended in favor of parodic fantasy, 
satiric conceits, and the mock logic of the mobile jester" (Branham, Unruly 16). But the 
jester is a paradoxical figure for he is a "seriocomic ... who, while comic and amusing 
on the surface, frequently emerges as, in some sense, earnest, with a claim to our serious 
attention" (Unruly27). The Cynic clown is simultaneously attempting a pedagogical 
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purpose within the tension of the serious and comic (Unruly27). Comedy and laughter 
are not, then, somehow "anti-logical" in their disruption of established modes of 
reasoning and argumentation. They are, rather, very logical, requiring the cognitive 
engagement of audiences. In effect, such a tactic works by surprise and cunning to 
rupture the terms of argument and critique, dressing them in the jester's language. 
Branham adds further that 
[a]ll true humor has an enthymematic character: it requires the 
audience to perform an act of mental collaboration that can be 
variously described as bridging a logical gap; moving between 
alien codes, frames of reference, or universes of discourse; or, in 
Koestler's classic formulation, bisociating divergent matrices of 
meaning. (Unruly 54) 
Nevertheless, and as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, parody has 
another side to it, one that does not always insure that the jester will make his point as 
he intends. That is to say, parody does not necessarily result in destabilizing hierarchy 
or making a political disruption. In the case of the Cynics, we can only rely on Laertius 
to confirm that Diogenes, in particular, was effective in his parodic imitation of Platonic 
thought. Consequently, Diogenes, and by extension, the philosophy and history of 
Cynicism, has not been taken seriously, at least not until the recent recovery of Cynicism. 
We might then argue that the use of satire and parody for which Diogenes and the 
Cynics are remembered is also the basis for their dismissal--for disrupting the "straight-
faced," logocentric norms of philosophical discourse. My point here is not to diffuse the 
political potential of parody, but to warn against a facile association of parody and 
humor with political transgression. Diogenes and the Cynics are examples of the 
successful use of these tactics, but such tactical rhetorics must be read carefully and in 
tandem with historical context. 
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Politically, such tactics attempt to wrest philosophy and rhetoric from the 
"seriousness" of Socratic and Platonic schools. The Cynics democratized philosophy 
and rhetoric in both their use of parrhesia and the medium of laughter, the latter which 
comes under attack by Plato because it is to be performed only by "slaves and 
'foreigners' (xenoi) for the purpose of showing citizens how not to conduct themselves .. 
. . Citizens should not give it serious attention" (Laws 816 as qtd. in Branham, Unruly 
48). Branham also notes Aristotle's dismissal of comedy because of its lack of 
seriousness and its focus on "less worthy objects" (49). The realm of the comedic, then, 
lands by default into the realm of the popular because it does not abide by the 
aristocratic emphasis on seriousness in philosophy and literature. Thus, the Cynic 
provided a location from which to speak and launch critique in the spaces outside of 
citizenship--to the slaves, women, and exiles of the polis. Cynic tactics offered, at least 
in their example if not in their exercise, the possibility of resistance. Vaage aptly 
identifies the democratic nature of Cynicism: "Cynic discourse as parresia opposed the 
'refined' speech of the educated. The Cynics spoke 'street' Greek" (Vaage 28). In the 
marketplace, on street comers, at festivals and public baths, the parrhesiast ook great 
risks in speaking out of place and out of tum. 
Ethical Bodies 
Throughout this chapter, I have been discussing tactics of Cynic rhetoric as they 
work in formulating a cultural critique. The Cynics offer models of resistance in their 
chosen rhetorical tactics as well as the dramatic use of the body, both as a complement 
to their tactics and a dialogic text to their asceticism. But the body is not merely a text--
one inscribed with cultural scripts of gender, race, class, and sexuality, to name but a 
few of the discourses that make their way into the formation of subjectivity--or a 
"prop" in the drama of Cynic rhetoric. The body is the locus of drives and desires that 
speak themselves into visibility and legibility. If we follow Cynic dicta, the importance 
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of the body, coupled with the an endorsement of naturalism, become important sites for 
reading an ethic of the body; for in defining arete or virtue, the Cynics held that all that is 
natural is considered good. The tactics that derive from such a belief endorse a 
philosophical and political connection between the corporeal body and the body politic. 
Foremost in Cynic thought is the importance of ethics; physics and logic are 
secondary pursuits. While they took their cue from the questions of virtue posed by 
Socrates, the Cynics expanded their discussion of ethics to include questions of public 
action . They attempted to redefine philosophy as a way of life from its Socratic 
emphasis as a "scientific system" (Hutter 117). This attempt to rejoin ethos and bias is 
part of the Cynic belief in enacting the practice suggested by theory. We need to recall 
the examples of Diogenes' contempt for the erudite and impractical arguments of 
Platonists to find evidence of this. 
On another level, joining theory and practice in ethical action finds a conclusion 
in the joining of the body-mind demarcation erected in Socratic-Platonic thought. Horst 
Hutter argues for a Nietzschean view of Socratic values, observing that the Cynics were 
responsible for the attempt to reverse the first transvaluation of values enacted by 
Socrates. 
Socrates and his followers ... originated a transvaluation of 
values under which' counternature' gradually assumed the force 
of instincts and initiated the reign of lies and priestly 
representatives of the life. Socratism then achieved its full 
expression in Christianity which has since then dominated 
human evolution. The original transvaluation, effected by 
decadent weaklings who successfully turned their resentment 
against life into morality, has since led to that total corruption of 
life in which all values are upside down. (120) 
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The second transvaluation in Cynicism, then, was an attempt to recover the "lost body, 
a problem arising from the attempt to house all value in the 'immortal' soul at the 
expense of the mortal body" (Hutter 118). In doing so, questions of the ethical life were 
asked in conjunction with and in terms of the body. We see this at work in the 
distinction between the Cynic affront to "material" pleasure--one that further severs the 
body and mind--and the importance of "natural" desire. 17 They contradicted some of 
the assumptions of askesis, their professed and practiced asceticism, in allowing for a 
body. The work of the fourth-century Cynic, Monimus, in his On Impulses, supports 
this belief in asserting that "truths" were to be found in "impulses" or what we would 
call "instincts" (Dudley 41). Naturalism and the shameless exercise of the body in 
public were the inevitable consequences of this belief. Both the tenets of their thought 
and the tactics of their rhetoric testify to the Cynics's use of the body as a "political 
somatics" (Hodge and Mansfield 209). If only in the possibility of political resistance, 
the Cynic chooses strategic positions and desperate measures to bring about a crisis of 
conventions. 
This political body advanced, and in some instances, worked against, the 
discursive ethics erected by Aristotle as well as the intellectual domain of ethics 
practiced by Socrates, not only in the "unreasonable" outbursts of Cynic rhetoric and 
the rupture of Cynic laughter, but also in the shameless influence of the body and its 
desire . The body and its attendant discourses become, then, visible agents of resistance. 
For Socrates, the development of the intellect led to moral virtue; in Aristotle, we find 
development of this education into ethical action. Action and reflection work in concert 
to form ethos, which is ultimately supported by reason. Like the example given in 
Phaedrus, Plato divides the soul into two parts: reason and irrational desire; pure 
reason will always temper the emotively-based drive of desire. Unlike Plato's 
demarcation, however, Aristotle offers some value and rationality to the "appetitive 
part of the soul" (Nichomachean Ethics 1102b, 6-28; 89-90). This part of the soul may 
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be further subdivided into rational desire and an aberrant but obedient drive, that 
"other in the sense that a child pays attention to his father" (90). Thus for Aristotle 
reason is of the highest order in the discussion of ethics and rhetoric, especially as this 
pairing relies on a strong sense of civic participation. Notably, however, Aristotle, 
unlike later Cynics, did not live to see the end of a democratic Greece. Furthermore, 
Aristotle's polis was severely limited by virtue of who could participate in ethical and 
political discourse. The Cynics, as a counter-statement to the imperative of reason and 
the education of desire, attempt to transvalue values while simultaneously developing a 
tactic of the margins. In the echo of the imperative of civic participation that is so 
important to Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric, Cynic laughter can be heard. Their 
opposition "laughed" at the role of logical argument by employing parody and other 
satiric genres. "Against their [Aristotelians] pretensions of civic friendship, and their 
interest-laden 'good reasons,' it [impious rhetoric] would oppose with paradox, 
burlesque, and ribaldry" (Charland 341). Thus, the Cynic always operates in the space 
of antitheses, offering arguments against any form of cultural monologism and restraint. 
In the relentless critique of cultural norms and mores, the Cynic exists in that vertiginous 
space that proves strategic. 
As practitioners of the seriocomic (Branham, Unruly 27), the Cynics offered 
serious ethical and political themes under the disguise of the comedic. Their revision of 
the body in their way of life is set in dialogic fashion against its erasure in other cultural 
discourses. In place of "pure" reason, they offered only phronesis informed by wit and 
cunning. In Aristotle we also find the emphasis on cognition, reason, and phronesis, but 
the body and its desires appear only in moderation--Aristotle's theory of the mean--and 
must be checked by the strength of reason. Aristotle, after Plato, finds that the comic is 
a vice; therefore, it should not be pursued unless it takes the better of two forms, that of 
"dramatizing [the] ludicrous rather than satiric material" (Branham, Unruly 49). 
Branham notes that heavy qualifications follow the use of comedy in both Aristotle and 
Plato, testifying to its potential to rupture the stasis of both the political text and the 
"right" uses of literary and dramatic genres. 
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Freud's work on jokes and the unconscious supports the subversive potential of 
the comic, in addition to suggesting that jokes release internal inhibitions (105). In the 
case of the Cynics, this release would appear as an account of the body and its desire. 
Freud adds further that satire or "hostile" jokes are the modes used in attacking those in 
positions of power, noting that this is a special case of the comedic that is particularly 
useful in revealing relationships of power (105). The comic, and especially in the case of 
the joke, always has something forbidden to say (Freud 106). At the same time, laughter 
destabilizes rationality for "a joke is derived from play with words or from the 
liberation of nonsense, and that the meaning of the joke is merely intended to protect 
that pleasure [desire] from being done away with by criticism" (Freud 131). 
Both Aristotle and the Cynics weighed the importance of phronesis in 
transforming rhetoric into ethical action. In its emphasis on practicality, the Cynics 
dealt with the "conduct of everyday affairs" (Charland 52). At their root, the Cynics 
focused on questions of agency and ethical life. Even with the proto-Cynic, Antisthenes, 
we find this relationship between virtue and self-transformation. Hakkert notes that for 
Antisthenes, "philosophy is especially concerned with the individual as agent, active in 
struggling to attain arete" (101). In their emphasis on practice, they maintained a 
discourse ethic that offered rhetorical tactics. As I discussed earlier, the memory of their 
presence--despite its anecdotal orgins--testifies to the inequity of real speech situations 
and the tactics that must be drawn and created when "in exile." 
In word and action, the Cynics "went public" not only with the exercise of 
personal desires, but also with their critique of social and political inequity. As Seyla 
Benhabib observes, "the struggle to make something public is the struggle for justice" 
(94). In doing so, they attempted to create a counter-discourse to the pretense of a just 
and virtuous polis. Not only did they offer discursive spaces from which to launch 
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critique, they blurred the boundaries that define the private and public. Their 
"shameless" private behaviors became public spectacle in what reads as an attempt to 
transvalue private and public spheres. In doing so, the Cynics take questions of virtue 
and morality out of the darkness of private decision-making to the light of public 
judgment and scrutiny. Jeffrey Minson names this private/ public demarcation as the 
conflict between foundationalist and personalist views of ethics (149). Foundationalist 
views are couched in the language of rights and the law, while personalist views rely on 
intensely intimate and private determinations of ethical problems (152). Minson sees an 
almost complete privatization of ethical questions at the expense of dialogue and 
important, public ethical questions sequestered by the demand for individual decision 
making. I think Minson is right in noting an historical split between these divergent 
views of ethics, one we can also see in the changing uses of parrhesia; such a split effects 
an almost complete privatization of ethics, a move that potentially "silences" ethical 
discourse as well as the bodies it attempts to control. What I find in the Cynics is an 
attempt to keep ethics in the public sphere, including normally private experiences of 
desire and the body. Their practiced and professed naturalism testifies to this. 
Furthermore, their attempt to collapse this public-private boundary highlights "the 
common antithesis between principles and tactical exigencies in politics" (157). 
Foremost in Cynic philosophy was the imperative to join the contradictions of 
theory and practice. Their idea of a "short cut to philosophy" creates a renewed 
importance on practice and action. Exiled-as women, slaves, or non-citizens--the Cynic 
used his position on the margins of culture to intervene. Exile, then, becomes yet another 
possibly operative stance for social and political critique. 18 A literal and rhetorical 
space, exile offers a starting point for creating "sorties," ways out that glean the 
possibilities of agency. Nevertheless, the exiled are often those who are without power 
in society. They are the minority that is always excluded from creating the very power 
structures that dominate them. Consequently, I am not suggesting that we should simply 
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re-value the space of exile to make it operative. Rather, exile for the social critic, the 
Cynic, can be used as an operative stance. As Benhabib offers, "[t]he social critic who 
is in exile does not adopt the 'view from nowhere' but the 'view from outside the walls 
of the city,' wherever those walls and those boundaries might be" (228). As a strategic 
place for resistance, exile offers the perspective that more entrenched positions might 
not offer. It is also the position that results because of ethical choices. As I have been 
arguing, we have much to gain from reading the rhetorics created in and from this space. 
In the singular example of the Cynics we find that it can generate radical tactics for 
ethical challenge. As Robert Edwards finds of exile and literature, exile forces literary 
transformations (23). The exiled attempts to create a parallel society through such 
transformations. In a very real sense, the transformative potential of exile mirrors the 
ethical in the emphasis on change and transformation. In the Cynics, we see this 
working in the creation of rhetorics of resistance. Transformations are indeed at work in 
the generation of Cynic tactics, as well as the alternative worlds created in Menippean 
satire, a genre that finds its legacy in the Cynics. 
In some cases, exile offers only silence as the speech of resistance, as in the 
contemporary examples of resistance from the Huairou conference that preceded the 
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in September of 1995. In this 
article from Newsweek, nine exiled Tibetan women are photographed wearing gags in 
protest of the repression of their homeland (42). According to the report, such a 
demonstration must have escaped Chinese censors who did as much as possible to 
impose "rules to restrict the expression of unwelcome opinions" (42). Like the example 
of the fourth-century parrhesiast, these women, already oppressed and exiled, choose 
their arms wisely, opting for the "loudest" expression they can create to speak out. In 
this and many other examples of women's resistance, we will find exile an 
uncomfortable and, at best, potentially operative position for marginalized speakers. In 
the next chapter, I will examine the location of exile in its relationship to feminism. 
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Beginning with the figure of Hipparchia, the next chapter will address her "double" exile 
for being at once a Cynic and a woman philosopher. Using her example as a starting 
point, I will discuss the development of a feminist ethic, one that draws upon the 
political tactics offered in Cynicism. 
-
Chapter 3 
Hipparchia the Cynic: Feminist Rhetoric and the Ethics of Embodiment 
I admire you for your eagerness in that, although you are 
a woman, you yearned for philosophy and have become 
one of our school, which has struck even men with awe for 
its austerity. 
A letter to Hipparchia from Diogenes of Sinope, 
The Cynic Epistles 
Stand fast, therefore, and live the Cynic life with us 
(for you are not by nature inferior to us, for female dogs are 
not by nature inferior to male dogs) 
A letter addressed to Hipparchia from her husband Crates, 
The Cynic Epistles 
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Little remains of the early Cynics; even less is known about Hipparchia of 
Maroneia (ca. 300 BC) whom Ethel Kersey identifies as the "first feminist" (132). What 
does remain is hidden within the history of Cynicism. From these traces emerges the 
legend of Hipparchia, the story of an outspoken woman who flouted convention, took 
up staff and cloak, and joined her husband Crates in the streets of various Greek cities 
to show the masses how they had fallen under the spell of false gods, shirking the 
virtues of a democratic polis for the comfort of easy wealth. In this way, Hipparchia 
participated in and continued the Cynic ethics and tactics of resistance. 
The most detailed account of her outrageous behavior is provided by Diogenes 
Laertius who tells the story of her engagement to Crates of Thebes, a follower of 
Diogenes of Sinope. A woman of high-birth, aware of the attendant expectations that 
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she would marry a wealthy m<U1 of the same class, Hipparchia rejected these 
expectations, as well as her parents' arguments, by her intention to marry Crates who 
had neither station nor wealth to offer her, save the few belongings he carried with him. 
Following the wishes of her parents, Crates tried to dissuade Hipparchia from her 
intention to marry him. But after all arguments went to waste on her, Crates finally took 
off his clothes, and standing naked before her said '"This is the bridegroom , here are his 
possessions; make your choice accordingly; for you will be no helpmeet of mine, unless 
you share my pursuits" (Laertius 101). By accepting Crates's offer of marriage, 
Hipparchia also embraced the Cynic way of life, a life that demanded she give up not 
only her domestic tasks, but also the comfort and stability of high social class. Living in 
the agora and openly questioning convention, Hipparchia and Crates exemplified the 
Cynic doctrine "to live a true life." 
The Cynics were one of the few sects that allowed and even encouraged the 
participation of women, observing no intellectual differences between men and women. 
Others were not so progressive . As Laertius relays, at a banquet given by Lysimachus, 
Hipparchia argued with the atheist, Theodorus . Laertius relays the encounter: 
'Any action which would be not called wrong if done by 
Theodorus, would not be called wrong if done by Hipparchia. 
Now Theodorus does no wrong when he strikes himself: therefore 
neither does Hipparchia do wrong when she strikes Theodorus .' 
He had no reply wherewith to meet the argument, but tried to 
strip her of her cloak. But Hipparchia showed no sign of alarm 
or of the perturbation natural in a woman. And when he said 
to her: 'Is this she/Who quitting woof and warp and comb and 
loom?' she replied, 'It is I, Theodorus,--but do you suppose that I 
have been ill advised about myself, if instead of wasting further 
time upon the loom I spent it in education?' (101) 
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In her essay on women and philosophy, Michele Le Doeuff observes that 
Hipparchia' s reproach of Theodorus' s insults concerns how she uses her time, in 
particular, her life-time, for the improvement of her mind rather than "wasting" her time 
confined to the home (205). For Hipparchia, time spent away from the loom and on 
"the getting of knowledge" (206) provides her with "a better life, but [in the process] she 
wins exile" (206). Nevertheless, Hipparchia preferred her exile to traditional feminine 
pursuits. 
I, Hipparchia, have not followed the habits of the female sex, but 
with manly courage, the strong dogs [Cynics]. I have not wanted 
the jewel or the cloak nor bindings for my feet, no headties 
scented with ointment; rather a stick, barefeet and whatever 
coverings cling to my limbs, and hard ground instead of a bed. A 
life such as mine is preferable to that of the Menalian maid, 
since hunting is not as worthwhile as seeking wisdom. (208) 
As I concluded in Chapter Two, the Cynic operated from a position of exile--
sometimes chosen, sometimes forced--and while the causes of exile require specific and 
responsible address in terms of what critical stances they offer, exile did provide a 
rhetorical space for the Cynic rhetor. In addition, the idea of exile assumes a spatial 
understanding of the political subject in her relation to the polis. That is, the literal and 
figurative space of exile assumes "an outside," a sense of (dis)placement that affectively 
situates the exile in relation to a perceived "inside." In some cases, exile is the spatial 
movement of the body over time and space to a place outside a city, a nation, a place. 
Thus, exile--in both literal and figurative terms--involves the body and its relationship to 
both space, as a figurative concept, and place, as a lived or "real" environment. 
Central to Cynic ethics was the performed function of ethical critique, and exile 
provided an important discursive space for this rhetorical practice. A philosopher of 
action rather than discussion, the Cynic is one who "receive[s] virtues for toils" 
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(Malherbe 65). "For the way that leads to happiness through words is long, but that 
which leads through daily deeds is a shortened regimen" (Malherbe 7). In addition, the 
Cynic imperative to create spaces to speak through parr~esia and to critique through 
·• 
; 
"serious laughter" maintains the Cynic ethics of resistance. Thus, Cynic rhetoric--in its 
emphasis on critique as well as the inclusion of women--too\. an ethical stance toward 
giving discursive spaces to "those who are not already located in speaking positions 
within dominant discourses" (Allen and Faigley 142). 
In this chapter, I want to develop the critical space of exile for the Cynic tactical 
repertoire. In the case of Hipparchia, we meet an almost "double exile" --as a woman 
excluded from political citizenship 19 and as a Cynic. In this sense, her exile is 
simultaneously forced and chosen, a move that further complicates the position of exile. 
Moreover, Hipparchia--as the woman rhetor-tells a different story as the gendered site 
of ethical and rhetorical enactment of Cynic tactics. As I will argue, Hipparchia 
highlights the problem for ethics, rhetoric, and embodiment because both ethics and 
rhetoric have historically assumed a male body and its corporeal experience. Women's 
bodies are positioned as "other" to men's centrality and the standard of their 
corporeality. Because of this, as well as her commitment to Cynic ethics, Hipparchia 
forces us to consider important issues of gender, sexual difference, and embodiment in 
ethical rhetorical practice. As I will discuss later in this chapter, her absence in the 
history of both rhetoric and philosophy and her present recovery as "the exception" in 
these traditions, speaks to the gendered assumptions that underwrite the writing of 
history. 
What Hipparchia addresses in both her bodily specificity as the woman rhetor 
and in her role as a Cynic are the important and overlooked connections between 
rhetoric, feminism, embodiment, and ethics. Moreover, as histories of women and 
rhetoric have and continue to evolve in the field, we need to consider how these 
recoveries work toward the development of feminist rhetorics. Related disciplines have 
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been considering the role of ethics for feminism, just as rhetoric has and continues to 
examine the possibilities of a feminist rhetoric . To this end, feminist philosophers have 
recently renewed their interest in ethics. Claudia Card, Iris Young, Seyla Benhabib, and 
Rosalyn Diprose are but a few feminist philosophers who are working to redefine ethics 
outside of or in resistance to masculinist or patriarchal accounts of ethical theory. 
Within rhetoric and composition studies, feminist rhetoric has been an important locus 
for generating inquiry, critique, and new histories of women in rhetoric; Patricia Bizzell, 
Susan Jarratt, Sharon Crowley, and Andrea Lunsford are a few names associated with 
this project. However, a specifically feminist ethics of rhetoric has yet to be addressed. 20 
While I am concerned with the reasons for this "omission," if it can even be called that, I 
am more interested in reviving the ethical within rhetoric, especially as rhetoric needs to 
confront feminist rephrasings of gender and new, spatial definitions of ethics that will, 
in turn, help to create new discursive combinations and contributions. In short, this 
inquiry seeks to reveal the occluded links between rhetoric, ethics, and feminism, a move 
that will initially force us to consider the unexamined ethic(s) that supports much of 
feminist rhetoric. 
Playing with the Big Dogs: Hipparchia the Cynic 
The enormity of Hipparchia's break with cultural and gendered norms can only 
be fully understood if we consider the historical context in which she lived. For an 
aristocratic woman of the fourth century, few freedoms were available. Subject to the 
rules of family and excluded from participation in the polis, women were not a visible 
presence in the public sphere. Periclean law certainly gave more importance to tracing 
and recording women's history and their familial legacies, but it did not translate into 
significant political purchase (Biesecker 104). Because she lived during the first century 
of the Hellenistic age (323-30 BC), Hipparchia enjoyed the few, limited extensions of 
social freedoms. I am not suggesting that there was any major shift in the status of 
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women during this time; however, there were subtle changes that expanded women's 
movement, and thus their spatial mobility, in the political polis. According to Eva 
Cantarella, women enjoyed more legal and social freedoms than ever before as a result 
of larger shifts from the city-state back to monarchies with women rulers. In addition, 
the affront to classical values demonstrated in the Cynic philosophers marked the 
changes that were taking place (90). 
Moreover, the changes were contradictory . Although they could "buy and sell 
goods and property, mortgage their own goods, give and obtain loans, assume 
obligations of work, make wills, be named heirs and inherit legacies" (Cantarella 91), 
women were still subject to apheresis, the right of a father to interrupt a daughter's 
marriage (91). Infanticide of female children and rampant illiteracy were still status quo 
for women in the Hellenistic age. Within this context, Hipparchia's refusal to follow the 
demands of her parents is all the more significant. Consider also that patrilineage, law, 
and social custom all considered marriage a financial arrangement. Hipparchia rejected 
these injunctions in choosing to marry for love, not the insurance of familial wealth and 
relations. Socially, Hipparchia assumed two roles: a wife and hetaira. 
The hetairai were often educated women who shared in the social, sexual, and 
intellectual life of men. As Cantarella outlines, Greek men of position often had other 
important relationships with women other than their wives, such as prostitutes, 
concubines, and hetairai (49-49). According to Pomeroy, the hetairai were euphemistically 
referred to as companions, similar to prostitutes for their paid service, but different in 
their education and social training. She also accompanied men where wives and 
concubines could not go, such as professional meetings and academic discussions (48). 
Highly unusual was the woman who held more than one role, as in the case of 
Hipparchia. One of the more famous hetairai was Aspasia whose controversial position 
as mistress, advisor, and teacher to Pericles alludes to the problem of classifying a 
woman who held more than one social role. 
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While Canterella paints a more positive picture of women in the Hellenistic 
period, Sarah B. Pomeroy looks at the ambivalent messages given to and about women 
during this time of cultural change. Furthermore, Pomeroy makes important distinctions 
between the different areas of Greece that held more liberal attitudes toward women -
than others. Pomeroy seconds the existence of legal and economic participation of 
women during this period, noting, however, that even though they were conducting legal 
and financial transactions, women were always attended by a male guardian to insure 
the proper management of business (127). Despite these gains, little changed in the 
political realm for women; they still held no right to vote, and Athens still remained the 
most conservative of the Greek world in its economic and legal privileges for women. 
Pomeroy credits the minor changes in women's status to several factors, namely 
the reinstatement of monarchies, as well as the exchange of culture and cosmopolitanism 
that characterize the Hellenistic period from the Classical . Important for understanding 
Cynic philosophy and Hipparchia's position in relationship to this school, is the gradual 
move from the communal ideals of the Classical period to "the goal of individual self-
satisfaction" of the Hellenistic (Pomeroy,Women 132). Pomeroy suggests that these 
changing values reflected the increasing gap between wealthy and poor. In seeking their 
livelihoods elsewhere, many men left their homes for colonies which held a more peaceful 
alternative than the fear of attack from warring monarchs at home (132). Ironically, 
however, with the loosening of social and familial responsibility for men and the focus 
on individual happiness, there were ambivalent messages sent to women about these 
changing mores. Pomeroy provides an example of the numerous treatises written on 
maintaining the virtues of feminine behavior, in particular, the behavior of free-born 
aristocratic women (134). 
As I have alluded to already, the sexual lives of men were expected to be active; 
consider the many "service" positions women could occupy in the life of a man. Wives 
were not legally or socially expected to have sexual relationships with anyone other than 
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their husbands, or in the case of slaves, their masters and his friends. Perhaps in 
response to these changing mores, women were engaging in more "unrestrained" sexual 
behavior . While this fact is impossible to prove, female representation in art and 
literature reflected changing attitudes toward the body and female sexuality, allowing 
for more equitable and understanding views of sexual pleasure in women (Pomeroy, 
Women 142-148). The existence and importance of educating female desire becomes 
more marked, then, in contrast to general social and cultural trends, especially as writers 
of treatises appear to be making gendered amendments to the larger emphasis on 
following individual desire. The case of educating female desire was, indeed, a special 
case, one deserving of careful interpretation. 
The Ethics of Exile 
In this section, I want to concentrate on how exile works both as a rhetorical and 
ethical space for women. This reading maintains a critical reappraisal of the position of 
woman as subordinate other by reevaluating the position of marginality. But the 
purpose here is not to reinvent marginality or to celebrate it; rather, it is to complicate 
exile and to foreground a rhetorical reading of such a stance . As Rosalyn Diprose 
outlines in The Bodies of Women: Ethics, Embodiment, and Sexual Difference, 
Even if we grant that ethics is about moral principles and moral 
judgment, it is also about location, position, and place. It is 
about being positioned by, and taking a position in relation to, 
others. Being positioned and locating others requires 
embodiment and some assumptions about the nature of the 
place from which one moves toward others . (19) 21 
Notably, Diprose calls upon the etymological relationship between ethos as location and 
habit and ethics as practice to redefine ethics as "the study and practice of that which 
constitutes one's habitat, or as the problematic constitution of one's embodied place in 
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the world" (19). Her account highlights a contextual account of ethics and the real, 
sexed bodies that inhabit discursive locations. Furthermore, by tracing the importance 
of habit and location, she reiterates the emphasis on action and practice that I want to 
extend in Cynic rhetoric. Di prose's work is central for concentrating on how discourses 
determine, evaluate, and regulate sexual difference. Foremost, however, is her 
contribution of how place--or in my configuration space--plays a vital role in a feminist 
ethics of rhetoric. 
Exile calls up the cognates of colonization and territorialization. We are, then, 
speaking once again in spatial terms. Moreover, employing spatial modes of 
understanding and historicizing allows us to collapse the facile insider/ outsider 
distinctions of binary thinking. In other words, binary positions used to describe the 
position of exile remove the mobility available to the one who has chosen exile as a 
critical rhetorical space. Nevertheless, I want to reinvoke Jane Marcus's warning for an 
"ethics of elsewhereness" in our thinking through new rhetorical spaces recovered 
through exile. We must beware of what Caren Kaplan observes as a "form of theoretical 
tourism ... where the margin becomes a linguistic or critical vacation, a new poetics of 
the exotic" (361). Kaplan also makes extended, important amendments to chosen and 
forced exile. "For if I choose deterritorialization, I go into literary/ linguistic exile with all 
my cultural baggage intact. If deterritorialization has chosen me--that is, if I have been 
cast out of home or language without forethought or permission, then my point of view 
will be more complicated" (361). I would argue, however, that in the case of 
Hipparchia, and in full consideration of historical and political context, she operated in 
both complicated positions of chosen and forced exile, highlighting the problem of binary 
and exclusionary terms for thinking exile. That is, the very terms that Kaplan uses to 
structure a complicated and assumedly less complicated exile exclude the possibility of 
occupying both positions of exile simultaneously. What Kaplan does make explicit, 
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however, is the creativity engendered by a practice of "leaving home," of finding exile. 
Yet, she reminds us that there is no "pure space" (264) of exile. 
The move to the spatial allows for a remapping of critical rhetorical spaces that 
are not rigidly maintained by exclusionary fantasies of complete and permanent 
overthrow of the negative binary "other." As Cheryl Glenn confers, "[e]ach time we 
encourage such remappings and reconceptualize basic assumptions, whether in our 
theories or our practices, we are redrawing the boundaries of rhetoric to include new 
practitioners and new practices" (300). The space of exile provides us with another 
way of thinking through a practice of critique, one that demands an exterior position is 
taken and a critical space is assumed. Kaplan adds to this assertion in her reading of 
Minnie Bruce Pratt's work on location that traveling away from home engenders a 
feminist practice of "deconstruct[ing] the terms of social privilege and power" (363). 
There is an ethics to this position of exile, an imperative to take up this position of 
critical consciousness. Chela Sandoval argues that this position produces an 
'"oppositional consciousness'"(as qtd. in Kaplan 357) for those "men and women who 
move between the cultures, languages, and the various configurations of power and 
meaning in complex colonial situations" (357). 
Much like the fourth-century Cynic, the exile feels an outsider and is often 
considered an eccentric. Furthermore, the Cynic's need for mobility requires that she 
live without material comfort and stability, those objects and attachments that would 
serve to anchor her too tightly to a fixed place. Edward Said seconds the creative 
consequences of exile, while also carefully noting the differences between real exile from 
home and country and the self-imposed exile of the expatriate. He observes that leaving 
home--under either guise-results in a new and important critical space. Said' s 
"Reflections on Exile" observes the compensation for the "disorienting loss" (448) that 
results in the creation of fictional worlds for the exile. As a future novelist or political 
activist, the exile finds an occupation that "requires minimal investment in objects and 
places a great premium on mobility and skill" (448). Said's description of the exile's 
characteristics shares many similarities with a Cynic rhetoric. 
Wilfulness, exaggeration, overstatement: these are characteristic 
styles of being an exile, methods for compelling the world to 
accept your vision--which you make more unacceptable because 
you are in fact unwilling to have it accepted. (448) 
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As the nomadic presence in "other" lands, the exile is disruptive in maintaining a 
position always at odds with his adopted home. For Said, there is an ethos, or in my 
configuration, an ethics of exile that results in the edification of the exterior, the "other" 
place the exile inhabits only temporarily. Said uses the more immediate examples of the 
struggle in Palestine and Israel to illustrate the task of maintaining this "exterior" ground 
in the face of oppression and "the threat of extinction" (450), but his point still has 
resonance for this discussion: the exile has to work to maintain a sense of self and 
connection despite the constant, and perhaps sometimes welcoming, attempt to 
assimilate, to let down the critical stance, and to steady the vertigo produced by an 
oppositional consciousness--to find rest in what Said calls the "contrapuntal" existence 
of exile; that is the "plurality of vision" (450) that, while engendering original, creative 
visions of the world, can prove exhausting to maintain. 
What Said adds to an understanding of exile as a rhetorical space comes in his 
discussion of Theodor Adorno' s Cynical view of mass culture. Said looks to Adorno as 
an example of what a productive sense of exile can do for the critic. According to 
Adorno, the intellectual' s mission is to maintain an exile that refuses the commodity 
status of everyday life--a life that exists in all homes and all nations. Said' s paraphrase 
is particularly apt in articulating a rhetorical space of exile. 
Adorno's reflections are informed by the belief that the only 
home truly available now, though fragile and vulnerable, is in 
writing. Elsewhere, 'the house is past. The bombings of 
European cities, as well as the labour and concentration camps, 
merely precedes as executors, with what the immanent 
development of technology had long decided was to be the fate 
of houses. These are now good only to be thrown away like old 
food cans.' In short, Adorno says with grave irony, 'it is part of 
morality to not be at home in one's home.' (450). 
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Hipparchia opens the rhetorical space of exile as a valid and necessary stance. 
Indeed, it was one space, if not the only, that would allow for a woman rhetor. As the 
Cynic exile, Hipparchia made other philosophers uncomfortable by her presence in their 
discourses. Within the polis, she was seen as more shameful than her husband because 
she flouted the convention of the cloistering of women. But in adopting the Cynic ethic 
of exile, Hipparchia tells a different story of Cynic rhetoric and points to important 
considerations for a feminist rhetoric. Because of the role of the body in Cynic 
asceticism, Hipparchia reminds us to consider embodiment in conceiving a feminist 
rhetoric. In particular, she reminds us of the absence of a feminist ethics of rhetoric in 
contemporary debates that calls attention to the ethical problems involved in 
predicating a feminism based on "essential" or embodied differences. She provides a 
point of departure for what I see as the ethical problem for feminist rhetoric. 
The Rhetoric of Feminist Ethics 
If not the body, then the functions derived from or associated with the cultural 
construction of the female body serve as the basis of many strains of feminist ethics. 
The field of rhetoric and composition has borrowed heavily from the findings of Carol 
Gilligan and Nel Noddings in the development of feminist rhetoric and pedagogy. 
Revaluing feminine, maternal characteristics of care and nurturance as well as women's 
ways of knowing have come--if not directly--then implicitly from the epistemological 
bases of their work. Feminist rhetoricians ranging from Starhawk 22 to Sally Gearhart 23 
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to Elizabeth Flynn 24 take up the development of feminist rhetoric by drawing upon a 
distinctly feminine consciousness that provides the foundation for feminist discursive 
and pedagogical practice. As I will discuss later, many feminist rhetoricians have 
questioned the essentialist foundations of Gilligan's and Noddings's work as well as 
how their models of femininity are imported for feminist rhetoric. Nevertheless, we are 
still responding to their work and the traces of it that have found their way into 
pedagogy and discourse theory--as we rightly should. However, such focused attention 
on critiquing these models leaves us little time to consider a foundation for feminist 
ethics of rhetoric. Ironically, I will also "spend time" doing the same, but with a 
different purpose in mind: 1) to examine the epistemological and ethical bases of 
feminist rhetorics and; 2) to point to and partially respond to the need for a viable 
feminist ethics of rhetoric. My second goal here addresses the need for a revised 
understanding of rhetoric's attention to embodiment as an ethical concern without 
reproducing essentialist or ahistorical foundations of woman upon which to build such a 
revision. I think we have overlooked the essentially ethical foundations of feminism and 
feminist theory, perhaps because as feminist rhetoricians, we, like Aristotle, assume the 
fundamental link between ethics and rhetoric . Thus, we feel no need to examine these 
foundations, as if we all tacitly agree that there is an ethics to feminism, even while it 
remains unarticulated. But this silence approaches deception. For much of what 
suspends feminist rhetoric harbors important, ethical assumptions that need to be 
addressed in the ethical project of developing a feminist rhetoric. 
An extensive body of scholarship responds to the problems and contradictions 
of Gilligan's work. Nevertheless, and despite endless theoretical challenges to the 
assumptions and consequences of her work for feminism, Gilligan still stands as an 
important figure in the development of a feminist rhetoric. Because of this, her 
appropriation for a feminist rhetoric needs to be examined in developing a feminist 
ethics of rhetoric that does not replicate stereotypically feminine, and by implication, 
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essentialist, theories of discourse. For, if as I contend at the outset, that a feminist ethics 
of rhetoric is about finding spaces to speak, then long-standing theoretical bases need to 
be examined for the spaces they cover up in "finding a space for all." As I argue in this 
section, the ethic of care as developed by Gilligan has been linked to an essential, 
feminine capacity for care in many appropriations of her work. An effect of this has 
been the confusion of feminist and feminine approaches in the development of a feminist 
rhetoric. 
Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development is a landmark on the map of feminist theory. In it, Gilligan refutes 
Lawrence Kohlberg' s five stages of moral development for its biases toward a 
masculinist ethic of rights. In brief, Kohlberg' s stages of moral reasoning value a gradual 
development of differentiating self from others, freeing thought from contextual 
constraints, and moving toward rational abstraction. The final stage of moral reasoning 
is thus equated with adulthood. This model progresses from egoistic to social to the 
highest stage of using universal, ethical principles to judge ethical dilemmas. According 
to Kohlberg' s data, men generally operate by an ethic of rights, one "geared to arriving at 
an objectively fair or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all rational persons 
could agree" (Gilligan 22). In contrast, women tended to place lower on the 
developmental scale than men which was, in tum, used to support the claim that 
women's moral reasoning was undeveloped. 
Gilligan criticizes Kohlberg' s stages not only because they favor masculine 
approaches to ethical decision-making, but also because Kohlberg created his stages and 
the value given to high order moral reasoning before sampling the responses of men and 
women. That is, Kohlberg's paradigm of moral development, and the value it gives to 
abstract reasoning, was itself a gendered model used to plot responses rather than 
letting responses determine the stages (Ainely). Taking her cue from this built-in bias, 
Gilligan studies women's responses and finds that unlike men, women tend to operate 
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by an ethic of care, one that values relationship and responsibility rather than duty and 
rights . "Thus the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of 
relationships, which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice 
approach" (73). Care, for women, is equivalent to moral responsibility. A fully 
developed ethic of care "that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and 
response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt . ... This 
ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, evolves around a 
central insight, that self and other are interdependent" (74). Thus, women see moral 
dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities, and this is what needs to be added to 
developmental theory, an account of "feminine voice" (105). Because of women's moral 
capacity and willingness for care and sacrifice, of affect rather than extreme rationality 
and impartiality, they are provided by Gilligan as valuable models of moral reasoning. 
At no point does Gilligan advocate replacing a masculinist ethic of rights with that of 
care. Rather, her work seeks to valorize women's unique relationship to others and their 
development of moral reasoning. 
I think it is easy to see how and in what ways Gilligan's assessment of women's 
moral development has been used to substantiate feminist theories of difference. Within 
rhetoric and composition, her distinction of an ethic of care and an ethic of rights has 
served to entrench a particular view of feminist ethics that favors relational models of 
discourse: dialogue over argument, shared rather than absolute authority, affect instead 
of, or in addition to, the rationality of argument, and collaboration and consensus as 
opposed to individual voices. Despite the positive models of change provided by her 
work, too often Gilligan, as well as appropriations of her work, celebrates a specifically 
feminine ethic of care, a move that does little to dismantle Kohlberg' s theory of moral 
reasoning. But my quarrel is not so much with Gilligan, for hers was and is 
groundbreaking, necessary work on women and moral theory . My problem stems, 
rather, from the unexamined foundations of the ethic of care and rights, as well as the 
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explanations given to build these differences upon two gendered categories. Moreover, 
though, I am concerned with the way in which an ethic of care has been used to ground 
feminist rhetoric in the field, and it is to these appropriations that I wish to speak. 
Gilligan uses men and women's primary differentiation from the mother as the 
grounds for differences in moral reasoning. According to Gilligan, women desire 
connection and relationship because of their initial connection to their mothers; their 
need for individuation comes later and is less threatening to ego boundaries. Thus, 
femininity is defined by relationship with another and is not threatened by intimacy . 
Boys, on the other hand, need to individuate from primary identification with the 
mother to assert their masculinity. Thus, intimacy and relationship are threatening to 
the strict maintenance of male ego boundaries (8). In this way, the ethic of rights 
operates by separation, not connection (19). 
Women's voice is located in their knowledge of connection and interrelatedness 
which is derived from their initial relationship with the mother. However, neither 
Gilligan nor Kohlberg ever substantially question the role of culture and social 
construction in the development of an ethic of care and rights. What is worthy of further 
note, however, is Gilligan's response to critics in the preface to the 1993 edition of In a 
Different Voice: 
I find the question of whether gender differences are biologically 
determined or socially constructed to be deeply disturbing. This 
way of posing the question implies that people, women and men 
alike, are either genetically determined or a product of 
socialization--that there is no voice--and without voice, there is 
no possibility for resistance, for creativity, or for a change whose 
wellsprings are psychological. [This combination] prepares the 
way . . . [for] the suffocation of voice and the deadening of language 
which ripen the conditions for fascism and totalitarian rule(xix). 
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Gilligan's oversimplification of social construction aside, she neglects to examine the 
essentialist tendencies in her own work. In other words, to locate the base of an ethic of 
rights and care in psychological theories of individuation and connection to the mother 
falls just short of--if not directly on top of-biological essentialism by locating the source 
of gender polarization in pre-existing and an assumedly unchanging psychological 
dynamic with the mother. Thus her categories can be read as the reduction of the 
complex foundation of ethics to predetermined premises about how and why women 
and men tend toward different characteristics in their moral reasoning. Because neither 
consider the cultural matrix that constructs values and rationality in each gender, 
Gilligan and Kohlberg neglect the integral component of culture in the formation of ethics. 
What I am objecting to here is not so much the ethical categories that Gilligan 
provides; indeed, they are still useful, operative terms in both ethical and rhetorical 
theory. But I have serious reservations about the very uncritical way stereotypically 
feminine characteristics are established as the means by which women respond ethically. 
However, Gilligan does address embodiment; an ethic of care that "takes inventory" of 
those affected by moral decisions and opens itself up to contingent circumstances is 
designed to consider the problematic of embodiment in ethics. Nevertheless, as her 
critics have argued, she extrapolates an ethic of care from a relatively homogenous group 
of middle- to upper-class white women students, a move that denies Gaten' s claims that 
we consider "an ethics of difference" (104). Moreover, I question how the ethic of care 
has occluded other modes of discourse in advocating a feminist rhetoric of care. In other 
words, the easy polarizations of masculine rights and feminine care have closed off 
alternatives to this traditional binary by speaking in primarily essentialist, ahistorical 
terms. 
What a feminist ethics of rhetoric can provide for this impasse is an emphasis on 
those alternative discursive spaces that need to be generated from this static binary. 
Furthermore, a feminine ethics of care is predicated upon the characteristics associated 
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with maternal care and nurturing. This dimension of an ethic of care is not so 
pronounced in Gilligan, and in all fairness, it may even be partially refuted by her study 
of women, choice, and abortion; it is, however, in the work of Nel Noddings, who, like 
many feminists working through Gilligan's work, have appropriated the ethic of care to 
develop those "positive" qualities associated with the mother. 
Nel Noddings' work on ethical theory and education in Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics & Moral Education is an example of the problems of essentializing 
masculine and feminine approaches to ethics. Taking her cue from Gilligan's 
identification of an ethic of care, Noddings explores and develops the possibilities of 
caring that reject principles and rules and the notion of universalizability in ethics, 
opting instead for a theory that "is not [about] judgment and not on the particular acts 
we perform but on how we meet the other morally" (5). Associating care, much like 
Gilligan, with the feminine assumedly in all of us, Noddings establishes a link with the 
mother previously ignored or subordinated to the paternal language of rights and justice 
in moral theory. Notably, she tries to maintain a sense of masculine and feminine that is 
fluid and not bound to essential differences between men and women (6). 
The ethical self in Noddings' ethic of care is an ideal, a picture of the "one-
caring" (the feminine) and the "cared-for" (the masculine) established in a pattern of 
reciprocity. "It is born of the fundamental recognition of relatedness; that which 
connects me naturally to the other, reconnects me through the other to myself" (49). 
Despite Noddings' initial disclaimer of wresting airtight masculine and feminine 
categories from "real persons," most of her examples are drawn from either a mother-
child dyad, a student-teacher relationship, or a therapist and patient. The most 
prevalent examples, and those used as the basis for developing an ethic of care, are 
drawn from a mother's reaction and relationship with a child (59-64). While the 
examples are too numerous and too lengthy to give here, the effect of making these 
choices in establishing evidence for her claims is the infantilization of the "cared-for" in 
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all relationships of care. As Sarah Hoagland observes, the contradictory practice of 
using a mothering model of care to argue for an independent, relational paradigm only 
provides examples of "unequal, authorized relations" that have no check on power, 
especially of an authority "promoted in the name of benevolence" (251). 
Like David Hume, Noddings predicates an ethic of care on an assumedly 
universal "sentiment of natural caring" (77). While ethical caring is not the same as 
natural caring of a mother for a child, it is built from a desire to maintain natural caring, 
one that can be extended to others not considered within the boundaries of those for 
whom there is natural caring (81). This approach--the "memory" of natural caring in 
situations where care is not automatic but must be summoned--is sustained by the 
predisposition to care that is "latent in each of us ... .In caring, we accept the natural 
impulse to act on behalf of the present other" (83). The desire to be ethical, then, comes 
from the desire "to remain related" (83). Thus when I do not naturally care for the 
cared-for, I must respond because of my obligation to care, one not rooted in contract 
theory, but an obligation from the emotion of care and the importance I place on caring 
(84). Thus, ethical caring is contingent, not based upon principles of duty, is relative to 
unique situations, and depends upon an ideal caring self as well as our commibnent to 
and capacity for ~are and the protection of a caring society. 
While I like Noddings's very rhetorical description of ethical caring, and I think 
that contingency and compassion are effective ways of viewing ethical decision-making-
especially when circumstance may call upon us to act when it is not easy to do so--1 
have problems accepting the epistemological grounding of her theory. In particular, 
Noddings neglects the politics of memory in arguing for ethical caring that could be 
summoned by "memory" of natural care and applied to those who are not our natural 
"cared-for's" but who require our caring response. In plain terms, she assumes that an 
indvidual has positive memories of natural care that can be commuted to a present 
other. Moreover, the other here is an unmarked figure, one who may not-because of 
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race, social class, gender, or sexuality- -trigger the propensity of care because of the "one-
caring' s" personal and political bias. Therefore, I see her creation of self and other as 
rooted very firmly in a liberal notion of the individual who can assumedly transcend 
existing circumstances to care for a very unproblematic other . Read in this way, 
Noddings's seemingly rhetorical sense of care "works" because it avoids particularities 
of real ethical situations. 
Noddings's ethical caring assumes a nurturing basis for care, an assumption that 
harbors certain class implications. The liberal notion of transcendence that grounds 
Noddings's work also implicitly ahistoricizes a latent propensity for caring, a move that 
Teresa Ebert associates with strains of ludic feminism. Teresa L. Ebert's "For a Red 
Pedagogy: Feminism, Desire, and Need" takes further the critique of liberal humanism 
that so defines what she calls ludic feminism. Ebert' s essay brings an important and 
overlooked concern to the feminisms deployed by Noddings and Gilligan, especially 
because she examines the seldom-discussed issue of class relations in contemporary 
feminisms . For this discussion, her critique offers further evidence that the 
epistemological bases for feminist ethics in rhetoric have yet to develop a viable, critical 
approach that is sensitive to the class implications of embodiment. 
Ebert argues against both the liberalist assumptions of ludic feminist theory as 
well as its reproduction and "normalizing [of] the very logic of late capitalism and its 
class politics" (804). At issue for Ebert is how this popular strain of feminist theory 
informs a pedagogy of desire, one that draws its liberatory energies from an ahistorical 
celebration of desire, "sensuous corporeality; erotic seduction, and nurturing" (799). 
Ebert associates the pedagogies of desire in a causal link: pedagogy of pleasure, 
pedagogy of congeniality, pedagogy of nurturing, pedagogy of the body" (796). In so 
doing, she illustrates the other side of the binary she is working to maintain, a pedagogy 
of critique, a "pedagogy of labor and materialism" (796). The problem with these 
feminisms and their pedagogies is that they do not go far enough, and in some cases, do 
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more harm than good; in positing liberation rather than emancipation as their goals, they 
merely reinscribe bourgeois concepts of the self as well as the conditions of class 
oppression (798). Thus ludic feminism is an "accomplice of capitalism" (804) by 
positing a market mentality of social relations in classroom, ones whereby "individuals 
are 'free' to negotiate in an unequal space that always privileges the owners [teachers]" 
(804). 
While most of her argument criticizes erotic pedagogy, Ebert' s critique implicitly, 
and at times explicitly, addresses the ethic of care that structures both Gilligan's and 
Noddings's work. "The other side of this erotic pedagogy ... is a pedagogy in which 
pleasure is not so much erotic as maternal: a nurturing pedagogy that seeks to create a 
safe space, a compassionate place for the pursuit of feelings and desire" (805). "Desire, 
feelings, pleasure are all understood as the fundamental, immanent, essential, and 
defining attributes of an identity as a person, and the person is understood as an 
isolated, contingent, bourgeois monad--free from economic necessity and historical 
determinacy" (806). By arguing for a red pedagogy--the pedagogy of critique--Ebert 
makes economic conditions, institutional practices, and class key terms in repudiating 
an ethic of care as a basis for feminist ethics and pedagogy. The maternal body and its 
affective domain of care and nurturance replicates not only the liberal self of 
Enlightenment thought, but also the unfettered desire so important to the maintainence 
of late capitalism. What Ebert also brings to a discussion of feminist ethics is a material 
concern for the bodies on which feminism is built, in all their difference and need as well 
as the literal and figurative spaces they occupy relative to the "authorizing" bourgeois 
voices that articulate most feminist theory. She illustrates the inviability of ludic 
feminism by drawing a direct contrast between the desiring body of ludic pedagogy and 
that of "Indian women who sell their kidneys to feed their children" (805). The point 
here is obviously to debunk any notions of eroticized social relations or nurturing care as 
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the basis for radical femininst theory, a critique that can equally be applied to the ethic 
of care. 
In contrast to Ebert, both Gilligan and Noddings assume a stable discourse of 
woman and the feminine, one that goes continually uncontested in both of their texts. 
Noddings, in particular, assumes female embodiment in the position of the mother . This 
assumedly stable base of woman as the eternally feminine "I-caring" is opposed to a 
model of abstract, masculine rationality. What both overlook is the logic established by 
their gender dichotomies that foreclose on the possibilities of other ways of mediating 
and meeting ethical agency. That is to say, if we agree that the maternal body--as it is 
deployed in dominant culture--is used to maintain social relations, then we can see how 
an ethic of care maintains the position of the woman-as-mother rather than challenging it 
or finding new combinations for woman in "the body politic." In short, both Gilligan 
and Noddings speak to the risks of embodiment in theorizing female difference. I will 
return to this point in a moment. For now, it is important to note the discursive foothold 
that their theories create. 
This discursive category of woman-as-mother, furthermore, is modeled after a 
psychologically and socially healthy, heterosexual female who brings no risk of abuse or 
neglect to her literal or metaphorical "cared-fors" (Hoagland 254). Noddings, in 
particular, adds nothing new to the maternal paradigm by establishing a "unidirectional, 
not mutual" model for care (Hoagland 254). As Hoagland notes "[t]o pursue the 
feminine is (a part of whose essence is agape and unconditional loving), to pursue this 
sense of female agency, is to pursue oppression. The masculine and feminine are not 
significantly different in what they engender" (Hoagland 259). Hoagland here testifies, 
albeit indirectly, to the need for a re-enunciation of a viable ethics . Thus, the discursive 
construction of an entrenched maternal, feminine model of an ethic of care and its 
opposite, a paternal, masculine ethic of rights, does little to disturb these gender 
categories or to offer a more political and rhetorical understanding of ethics . 
We are now at a point when gender categories--whether essentially or culturally 
derived--need to be refashioned to create new, viable, ethical combinations. "A truly 
radical ethics will challenge not only the masculine but also the feminine, for the feminine 
is born of the masculinist framework and so does not, at a deep level, represent any 
change" (Hoagland 259). As Hoagland aptly suggests, there needs to be another 
paradigm. In my configuration, this need is for discursive combinations beyond our 
gender dichotomies, those that can account for embodiment(s) and that can enable us to 
configure feminist ethics of rhetoric. This movement does not pretend to dispense with 
feminism or the goal of a feminist ethics-even an ethics of care. Rather, it diverges from 
a specifically feminine ethics of care for a rhetorical and ethical understanding of 
feminism as a discourse on ethics. As Joy Kroeger-Mappes confers: 
Identifying two ethics and labeling one masculine and one 
feminine is not new, nor is it helpful. There is no reason to 
believe that the feminine ethic would or should be adopted as 
the ethic for everyone. Although discerning the male bias in the 
dominant ethic and the resulting implications for women 
and men is important ... , we need now to move away from a 
system that has generated so much destruction . (125) 
Rhetoric is well-poised to continue tactical exigencies for feminist ethics that account for 
bodies and the spaces they occupy, for rhetoric provides important intersections of the 
body, the political field, discourse, and constraints. For example, exile is a space that 
complicates gender assumptions by speaking through a "colonial" framework. And 
while exile does not eradicate the problem of gender--that is not the goal here--it does 
provide another space for critique that does not rely on a discourse of woman. Indeed, 
the exiled carries with her a certain gender--if only in being feminized by one's position 
in relation to the "inside." 
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I. A Feminist Ethics of Rhetoric 
While I do not think we can dispense entirely with the category of woman for a 
feminist ethics of rhetoric, we need to keep in mind the ethical dimension of "speaking 
by proxy" (Probyn) that often occurs in feminist theorizing, a move that so often 
homogenizes women into Woman. Nor do I think a sort of feminist pluralism is the 
remedy for breaking the dichotomy between liberal feminism and essentialist theories 
(Looser 66), or between the feminine and masculine as Kroeger-Mappes outlines. We do 
need to recognize rigorously the differences among feminisms, but we can also, as I will 
argue, maintain a certain gender skepticism in the attempt to maintain a politically 
efficacious feminist ethics of rhetoric. The project of grounding a feminist theory beyond 
a single category of woman-that is, with an eye to embodiment--is thus an ethical one, 
especially as we maintain the responsibility to create operative rhetorical spaces in 
theory and practice for speaking and in finding ways to respond in situations of silence 
and exclusion. As Deveney Looser asks in "Composing as an 'Essentialist'?: New 
Directions for Feminist Composition Theories," "'Can there be a thing called feminism 
(or a feminist composition theory) without a presupposed--if only strategically 
constructed-category of 'women'?" (66). Her question is an important one for this 
discussion, for I also question the ethical assumptions of feminist rhetorics that are 
predicated upon essentialist notions of a female self. Furthermore, and as I discussed in 
the previous section, we need to ask how and to what extent an ethic of care has served 
as the guiding ethic for a feminist rhetoric. Looser' s article goes on to investigate the 
very issues surrounding identity politics in the field and the essentialist base of much 
feminist work in the field, observing that there still remains resistance to the ways in 
which poststructuralism has challenged feminist rhetoric and politics. 
Notably, most forays into historicizing and theorizing a feminist rhetoric have 
become what I earlier called "textualizations" of classroom practice. That is, whatever 
discursive tactics or models are recovered or proposed for a feminist rhetoric are often 
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translated into feminist pedagogy or "read off" the classroom . Indeed, feminist 
discursive practice is easily translated into pedagogy, and I am not suggesting that this 
should not be the case. Feminist rhetoric and pedagogy has, to a great extent, 
inadvertently replicated the same maternal-feminine paradigm of the ethics of care. In 
response, I want to invoke a feminist ethics of rhetoric in managing the multiple 
discourses of feminist critique. For it is important that we learn lessons from 
poststructuralism in that we cannot take down one feminism and merely supplant it 
with another, nor can we welcome the validity of all in a benign attempt at pluralism or 
celebrations of difference. The project, then, is a contradictory one: to interrogate 
feminist theories so that no theory creates an epistemological space for all; at the same 
time, this interrogation must authorize some space from which to speak. This inquiry 
finds that rather than answering Looser' s question about what epistemological definition 
of woman authorizes feminist theory, there is only the continual renewal of critique, an 
obligatory ethos in linking and creating phrasings of and for feminism. However, one 
provisional answer is the rhetorical positioning of woman and/ in exile in addition to an 
ethics of embodiment. As Ebert' s work identifies, there is also a strong political 
possibility in the class positions occupied--and shared--by women . 
Always in search of a discursive enactment of feminist politics, feminist rhetoric 
looked to French feminism and ecriture feminine for its possibility of resistance in offering 
a different language, a feminine one, that ruptures the logocentric systems that exclude 
this distinctly feminine language from presence. But there are problems with the French 
theories--as with the ethic of care--because much of their arguments rest upon "biological 
bedrock" (Bammer 248), especially the call to write the (female) body into visibility. 
Cixous, Irigaray, and to some extent, Kristeva, are a few of the major authorizing voices 
of French feminism. While each has distinct differences in theorizing women's libidinal 
difference from men, all confer that a revolution of phallogocentric language is possible 
in alternative forms of writing-as-resistance. In short, French feminism targets the 
141 
history of binary thinking, patriarchal systems of inclusion and exclusion, and the 
position of language in maintaining patriarchal hegemony. By now, most readers are 
quite familiar with French feminism, its theoretical tenets, and its linguistic possibilities 
(see Junker; Jones; Worsham), so I will avoid lengthy descriptions and explanations of 
key theorists' work. 
There are some startling intersections between an ethic of care and the way in 
which French feminism has been proposed for a feminist rhetoric. The "will to 
pedagogy" (Worsham 96) that drives composition to "practice" a possible feminist 
rhetoric results in an ethic of care in the classroom . For example, Clara Junker's "Writing 
(with) Cixous" is one important example of an attempt to absorb the theories of French 
feminism for the composition classroom. Junker extracts from Cixous for composition 
an emphasis on prewriting and revision to show students that texts are always being 
written. Cixous positions women as subjects who do not speak; they are designated in 
positions of lack. Ecriture feminine--like Gilligan's "different voice"--tries to locate a 
feminine self in absence to make it speak. Because of primary difference--conceived in 
either libidinal or psychological terms--Cixous in the writing classroom can "allow 
women writers ... to speak foreign tongues" (431) by expanding and experimenting 
with writing. Junker adds that we need to encourage experimentation, lack of closure, 
invention and "reception rather than [the] aggression" (433) of academic argument. 
While feminine ecriture has been valuable for feminist rhetoric, it does not offer 
the kind of rhetorical spaces I want to advocate. Furthermore, I have ethical concerns 
about this model for "real world" writing situations . For if women writers are 
encouraged to break these rules by joining in the free play of the signifier released from 
symbolic law, aren't they at a disadvantage when it comes time to "write like a man," 
adhering to the logocentric, formal rules of argumentation? Feminine ecriture still 
positions women writers in terms of--or in opposition to-men and masculine symbolic 
discourse. Furthermore, and as I argued against an ethic of care, I have problems with a 
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theory that capitalizes on feminine behavior by advocating "reception rather than 
aggression" Ounker 433) for female students . "Reception" is associated with essentialist 
qualities of the feminine. And much like the need for relationship and understanding in 
an ethics of care, feminine ecriture conflates aggression with the inversion of "true" 
femininity. 
The ethic of care also shares many similarities with feminist pedagogies that use 
expressivist paradigms in the classroom. Autobiographical and personal writing are 
often the chosen modes in these caring, sharing, and "womb-like" classrooms that have 
opted for squelching argument and difference in the hope of providing a more nurturant, 
supportive environment for students. This particular strain of feminist pedagogy 
attempts to rewrite the cultural script of banking models of education (Weiler) by acting 
as a guide rather than a depositor of knowledge; favors collaborative learning and in-
class group activities; uses one-on-one an personalized correspondence with students; 
and attempts to share and decenter authority in the classroom. Ideally, consensus 
learning and problem solving in a sharing, caring environment provide the setting for this 
comfortable practice of learning. Moreover, many expressivist pedagogies rely on 
assumptions of woman, femininity, and the alignment of "woman-as-mother," in 
addition to a focus on highly personal, private experience. Susan Jarratt argues that, 
while they allow students personal and unlimited expression, expressivism does not 
turn personal experience outward into public issues and public voices (121). Jarratt goes 
on to critique a trend among feminists to see argument, and by extension, rhetoric as a 
non -feminist mode of expression, an assumedly violent and phallocentric drive for 
masculinist models of discourse. Notably, argument provides a model for using private 
experience in a public way, a means of mediating both spheres, and if we follow through 
on the gendered connotations of these spaces, negotiating the private and public allows 
both men and women to integrate and occupy traditionally feminine and masculine 
space, a move that helps to question gender categories. 
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Noddings' chapter on moral education in Caring shares the same means and 
goals of feminist rhetoric as I have described in it pedagogical translations. The ethic of 
care operates between student and teacher in an emphasis on "working together" (178). 
She "encourage[s] [the student] to stand personally related to what he says and does. 
He is not just part of the lesson .... He is a human being responsible for his words and 
acts" (178). The teacher in this classroom negotiates rules and even bends them to 
students' needs because these rules "are not sacred to her" (178). Instead, the teacher 
engages the student in dialogue to show him caring relations. To this end, smaller, 
collaborative classrooms foster the kind of dialogue necessary to meeting the other 
morally (181). Until this point in her chapter on moral education, I agree with the ethic 
of care in the classroom. However, Noddings is most concerned with "making the voice 
of the mother heard in both ethics and education" (182). The rules of argument, 
objectivity, and abstraction foster "detachment and loss of relation" (182). In contrast, 
the assumedly more valuable ethic of care fosters a more humane dialogue of 
relatedness. 
There is, then, an obligatory ethos associated with feminist rhetoric and 
pedagogy: The message for feminists is that rhetorical strategies should be translated 
into classroom practices to further the goal of liberatory pedagogy. In the process of 
doing so, feminist rhetoric has inadvertently re-voiced Gilligan's initial findings about 
women and ethics. By predicating moral theories of difference upon quasi-essentialist 
foundations that do little to provide alternative rhetorics, Gilligan and Noddings attend 
to only one form of embodiment and help to establish a limited foundation for feminist 
theory. In addition, the liberatory goals of feminist rhetoric attempt to make public 
women's discourse and ways of knowing. Ironically, these attempts, in the limited 
''bodies" assumed in their appropriations of an ethic of care, privatize rather than 
publicize the difference of women's experience and embodiment. Thus,to deal with 
embodiment is to contend with politics; it means to go public. 
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II. Gendered Spaces for a Feminist Ethics of Rhetoric 
If we agree with Meaghan Morris that creating positions is the business of 
rhetoric, of forming what she calls "enunciative strategies" (86), then it is our business as 
teachers and academics concerned with ethics, rhetoric, and feminism to create these 
spaces of and in discourse. Rosalyn Diprose makes the connectedness of the body, 
discourse, and ethics apparent in linking these three coordinates in a spatio-temporal 
framework. "Taking up a position, presenting oneself, therefore requires a non-thematic 
awareness of temporality and location. And, the intrinsic reference point for 
temporality, spatial orientation and, therefore, difference is one's own body. That 
location and position are concepts easily interchangeable, illustrates the co-incidence of 
embodiment and ethics which necessarily come together by virtue of our spatio-temporal 
being-in-the-world" (The Bodies of Women 65). Diprose provides an important 
understanding of ethics in terms of "bodily specificity" (65), where the body is a site of 
subjectivity, a space "where the body is constituted by a dynamic relation with other 
bodies in a social context of power, desire, and knowledge" (66). Moira Gatens seconds 
the corporeal dimension of ethics in arguing for an embodied ethics, an ethics built from 
specific corporeal reactions and spaces. She qualifies, and quite rightly, that even while 
we accept the body as a site for an ethics, we cannot tacitly assume an essential female 
body upon which to predicate this ethics . She amends an "ethics of difference" (104) to 
attend to the "different forms of embodiment [that] are themselves historical and open 
to change" (104). 
Politically, that is, within a male ''body politic," Hipparchia's appearance as a 
public philosopher and rhetor disturbs what Iris Young calls "the moral division of 
labor" (100) that characterizes men's and women's roles in performing ethics. While 
Young sees this split emerging with the rise of the public sphere and Enlightenment 
philosophy, I would argue that her characterization extends to other historical periods 
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as well. For even in the Hellenistic age, middle- and upper-class women remained in the 
home, schooled in little more than domestic virtues. Manuals for the well-bred, literate 
woman advised a passive and patient demeanor in the face of marital infidelity, the 
handling of slaves, and the ideal social behavior of a virtuous woman. Generally, 
passivity and silence were the favored virtues of respectable women of the polis. Indeed, 
while the central organizing principles of Greek society differed greatly from 
Enlightenment Germany, the role of women in maintaining private morality versus male 
participation in legislating public ethics remains a comparable distinction. With 
Hipparchia, we find the woman philosopher--the exiled parrhesiast--breaking into male 
territory. Furthermore, Cynic "shameless asceticism" in the use of the body as an 
enactment of ethics is further problematized when "woman" is thrown into the "body 
politic." In this way, Hipparchia uses the excluded spaces of Cynic rhetoric to engage 
the public sphere. 
We need only consider the spatial separation of the sexes in ancient Greece to 
realize the significance of Hipparchia living and speaking in public (Pomeroy 78). 
According to Sarah Pomeroy, "respectable women" of the upper classes were secluded 
in the home, even the living quarters of the home were separated by sex. Men usually 
lived on the lower levels of the house, with the women, including a wife, living on the 
upper level to shield them from the public distractions of the street (Goddesses 80). 
These arrangements were normally maintained to prevent slaves from breeding and to 
keep upper-class women from the eyes of other men. Lower-class women and slaves 
were not as restricted for their work demanded that they leave the home to fetch water 
and do errands (80-81). 
In literal spatial terms alone, women were annexed to the private rooms of the 
home, as they were equally exempted from participation in the political and social 
spheres. Just as there were "feminized" spaces in the architectural plan of the Greek 
home, women were also associated conceptually with what Plato calls the chora. In 
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Timaeus, Plato describes "a mythological bridge between the intelligible and the sensible, 
mind and body, which he calls chora" (Grosz 47). Like the insurgent and mobile 
potential of space as conceived in the first chapter, chora is an historically appropriate 
concept of space at work in ancient Greek life, especially in terms of how it was used to 
describe "feminine" space. Chara, according to Grosz, has served "to produce a 
founding concept of femininity whose connections with women and female corporeality 
have been severed, producing a disembodied femininity as the ground for the production 
of a (conceptual and social) universe" (48). To this end, she offers further definitions of 
chora as '"site,' 'region,' 'locale' [and] associated with a series of gender-aligned terms--
'mother', 'nurse', 'receptacle', and 'imprint-bearer"' (48). Grosz finds that spatial 
concepts like chora have served to appropriate a disembodied feminine space that has 
no characteristics of its own, but is always in a position to "be occupied [and colonized] 
... an extension which can be . .. (taken)" (Algra 33). That is to say, chora is the space 
of appropriation, one wherein the particularity of gender is philosophically divorced 
from lived bodies. 
While Grosz argues that foundational concepts of space have been attempts to 
"colonize" woman in philosophical thought, I would like to suggest, as Kristeva has, 
that chora is an important and useful discursive space . I do not, however, equate this re-
valuing of chora with Kristeva's notion of chora as a prediscursive or "maternal" space 
for this may be perceived as yet another discourse that attempts to regulate the female 
body. Rather, I support her attempts to overturn Plato's association of chora with '"the 
mysterious' and 'incomprehensible"' (6). The point here is that in aligning chora with the 
feminine, the mysterious, and the amorphous, Plato created a question, an ambiguity 
that had to be answered and defined. The answers to this ambiguity defined woman by 
function--mother, nurse, receptacle. The move to (re)place the body and its sexual 
"script" --which may be further written over with the asymmetries of race, class, gender, 
sexuality, and age--is an ethical and rhetorical task because this interpretation of chora 
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will work to recharge this space as a political, ethical, and thus, "embodied" one. In 
other words, chora represents the relationship between gender and ethics and is a spatial 
metaphor for the philosophical connection between woman and passivity. If she can be 
"occupied," she is incapable of maintaining the moral rigor needed for ethics. If she is 
disembodied, she cannot stand her ground. 
In my reading, chora can provide an operative space for reconciling feminism with 
feminist ethics. If the problems I have identified stem from the responsibility to 
represent difference in the critique of Woman, especially as that woman often falls prey 
to maternal metaphors, then we need to consider how this project often assumes "that 
there is an identity that we share as women and that the differences between us are 
secondary" (Cornell 85). Claims of a female identity can often disguise privilege, in 
particular, those privileges based on racial and class differences. The result, according 
to Cornell, is a "dearth of symbolizations of the feminine within sexual difference that 
yields the experience of silencing" (78). We can read the ethic of care as one of the few 
"symbolizations" of the feminine that creates limited, silencing discursive spaces and 
one that has easily been taken up by feminists who "pass" into and are "accepted by 
institutional structures" (84). 
Cornell's reading of the paradox inherent in Lacanian lack is helpful for 
evaluating the space of chora and for providing epistemological directions for feminism, 
and more specifically, feminist ethics. Because she is identified with lack and "lacking 
meaning, [woman] can 'be anything.' The impossibility of absolutely fixing the meaning 
of woman yields endlesss transformative possibility" (87). Like the feminine space of 
chora, lack represents the empty, passive space of woman. "The hole we leave in reality 
is filled with masculine fantasy" (90). The few discourses available to women as 
"feminine Other . .. set the stage for a very limited conversation" (90) because we as 
feminists have unconsciously and inadvertently replicated existing gender dichotomies 
and the few available roles in this drama. If we consider chora as an equivalent to lack, 
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then I think we can begin to see one possibility in reconciling ethics and embodiment, if 
only in the responsibility for representing "new symbolizations" of other bodies, 
relationships, and places speak. For rhetoric, this means creating new rhetorical tactics-
-feminist discursive spaces--that allow for intervention. For ethics, this means 
contesting "the assumed sexual neutrality of moral judgment" (Diprose vi). Revaluing 
the space of chora not as a masculine fantasy, but as a feminist rhetorical space that 
includes tactical discourses of intervention may prove beneficial. Indeed, it may even 
lead us to consider that "gender is a place, one which can be entered or left, not an 
identity" (Allen and Faigley 163). Thus, the work of feminist rhetoric is to keep this 
warehouse full. As I have argued throughout, Cynic rhetoric provides us with an 
"arsenal" of strategies with which to begin this work. 
III. The Problem of Difference 
At issue for feminism is the "genesis of identity and difference" (Diprose 28) 
that serves as the foundation for feminist theories. For earlier feminists like Gilligan and 
N oddings, this quest has brought them to psychological explanations of women's 
inclination for ethical caring. They each opt for a valorizing of women's unique 
expressions and contributions to moral development. Indeed, the explanatory power of 
Gilligan's work is one of the reasons she has maintained such a foothold across the 
disciplines. However, as the earlier mention of Cornell's work suggests, a gender 
skepticism about the viability of the category of woman and a critique of feminism's 
homogenizing tendencies has served to fracture feminism into difference, rather than 
building feminism on a psychological or essential discourse of Woman . As Teresa Ebert 
outlines, this fracturing has produced feminisms of "differences within" (892), rather 
than differences between men and women, as the source for a feminist pluralism. Her 
observation of this trend speaks to my own concerns about building a feminist politics 
that maintains a responsibility to difference: "And of course, the question for feminism 
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is how can it build a transformative politics on a postmodern difference that throws out 
certainty and destabilizes identity" (892). 
Difference suggests a pluralism that potentially authorizes what Susan Bordo 
calls the construction of "an Other who is an exotic alien, a breed apart" (140). Bordo 
worries that theoretical moves to encourage difference, while important 
epistemologically, risk ignoring real bodies in real worlds. "They refuse to assume a 
shape for which they must take responsibility" (145). Ebert too remains skeptical about 
a feminist pluralism because "[it] . . .involves a very insidious exclusion as far as any 
politics of change is concerned: it excludes and occludes the critique of global or 
structural relations of power as 'ideological and 'totalizing"' (898). Ebert's solution to 
this impasse offers something along the lines of a coalition politics that is not based 
upon sameness or identity; rather, feminism is created by subjects who are differently 
positioned within patriarchy, but who are also "subjects of the same structures of 
oppression" (901). Ebert bases this feminist practice, then, on differences-in-relation 
rather than differences within to form the base for a feminist politics. 
In short, professing difference is not enough. Ebert' s re-theorizing of difference 
draws attention to the inadequacy of difference as well as the benignly liberal moves 
difference can make for feminist politics. And while I agree with her reconfiguration of a 
feminism of differences-in-relation, I want to extend this search for feminist politics to 
include questions of ethics and a "justice of multiplicities" (Fraser and Nicholson 23). In 
my mind, we can only represent differences-in-coalition if there is a theory of justice to 
ground political action, for as Cornell argues, our "solidarity is not just given to us on 
the basis of our shared identity as women" (83), but extends to our responsibility for 
generating confining fantasies of Woman (83). But this theory of justice must also be an 
"in-between" space like that of chora; it cannot replicate the exclusions and assumptions 
of traditional concepts of justice. 25 As Jane Flax provides, 
Justice can be understood as belonging to the 'transitional 
space' ... a 'third world' that is neither subjective nor objective, 
neither purely inner or outer. This world has its own processes, 
tasks and ways of making sense out of experience. This space is 
transitional only in the sense that it bridges the gaps between self 
and other and inner and outer reality .... It does ... continually 
grow in complexity and richness. (204) 
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Our inquiry, then, must turn toward making the "ethics of difference" a viable political 
practice. For feminist rhetoric, this means making differences speak with an eye toward 
discursive practices that maintain political responsibility. As I contend throughout, it is 
the business of a feminist ethics of rhetoric to invent new spaces for discourse that can 
simultaneously provide tactical exigencies for speaking as well as the apparatus for 
critiquing how discourses silence and exclude. 
Toward a Feminist Ethics of Rhetoric: Hipparchia and a Political Somatics 
Beginning with the ethical task of insuring a "justice of multiplicities," one that is 
attentive to difference and the ways specific bodies are positioned in discourse and 
culture, I want to look at what Cynic rhetoric, especially in its attention to the body and 
discourse, can provide for a feminist ethics of rhetoric. In particular, how can 
Hipparchia provide an example, if not a model, of what a feminist rhetoric might look 
like, as well as how to make an "ethics of difference" (Gatens) speak outside of 
overused models of care and maternal alignment. 
Cynicism provides a space, "a theatre for practical actions" (DeCerteau 175). It 
creates a field that authorizes dangerous and contingent social actions (125). In 
Hipparchia and the Cynic corporeal enactment of ethics, we engage with a rhetorical 
practice of the body, but one based on the contradictions of ascetic practice. For 
example, the Cynics professed the negation of physical desire, but Crates and 
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Hipparchia are renowned for having sex in the agora. Branham adds to this Diogenes' 
use of the body as a source for his "serious laughter": 
[M]any of Diogenes's jokes are aimed at the body or call attention 
to the bodily aspects of his interlocutors and targets, e.g., a 
woman bending over as she prays, a boy exposing his rear .. 
. . The ungovernable body recurs in many forms upsetting the pretenses 
to serious or civilized behavior. It is the ideal instrument for the Cynic 
attack on the artificiality and falsity of official codes of civilized life. 
("Cynic Rhetoric" 351) 
Moreover, what do we make of Hipparchia in the ''body politic," not just for the 
flouting of strict social conventions, but for assuming the position of rhetor and 
philosopher? Like Diogenes of Sinope, Hipparchia engages in a "political somatics" 
(Hodge and Mansfield 200), an intersection of the body, the public sphere, and 
resistance. What Hipparchia adds for a specifically feminist rhetoric is the creation of 
spaces that speak of bodies that negotiate contradictions between speech and action, 
belief and desire, convention and ethics. 
Cynic rhetoric and ethics provide a range of discursive tactics whose task it is to 
point out injustice. A feminist "political somatics" uses the body to forge new 
combinations and contradictions. But this body is not an essential female self; it is, 
rather, the space afforded a political body that is regulated and limited by the spaces in 
which it can speak. As a "political body" in a ''body politic," Hipparchia contests 
these spaces by calling attention to the limited range of spaces available to exiled and 
ambiguous bodies. In the example of Hipparchia and Crates, bodies and their ability to 
speak and support ethical stances were invoked to compel audiences to follow the 
example of just living. As Rosalyn Diprose explains, the body cannot be divorced from 
discourses, but "the body always refers beyond itself, its production is incomplete .... 
Sexed bodies are always opened to other possibilities beyond those which position 
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woman as other to man" (80). Diprose goes on to advocate new possibilities derived 
from the "ambiguities and contradictions" (135) of this binary, new ways of engaging 
resistance that also offer discursive positions to seek out how injustice is made possible 
by regulative discursive practices (Diprose). 
In this way, the body becomes the locus of rhetorical enactment, "a trope" to be 
used in persuading listeners to an ethical life of action (Branham, "Cynic Rhetoric" 350). 
Considering the Cynic tactics of resistance, we can also see how the body becomes 
involved in a political somatics. Ethics and politics are thus predicated upon what one 
does with one's body. In light of the few available literal and discursive spaces afforded 
to the body of woman in the polis, Hipparchia' s asceticism and her flouting of 
convention followed through on the Cynic commitment to naturalism. By engaging in 
sexual intercourse with Crates in a the agora, she exposes an "ungovernable body" in the 
affront to standards of feminine modesty (Branham, "Cynic Rhetoric" 231). At the 
same time, however, she risks not having the demonstration of her ethical stance taken 
seriously. This is, after all, a central problem with interpreting ancient practices in light 
of a contemporary framework. Nevertheless, I can see a similar bodily demonstration of 
ethical belief in the contemporary example of women and men who accompany women 
into protested abortion clinics, using their bodies in support of an ethical and political 
position . 
At the very least, Cynic rhetoric is useful in enacting a political somatics and by 
creating discourses and stances that account for a body. But if, as I maintain, 
Hipparchia provides us with directions for a feminist ethics of rhetoric, then we need to 
examine her attempt to disrupt the private sphere of moral behavior. I should note that 
one of the central reasons the Cynics lived in public places was to address the 
hypocrisies that often went on "behind closed doors." Epictetus recalls: 
For this you ought to know: Other men have the protection of 
their walls and their houses and darkness, when they do 
anything of [the] sort, and they have many things to hide them .. 
. . But the Cynic, instead of all these defences, has to make his 
self-respect his protection; if he does not, he will be disgracing 
himself naked and out of doors. His self-respect is his house, 
his door, his guards. [He has no need of something to conceal 
him] . (135-137) 
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This passage is significant in light of the relationship between the private and public 
sphere in ancient Greece. A citizen's status in the polis was dependent upon ownership 
in the private or "private property." The private was governed by the public citizen 
assumedly according to the ethical and political practices and beliefs of the public 
sphere; thus, there was a unity between the ancient public and private spheres that we 
do not now experience. Because of this, the Cynic public embodiment of ethics was an 
affront to the assumptions of private ownership. In addition, it did not allow for "a 
hiding" of discrepancies between a public and private self. If we reconsider Seyla 
Benhabib' s assertion that "the struggle to make something public is the struggle for 
justice" (94), then we can consider how the role of the woman rhetor becomes more 
complicated in the struggle to "go public" with a political somatics. 
By taking female bodily experience-especially experiences carefully managed by 
discourse--from the private sphere and into the public where they might not even be 
recognized in light of the entirely male participation in the ancienct public sphere, 
Hipparchia challenges the universal of male embodiment by complicating this narrative 
with the female body. We need only recall the spatial arrangement of the ancient Greek 
home to witness the extent to which female bodies were privatized by both ideology and 
architecture. As "partial" citizens, women were public bodies without the freedom and 
rights available to those of men . Their bodies were legislated publicly to maintain the 
private sphere. The public sphere of the Greek polis was based upon the public 
participation of propertied, free, slave-holding males, while women, slaves, and by 
association, Cynics, were identified with oikos--the sphere of the home and family. 
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In terms of its gender implications, the public sphere has historically excluded 
women. As Joan B. Landes outlines in "The Public and Private Sphere: A Feminist 
Reconsideration," the bourgeois public sphere is an ideal space for democratic discourse, 
one that was intially separate from the market and the family. Based on his 
recuperation of the eighteenth-century model, Jurgen Habermas in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere identifies neutrality and universality as the 
presuppositions of the public sphere and its attendant model of ideal speech. It was 
assumed that the subjects and concerns discussed in the public sphere--those of white, 
propertied men--carried the force of universality. By reinstating this paradigm, Landes 
observes that "Habermas overlooks the strong association of women's discourse and 
their interests with 'particularity,' and conversely the alignment of masculine speech 
with truth, objectivity, and reason" (98). Moreover, it was the assumption of a male 
body, of a "(male) particular" that established the public sphere and masculine 
embodiment as a universal norm (Landes 98). 
The Greek polis, not unlike the Enlightenment ideal, maintained that "'the civil 
public where citizens meet in terms of equality and mutual respect is too rounded and 
tame an ideal of public. This idea of equal citizenship attains unity because it excludes 
bodily and affective particularity, as well as the concrete histories of individuals that 
make groups unable to understand one another'" (Iris Young as qtd. in Landes 99). 
Similarly, in the Greek polis, women's particularity was excluded spatially, discursively, 
and politically from the public sphere. Hipparchia' s discourses and actions therein 
forge a moment of visibility and audibility for women's particularity. Furthermore, the 
public sphere of the polis was even more restrictive of democratic discursive freedom. 
As Landes examines of Habermas, the Greek model did not provide for the vital 
component of communicative rationality with other citizens against and in response to 
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government. Because the organizing concerns of the Greek polis focused on maintaining 
military strength and military competition among citizen males, this model of the public 
sphere does not provide a space for dissent from government since the polis is 
maintained against external threats rather than internal ones (Habermas as qtd. in 
Landes 95). And in light of women's almost non-existent role in military exploits, we 
can assume that the polis, simply by virtue of its organizing principle, strictly maintained 
public and private spheres, offering little room for even those dissenting male voices that 
did participate in the democratic forum. 
While the problems and contradictions of a feminist ethics of rhetoric are not 
resolved entirely in exporting from Cynic rhetoric an emphasis on embodiment, ethics, 
and rhetoric, they are met with an important example of Hipparchia, who, as I have 
argued, simultaneously complicates Cynic rhetoric as a "double exile" and foregrounds 
the role of the body in maintaining the injustice of exclusion from the public sphere. 
Furthermore, as Landes criticizes of Enlightenment rationality and the public sphere, 
privileging speech-acts and communication for the fostering and development of 
democratic polity "distorts the performative dimension of human action and 
interaction" (108). Like the Cynic emphasis on action and ethical practice, Landes 
advocates a pragmatic account of the public sphere. "Pragmatics, the formal use of 
language in interaction, is best accompanied by a theory and observation of (stylized 
and informal) bodily gestures and postures" (109). I think a similar argument could be 
made against rhetoric as well. While we often pay lip-service to nonverbal 
communication and a rhetoric of the body, we seldom examine this rhetoric on its own 
terms or its relationship to larger issues of gender and embodiment. As I have implicitly 
argued throughout, gender is mediated by language, and so too are the performative acts 
that both derive from and maintain gendered spaces. But these discourses have opened 
up and maintained fairly regulated discursive spaces, especially as feminist rhetoric and 
ethics have worked to replicate maternal models of care. I do not want to suggest that 
these are wrong; they are not. Rather, our goals now are for complication, ambiguity, 
and contradiction. 
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I think the story of Hipparchia provides us with an important example of the 
risks and complications of "going public" in the body politic, as well as the 
complications that issue from "placing" her in working toward a feminist rhetoric. 
Indeed, bodies often do this; they can both destabilize and institute discourses. In either 
sense, embodiment challenges us to deal with real bodies in real spaces. If we consider 
that female bodies and feminine space has been excluded from the public sphere, then 
we can understand the important attention that must be paid to particularity. The 
recent example of Fauziya Kasinga brings together the terms of this discussion--exile, 
resistance, ethics, and embodiment--and exemplifies to what extend the female body 
and its particularity still remains outside the concerns and responsibilities of the public 
sphere, a case-study that highlights both the problems and imperatives of dealing with 
embodiment and ethics. 
In the case of Kasinga, we might revise Fraser and Nicholson's "justice of 
multiplicities" (23) for a "justice of particularity." Fauziya Kasinga's case is by now the 
well-publicized story of the seventeen-year-old woman who escaped from an arranged 
marriage and genital mutilation in her native Togo. Upon entering the United States, 
Kasinga alerted customs officials that she had entered the country with an illegal 
passport and that she was seeking asylum. She has spent the last two years of her life 
being transported from one penal facility to another. During this time, she suffered 
abuse and humiliation as her case awaited judgment. And while her story has a positive 
ending--Kasinga was eventually granted asylum in the United States--her case and the 
reasoning used to deny her plea in the first ruling directly address the ethics of 
embodiment and the neutral body assumed in the legislation of the public sphere. 
Kasinga' s case marks the first that takes on the issue of female genital mutilation 
'"as the basis of an asylum claim'" (Musala as qtd. in Dugger A12). According to 
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lawyers involved in the case, "[b ]y law, people can win asylum if they are found to have 
a well-founded fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, political 
opinions or membership in a social group. The statute does not mention gender" 
(Dugger A12). Kasinga' s lawyers will argue in her appeal that she was a member of a 
persecuted social group, including all young women of her tribe who were subject to 
genital mutilation. The judge at her initial hearing denied Kasinga asylum because he 
had serious reservations about the facts of her case, ultimately ruling that she was not 
credible (Dugger A12). Another INS judge in an earlier case also denied asylum to a 
woman, ruling that "the woman could not change her gender, but she could choose 
whether or not to submit to her tribe's customary genital mutilation" (A12). It is my 
contention that the general trend to deny asylum in cases of female genital mutilation 
observes a rule of "abstract equality" (Landes 97), one that ignores the particular issues 
of female embodiment. 
In the courtroom, Kasinga ' s case challenges the assumption of male embodiment 
that passes for the standard of neutrality and objectivity. And while the conditions for 
granting asylum do attend to the particularities of ethnicity, race, and religion, they do 
not consider gender and women's bodies as within the domain of causes for persecution. 
As I argue, one primary reason for this omission stems from the privatization of 
women's interests and the particularity of their bodies, which are thus deemed 
"improper subjects for public debate" (Landes 98), especially when these bodies may 
fall within "private" tribal economies and fall far beyond the discourses normally used 
to talk about them. Moreover, American judges, grounded in a democratic polity, look 
for the choices that these women had to escape mutilation, a search that recklessly 
places genital mutilation within the realm of free choice. In doing so, the logic of one 
judge's refusal to grant asylum because a woman "could choose whether or not to 
submit to .. . genital mutilation" (Dugger A12) constructs this act as something that 
most women choose to do--as if pain , infection, banishment, or possible death are 
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choices; the logic used to dismiss her case follows a logic not unlike the one that 
suspends much public and legal treatment of rape in this country. Furthermore, this 
ruling assumes that members of these communities share equality, and that tribal 
customs are a matter of exercising a neutral individual choice, one unfettered by the 
constraints and conditions of embodiment. The language of law, and even immigration 
law that deals explicitly with difference, maintains the truth, objectivity, and reason so 
associated with this sphere. To this end, the judge's determination of Kasinga's 
testimony as lacking "rationality, ... lack of internal consistency, and [a] lack of 
inherent persuasiveness in her testimony" (A12) fails to meet the "norms of reason" and 
rationality of the public sphere (Landes 97). 
Furthermore, I think race certainly played a role in complicating an already 
complicated refusal to consider gender as a protected category. Notably, if she had 
claimed persecution on the basis of race, Kasinga would have had a "better" case, at 
least according to the terms of immigration law. Also, the stereotypical association of 
women's speech as emotional and irrational may have been further enhanced by a long 
history of associating a racial, African "other" with the tribal, the incoherent, and the 
amorphous (Deane 356). Thus the "colonial" position articulated earlier by Elizabeth 
Grosz finds application here in the example of "the unreasonable" body, one situated 
differently within a discourse of woman because of the particularity of race and nation. 
Not unlike the questions surrounding the epistemological space of chora, the question of 
embodiment was answered by the first judge's ruling by "colonizing" the threat to the 
plaintiff's body with gendered assumptions about the experience of female embodiment; 
that is to say, the judge used patriarchal, masculinist norms when deciding upon a 
perceived threat of persecution, ignoring the particularities of gender within a specific 
tribal community and the consequences that might have resulted had Kasinga refused 
this tribal practice. 
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Like Hipparchia, Kasinga occupies the position of exile, a literal and discursive 
position that provides both with a space from which to speak; but for the latter, this is 
a persecuted position that puts the terms of this discussion into immediate effect and 
makes the ethical implications of using the term exile all the more significant. Moreover, 
this literal example precludes any celebration of exile as postmodern strategy of 
resistance. I see Kasinga' s case as a starting point as well as a practical enactment of a 
feminist ethics of rhetoric. For, in one sense, her situation highlights our responsibility to 
respond in both theory and practice. In yet another, she contests the exclusions of 
female embodiment in the public sphere, a confrontation that must be met with tactical 
rhetorics, including, as Susan Jarratt would insist, the force of better argument. She also 
shows how exile is not always merely a discursive position, but one that may be 
difficult, even disturbing to imagine. In so doing, she, like Hipparchia, upsets those 
spaces already reserved for women in the public sphere by forcing a confrontation with 
embodiment in all its complicated and painful reality. As feminist rhetoricians, we 
should look to a variety of spheres, not just the public sphere of the academy, to find 
examples and narratives that help to tell this story and provide new speaking positions-
-those spaces of contradiction and ambiguity that "real lives" can create. 
A further, key distinction must be made, however, in appropriating the space of 
exile. Hipparchia is an example of what Benhabib calls "the social critic" who chooses 
a social space of exile outside the critical comforts "everyday certitudes" (226). This 
positioning, or "leaving home" as Benhabib calls it, is part of the vocation of social 
criticism "insofar as criticism presupposes a necessary distantiation" from the object of 
critique (227). This is a key point I want to emphasis: the space of the social critic, like 
that of the feminist rhetorician, is one that may require the "distantiation" of exile. In 
many obvious ways, exile for Fauziya Kasinga is much more than a rhetorical space of 
discourse. But in her example and the use of exile as a tactical exigence of rhetoric, I 
find a new directive for a feminist ethics of rhetoric that is attentive to the problem of 
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embodiment. Feminist rhetoricians like myself who want to develop a feminist ethics for 
rhetoric must tum our focus away from our comfortable "disciplinary homes" to real, 
lived examples of how our theories are challenged, complicated, and enriched by the the 
lives and bodies that are affected by the inequities created in the very rhetorics that 
structure our public sphere. This emphasis takes away from the comfort of categorical 
Woman to the study of both discourse, the body, and its "performance" within a 
political field. Ethics involves, then, our response to these embodiments in a public way. 
So while Hipparchia provides an historical example of "going public" with ethical 
stances and offers exile as another, differentiated foundation for a feminist ethics of 
rhetoric, Kasinga' s case makes the task of publicly responding to the locations of real 
bodies in exile, pain, need, and loss all the more imperative. 
Chapter 4 
Ethical Subjects: Composition, Pedagogy, and the Postmodern Classroom 
Ethics: Local or regional customs, like Basque folk songs 
or Bolivian hats . Sold at steep discounts in the global economy. 
Lewis H. Lapham, from "Economic Correctness" 
Rhetoric and composition studies has embraced critical and feminist 
pedagogies 26 for their political possibilities in the classroom. The first assumption of 
these pedagogies is that the classroom is a place where the political and cultural 
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contests of the culture are addressed on a local level. Signing on after Paulo Freire, Ira 
Shor, Gerald Graff, Kathleen Weiler, and Henry Giroux--to name a few names involved 
in this project-continue to engage both students and teachers in the study of how 
critical literacies can generate the kind of thinking needed for radical social change. 
"Hegemony," "resistance," and "agency" are some of the shared vocabulary of these 
projects, and they reflect the very political terms in which education is being discussed. 
But in focusing on the politicization and critique of education, critical and feminist 
pedagogues have sidestepped the very ethical moves that their works make. In tum, 
and as a consequence of rhetoric and composition's embrace of critical and feminist 
pedagogy, we can read this same omission in our own field. In many ways, composition 
has made a semantic move away from the ethical in favor of the political. As I contend, 
this move betrays what we are really talking about when we talk about politics. 
The politicization of composition pedagogy has and continues to be a topic rife 
with contention. Maxine Hairston, certainly not the first to decry the politicization of 
the classroom, but perhaps the loudest, argues in her 1992 article, "Diversity, Ideology, 
and Teaching Writing," that the teaching of writing has and is currently being taken over 
by the ideological agendas of instructors who are substituting politics for pedagogy. 
This move to the political in the teaching of writing serves to undermine the long-
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standing model of teaching writing as an assumedly non-political and ideologically-
neutral task. "It's a model that puts dogma before diversity, politics before craft, 
ideology before critical thinking, and the social goals of the teacher before the 
educational needs of the student" (180). Later that same year, a conversation among 
Susan Jarratt, Patricia Bizzell, Richard Marius, and Louise Wetherbee Phelps in the ADE 
Bulletin concerns the still quite controversial issue of politics in the composition 
classroom. Contrary to the vision of composition Hairston projects, Bizzell takes aim at 
-. -~e assumed neutrality of non-political pedagogy; she argues, instead, for a frank 
acknowledgment in the classroom of the positions and agendas held by instructors.; 
"what we should be doing is ... frankly acknowledging that we are promoting those 
values that seem best to us, as liberal arts instructors have always done" (5). Bizzell 
qualifies later that the value-forming task of liberal education should be "outed" from 
the closet of its implicit moral commitments (5). 
Bizzell' s argument for acknowledging one's politics and ethics in the classroom 
implicitly responds to the advent of postmodemity and poststructuralism, an 
engagement that has helped to usher in radical changes to the foundations that have 
supported the way instructors teach writing. Accordingly, the field's politicization of 
the teaching of writing is paired with the commitment to social and cultural change that 
has developed from the emergent spaces revealed through the political strains of 
poststructuralism. The classroom is the site of that enactment, a space where a 
community of writers can engage in the examination and critique of the potential and 
consequent silences and oppression(s) of consumer culture. In short, this critical stance 
of the field would have us look for politics in places where it is said there are none. 
My task here is not to provide an historical overview of the rift between those 
who would have us politicize the teaching of writing and those, like Maxine Hairston, 
who argue that the composition classroom has already become a site for political 
indoctrination; indeed, this argument continues to resonate, as I think it should. My goal 
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here is to recover and, in some sense, to reveal the ethical commitments that support 
politicized classrooms and the liberatory goals that drive them. That is to say, 
composition pedagogy, in its political commitment to social change, harbors often 
unacknowledged commitments to the ethics of its politics. As teachers of composition, 
we do not often consider ourselves involved in the teaching of ethics when, in fact, our 
political views are fundamentally about ethical norms-those ways of living in, being in, 
and responding to the world that serve as implicit "ought" statements about our goals 
for a more democratic culture and critical literacies. In other words, whether we realize 
it or not, we are equally engaged in projecting not only our politics but also our ethics in 
the classroom. 
I think the tacit connection between politics and ethics in the field is a fairly 
obvious one. Nevertheless, the use of "politicization" as a descriptor of composition's 
pedagogies overlooks the equally important influence of ethics in the making of these 
pedagogies. One central reason for using politics to describe ethics may stem from our 
associations of politics with public discourse; in democratic societies, politics is the 
name of public discourse, and because of this association, politics is a much more 
comfortable way of describing what it is we are doing when we politicize the writing 
classroom. That is, our attempts at political pedagogies are simultaneous attempts at 
public, political change . Clearly, the key term here is public; the assumption is that a 
discussion of the political constitutes an intervention into the life of the public and to 
social change. In addition, politics is a term that has consequence, either in the act of 
public discourse or in the democratic process. The ethical, on the other hand, has 
traditionally been associated with the personal, private experiences of individuals. 
Because of this association, the ethical is bound up with notions of the private 
individual and her "right" to make ethical decisions apart from public influence. Teresa 
Henning adds to this alignment of the private with the ethical by noting that the moral 
and ethical are areas of inquiry that we have yet to negotiate comfortably: "Our 
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personal, public, and disciplinary experiences with moral debate also hinder us from 
making a thorough inquiry into the relationship between ethics and our field" (1). This 
tendency to sidestep the ethical points to two important, initial contentions that will 
guide this discussion: the fact that we do not have enough public ways of talking about 
ethics and that we have only recently begun to reconcile productively a postmodern 
ethics in the composition classroom. 
This chapter examines initially how composition studies' emphasis on the 
political reveals its ambivalent relationship with ethics. This emphasis on the political 
"silences" a direct discussion of the ethical and effectively highlights the scarcity of 
models for discussing ethics in a public way. But this ambivalence is not recent; it has 
an historical precedent in the teaching of writing. To illustrate this, I want to delineate 
historical traces of the ethical in composition pedagogy, especially because this 
admittedly-cursory glance finds a curious commensurability: With the rise of training for 
business and professions in the early university came the decline of ethical themes in 
classroom. The liberal arts' historical commitment to ethics in the curriculum was met, 
more often than not, with an increasing emphasis on practical knowledges and 
professional training, a move that squelched discussions of ethics or turned them into 
prescriptive expositions on the preservation of liberal culture . Such an examination 
finds that, far from going underground, the relationship between ethics and composition 
studies has been an "uncomfortable" one, surviving on long-standing tensions between 
the ethical and the political, traditional and postmodern conceptions of ethics, and the 
public and private spheres. I want, then, to fashion both a theoretical and practical 
model, an "architecture of resistance" (Peters 93) that will not succumb to either a 
prescriptive morality or "the imposition of moral codes and agendas" (Henning 2) that 
have classified discussions of ethics and pedagogy or the appropriation of ethics to the 
private sphere. In doing so, I want to offer a Foucauldian ethics, for its emphasis on 
-
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subjectivity as well as its practicality for the classroom, in the project of reconciling the 
ethical in composition pedagogy--an ethics that matches its politics.27 
Composition Studies and the Ethics of Ambivalence 
The politicization of composition studies runs into a curious paradox when we 
come to the implicit, and in my view, uncomfortable prospect of admitting the ethics of 
our politics. Patricia Bizzell aptly articulates this tension when she describes the 
"catch-22" of admitting one's agenda while simultaneously attempting to avoid making 
this agenda an imposition on students . ''Because we view the imposition of ideological 
agendas as morally questionable, we become reluctant to exercise power in the 
classroom. But on the other hand, our moral sensibility motivates us to promote 
particular ideological agendas, or, if you prefer, particular ethical positions" (4). Bizzell 
goes on to describe the effects of such a tension as paralyzing to academics who need 
now, perhaps more than ever, to intervene and "exercise moral leadership" (4). 
Whereas Bizzell traces this tension to instructors' comfort with "hiding" behind the 
formal requirements of teaching students to write competent, expository prose, I tend to 
see the advent of politicized pedagogies as an attempt to exercise the very moral 
leadership she's calling for. The distinction, however, is in what I read as a use of the 
political that rests upon strongly held ethical foundations. Nevertheless, Bizzell 
appears to be arguing that even in cases where instructors have taken up a poltiical 
position as institutional authorities, linking their political commitments to pedagogy, 
they should also be aware of and open about the moral and ethical beliefs that inform 
their politics. 
In a more specific example of how discussions of ethics in a politicized 
pedagogical climate are foreclosed, Terry Rassmussen in" Antifoundationalism: Can 
Believers Teach?" refers to the "offending essay scenario" posed to a group of teaching 
assistants as an event that exposed the ethical implications of politics. While the 
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offensive essay is never clearly identified, readers are left to assume that it is the 
dreaded paper in which a student argues for "racism, sexism, or gay-bashing," an essay 
that does more than just make an instructor wince at an opposing political view (152). 
My first year in graduate school, this offensive essay scenario was 
posed to me and a group of fellow teaching assistants. Not 
surprisingly, an awkward silence followed. My initial response 
was that I would call the student in for a conference, discuss her 
views beside my own, and hopefully persuade the student 
towards my own way of understanding. On second thought I 
questioned that position, wondering if I had any business calling 
upon a student to witness my ethical inclinations. (151) 
Rasmussen's description of the silence surrounding the question of what one was to do 
in reponse to such a paper is a key example of the ambivalence surrounding the question 
of ethics in composition studies, in general, and for writing pedagogy, in particular. 
Rasmussen also situates the question of the ethical after postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, suggesting that this feeling of "groundlessness" has developed from 
the field's attempt to question its own epistemological foundations. The effect of this 
has made ethics all the more difficult to consider for the postmodern classroom. In a 
field that has embraced new pedagogies for their political potential, Rassmussen asks, 
"Why is it that today's educators are so squeamish about sharing values in the 
classroom when we daily express our epistemological biases in what and how we 
teach?" (151). 
In response to her own question, Rassmussen sees the discomfort with talking 
about ethical and moral views issuing from the "risky business" (151) of sharing these 
views in a discussion that may get contentious (151-52). While I do think that the threat 
of heated and potentially ugly debate in the classroom is one immediate reason for 
"silence" on such questions, I think our discomfort with discussions of the ethical in 
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public goes deeper than that threat. As I have already alluded to, and will argue later, 
the ethical in pedagogy is aligned with private and individualist notions of one's 
freedom to choose and decide upon ethical decisions away from responsibility to a 
social whole. The very American foundations of liberalism insure that the individual 
will retain her status on questions of the private and personal to insure the cohesion of 
the social whole. Thus, to bring in a public discussion of personal ethics threatens to 
tear the fabric of a liberal democracy--and one small example of this democracy is a 
student's freedom to argue any point she likes in the classroom, however ethically 
questionable that argument might be. 
While they both point to composition studies' dis-ease with the ethical, 
Rassmussen and Bizzell also implictly suggest further reasons why we either do not deal 
with the ethical as well as why such an engagement will erupt in a heated and 
uncomfortable exchange. In my view, one major obstacle to discussing ethics is that we 
do not have a public way of talking about them, a point that might partially explain the 
discursive options of silence or "unpleasant confrontation" that Rassmussen describes 
(152). She observes the uncomfortable silence about what one is to do in the face of an 
ethically-challenging essay with her own inability to articulate a response. Perhaps for a 
lack of viable models, Rassmussen falls back on her "gut reaction" that something 
certainly authorizes the teacher's voice as a rhetorical authority in reponse to an 
unethical paper, but "[t]hat opinion was never voiced: I had not proof, no line of 
support'' (152). 
Both Bizzell and Rassmussen respectively create solutions to this problem. For 
Bizzell, a more general inquiry into finding ways of talking about our ethical 
commitments is in order. "I feel strongly that we academics need to find more ways to 
promote social justice. The problem is how to talk about such values without promoting 
exclusions" (6). Rassmussen and Bizzell both argue for the increased importance of the 
teacher as a rhetorical and ethical authority. Interestingly, however, Rasmussen 
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contends with the postmodern refusal to authorize anything in arguing that the authority 
of the instructor's position is not negative , that the student-teacher relationship is not 
always a negative power relationship, and that some authority is necessary to maintain 
the ethical in composition pedagogy (155). To this end, she advocates that we take 
responsibility for our positions as instructors and demonstrate that ethos is a "legitimate 
persuasion" (160) that students should be taught to recognize and investigate as they 
argue in their own work. In short, we should take the risks of taking a position rather 
than allowing for a situation in which "one belief is as good as another" (161). 
I will return to other possible solutions to finding a way to talk about the ethical 
in the classroom in Chapter Five. For now, though, I want to emphasize that 
composition studies and its pedagogies have been uncomfortable, and at times, 
ambivalent about the ethical in the field and in the classroom. Furthermore, both Bizzell 
and Rassmussen point to the fact that we do not yet have established ways of talking 
about the ethical, unless, of course, we talk about it as epistemology or politics. In their 
acknowledgment of postmodernism, they both also attempt to work out ways of talking 
about ethics that do not rely on civic discourse models or Aristotelian models of the 
public sphere, a move that has remained a standard of composition's engagement with 
ethics. They attempt to work in the local space of the classroom, instead of calling up a 
model of the Greek agora to "go public" in their discussions of ethics . They also tacitly 
examine the formation of teacher subjectivity in an honest acknowledgment of teaching 
authority, but an authority that harbors possibility and positivity for shaping--not 
students' ethics--but their appreciation for and articulation of ethical positions. In the 
following section, I provide an historical reading of composition's changing and 
ambivalent relationship with the ethical as well as its reliance of Aristotelian civic 
discourse models. My critique of the Aristotelian civic discourse model and its 
attendant model of the public sphere serves to open up a space for a more historical and 
critical ethics. 
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In Brief: A History of the Ethical Subject in Composition 
While I contend that composition maintains an ambivalent relationship with 
ethics, there are voices from the field who have clearly established an explicit 
commitment to creating ethical subjects--of students in the classroom and in the projects 
in which they are involved. Bruce Herzberg' s community service and writing course 28 
and Brook Thomas's constitutional literacy course 29 serve as examples of the ways 
writing teachers are responding to our profession's historical commitment to ethics and 
rhetoric by asking students to "go public" in their writing and thinking. By turning 
toward models of critical, political literacies, these instructors are asking students to 
respond to social injustice and understand their imbrication in systems of power and 
exclusion. In addition, these three courses are predicated upon an appreciation of civic 
education for civic participation, a goal that holds much in common with Aristotle's 
concept of education for political participation. My goal is, then, to observe the field's 
long-standing relationship with Aristotelian notions of education and civic 
participation, that ethics after Aristotle tends toward an ethics of public discourse. As I 
contend, this linkage situates ethics in terms of a clearly-defined public sphere, one that 
involves positivistic and populist conceptions of democratic community. 
To begin this trace, I must first look to the rhetorical tradition to find the traces 
of ethics in pedagogy and the curriculum, especially as ethics has often become a 
question of "moral rightness" (Henning 7) and prescriptive morality. Teresa Henning's 
observation of what I will call prescriptive ethics in composition pedagogy has been the 
dominant model used in composition classrooms. What we find in even a cursory glance 
at this presence in pedagogical history, is the need for a new paradigm for thinking 
ethics in the classroom, one that centers more on student agency, questions of 
subjectivity, and the mediation of private and public spheres--in short, a critical ethics. 
At the same time, I look to standards of literacy and the purpose of education in 
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different historical periods to understand how the ethical has always maintained a 
relationship with education for citizenship and liberal culture, in general and to writing 
pedagogy, in particular. As I argue, the belief in education for critical literacy and 
citizenship has had a confusing and contradictory relationship with the rise of American 
industry: With the rise of business and vocational training in American colleges 
throughout the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries came the decline of ethical 
themes in rhetoric and composition classrooms, an emphasis that further conflates 
spatial relationships of private and public ethics. 
I. Aristotle, Moral Education, and The Public Sphere 
Historically, the central purpose of rhetoric was to train students "in communal 
public discourse on civic issues" (Applebee 171), a central tenet of early education 
which survived in the liberal arts college in America. The goals of a liberal education 
developed with the Sophists in what came to be known as the medieval trivium of 
writing, argument, and speech and quadrivium of artithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and 
music (Verbeke 2) and remained consistent until the nineteenth century when demands 
for specialized and business professions changed the demand for a liberal arts 
education. The Sophistic schools also favored practical skills that encouraged good 
citizenship and the attainment of an influential position in society (Verbeke 6). Quite 
early on in educational history, then, the function of a liberal arts education was linked 
to citizenship, to the fundamental needs of the citizen to function productively in a 
democracy. In Aristotle, we meet a fuller articulation of the relationship between civic 
participation and moral education. 
According to Gerard Verbeke in Moral Education in Aristotle, the role of a moral 
education in the lives of young people was of paramount importance to Aristotle. For 
Aristotle, humans are ultimately political and moral animals who strive for the good and 
define this good in communities guarded by laws and custom. Thus, the importance of 
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an educated and informed citizenry only increased in democratic Greece to insure the 
maintenance of community; laws "are [then] a permanent expression of the moral sense 
of a community" (Verbeke 12). In brief, Aristotle's goals for a moral education include 
three factors: 1) nature; 2) reason; and 3) training. Man is by nature a moral being , 
capable of reasoning and emotion, but his passions must be tempered by training. As a 
result, Aristotle believed that virtue is achieved through the practice and habit of moral 
behavior . 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle develops his concept of eudaimonia, or 
happiness, as the greatest goal of human life, but this happiness is achieved not through 
the indulgence of sensual pleasures; rather it is the achievement of "moral virtue and 
intellectual contemplation" (Verbeke 51). Once he has acquired the habit of virtue, an 
individual can turn to questions of judgment. Passions and desires "obscure the mind 
and prevent agents from having a clear view of what is to be done" (52). In theory, the 
agent will make correct judgments if he values reason and -is not swayed by desire and 
passion. For Aristotle, then, the student must participate in a habit of virtue that 
educates desire toward ethical behavior; ethics is not, then , about constraint but the 
education of desire toward an innate propensity to be moral. 
In short, an Aristotelian view of education relies on or is formed within a 
political community. And like the education of taste and sensibility, ethical behavior 
has to be imparted by habits of virtue . As Verbeke mentions, however, the role of 
teachers is never directly addressed in Aristotle. The assumption here is that teachers 
are virtuous persons who will work to educate students toward the goal of the political 
community (212). Notably, the political and ethical role of the teacher is assumed to be 
in line with the dictates of local government, supporting rather than resisting the 
hegemony of propertied Greek men . Ironically, however, Aristotle testifies to the 
inextricable link between the goals of a democratic community and the education of its 
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ethical behavior. "Aristotle believes that outside a political community moral education 
is impossible" (Verbeke 233). 
Composition studies has, to a great extent, continued Aristotelian ideas of civic 
discourse, political virtue, and moral education. To find evidence of this, I look to 
Sandra Stotsky's "Conceptualizing Writing as Moral and Civic Thinking" as an attempt 
to reconcile "the moral" with an Aristotelian responsibility to civic participation. 
Stotsky begins with an important comment on the general lack of scholarship 
dedicated to the moral reasoning necessary to the making of academic texts, noting that 
most scholarship concerns making an instructor's political and ethical agenda the 
mainstay of the course, citing Bizzell and Dale Bauer as examples of this. Stotsky then 
offers a list of ethical and rhetorical imperatives of a writer's responsibilities to observe 
the conventions of academic writing, assumedly to guide students in their selection of 
evidence, attribution of sources, fair presentation, and coherence in writing (799). With 
the Aristotelian goals of civic virtue and responsible citizenry in mind, Stotsky confers 
that "it is possible that learning to understand and observe the obligations embedded in 
academic writing may contribute more to the development of a student's moral character 
as a citizen than discussions of the teacher's personal values and the moral meaning of 
historical events, contemporary public issues, fictional dilemmas, or applied science and 
technology" (799). 
Though I applaud Stotsky' s schema for locating ethics in a local way and for 
providing students with a means of constructing texts by way of the ethical imperatives 
of academic writing, that is, in terms of their responsibilities as writers, there is no 
critical consideration of how the ethics of academic writing create the subjectivity of 
students or discussion of how what we adopt as conventions of academic writing come 
to have the force of authority; Stotsky sees these conventions "as static bundles of rules, 
rather than contingent practices" (Friend 553). Ultimately, Stotsky echoes Aristotle's 
conception of ethics as consensus-driven virtues that must be imparted to the minds of 
-
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students to acquaint them with "the habits of responsible thinking" (806). Furthermore, 
Stotsky suggests a model of the public sphere, drawn from Aristotle, that assumes a 
unity between what students learn in the classroom and their conscious will to bridge 
school and civic participation in a seamless "carry over" of educational virtue to the 
political sphere. Because of this assumed unity or relation, the Aristotelian public 
sphere does not meet with the complexities forged by an encounter with late capitalism, 
and therefore risks situating students ahistorically within an "early model" civic public. 
While looking to the moral questions involved in academic writing, Stotsky 
draws upon Aristotelian notions of virtue, judgment, and civic responsibility. In doing 
so, Stotsky leaves the emphasis on prescriptive ethics firmly in place, while leaving 
questions of student subjectivity unanswered. This is, of course, not her goal in 
constructing guides for student choices in academic writing. I point to this omission in 
her work because it repeats the field's historical tendency toward prescriptive moralities 
in the formation of student ethical subjectivity and draws on a theoretical foundation in 
Aristotle. Furthermore, Stotsky, while criticizing the political turn in composition 
studies by advocating an ethical formalism in writing, does not engage with or reconcile 
the field's attempt to think through a more critical approach to ethics, one that might 
benefit from postmodernism. The central tenets of Stotsky's pedagogy retain the 
autonomy of students in deciding questions of ethics, but their autonomy is linked with 
agreement of the common good and the civic participation necessary to maintain it; 
dissensus or the contingency of community norms is a questionable or secondary 
practice in these classrooms, a characteristic that replicates one major obstacle in 
responsibly appropriating Aristotle: the problem of difference. 
I do not want to suggest that Aristotle is just "bad all the way 'round" for ethics 
in the classroom; rather, my purpose is to show how few contemporary models of ethics 
have offered a view toward integrating the lessons of postmodernism as well as 
criticisms of community and consensus. I would argue that it is because of the recurrent 
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turn to Aristotle that we do not have more critical models for thinking ethics in the 
classroom. It is as if we have found something that works in just about any historical 
and pedagogical context and therefore assume that it should be used because it can so 
easily be appropriated . Because of this trend, I think we should be skeptical of a model 
that can be taken from one very different historical period for which it served certain 
needs and performed certain functions and placed into another, far more complex and 
heterogenous one and expected to operate in much the same way. To examine what I 
see here as the "incommensurability" of the Aristotelian public sphere upon which civic 
discourse is built and our current one, I want to examine further the problems of 
ahistorically employing Aristotle's ethics in the classroom. 
II. Problems with Aristotle's Ethics and the Public Sphere 
Aristotle really provides a "mixed bag" when it comes to providing models of 
ethics, discourse, and the public sphere. While he provides an understanding of ethics 
that shares some of the contingencies of postmodern ethics, Aristotle's civic discourse 
assumes a public sphere that is undifferentiated and unmediated by the confusions of a 
late twentieth-century, industrially-advanced public sphere. Thus, appropriations of 
this sphere in models of public discourse, civic participation, and ethical responsibility 
that characterize composition's import of Aristotelian ethics and civic polity risk 
misrepresenting both the contemporary public sphere as well as any theory of ethics. 
What is useful to retain in Aristotle's concept of moral education is that ethical norms 
do not bear the authority of transcendent imperatives. The derivation of ethical norms 
is more tentatively situated in terms of the community-based discussion and consensus 
of what virtues and habits are best for the polis. Indeed, composition pedagogy keeps 
returning to Aristotle for public discourse models because Aristotle provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the role of rhetoric in a community bound by ethics. 
Nevertheless, the value given to Aristotle's model of public discourse is based upon its 
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"success" in a homogenous community, one built upon exclusions that we would today 
find unacceptable. 
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jurgen Habermas traces 
the origins of the bourgeois public sphere to ancient Greece. His analysis highlights that 
even though Aristotle offers some important foundational premises to keep in mind for 
moral education and civic discourse, namely an emphasis on the social construction of 
virtue and the importance of civic participation, the Greek public sphere was established 
upon premises that make this model of limited use for contemporary composition 
studies. The public sphere of ancient Greece included the spatial particularity of place, 
such as the agora, or the marketplace, lexis, or the discussions that took place in law 
courts and public gatherings, and the actions needed to organize for war (3). The 
relationship between the public and private sphere relied on the individual's status as 
master of oikos, or household (3}; in other words, a freeborn male had to own property, 
including slaves, to maintain status in the public sphere (3-4). Inextricably bound up 
with politics, the public sphere in ancient Greece was closely related to the state and 
centralized government, unlike the public sphere of the eighteenth century, which formed 
against these authorities (27). Not until the eighteenth century do we find a modern 
sense of the public sphere as a community of individuals, private citizens, coming 
together as a public; "they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against 
the public authorities themselves, to engage them in debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor" (27). Discussions were formed and expanded by citizens; 
the polis "provided an open field for honorable distinction ... The virtues, whose 
catalogue was codified by Aristotle, were ones whose test lies in the public sphere and 
there alone receive recognition" (4). Because status in the public sphere was directly 
related to status in the private--in terms of the ownership of property--the opposition 
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between public and private did not exist in ancient Greece to the extent that it did in the 
eighteenth century or that it does now (5). 
In both Habermasian and Aristotelian or Greek configurations, ethics is located 
within a sphere that has been created explicitly for abstraction and transcendence; this 
is what makes the public sphere public, the eradication of difference and the assumption 
of a universal and highly rational bourgeois subject, or in the case of Aristotle, the 
propertied political subject. As Michael Warner argues in "The Mass Public and the 
Mass Subject," the Habermasian concept of the public sphere, not unlike that of the 
Greek model, creates a space that is designated by the desire either to transcend 
difference in the goal of universality and consensus or to maintain a public sphere based 
on the shared, equal status of participants (382). However, a key historical distinction 
between the Greek and contemporary public spheres is the assumed unity of public and 
private spheres in their early formation. In other words, the Greek sphere relied on the 
continuity between private and public spheres in that "publicity" in the public sphere 
relied on ownership in the private. "Status in the polis was therefore based upon status 
as the unlimited master of an oikos" (Habermas 3). Likewise, a continuity of "value, 
judgment, and reputation" (Warner 378) moved between public and private spheres. In 
W amer' s critique, the bourgeois public sphere laments this initial unity that has become 
further separated by capitalism in the separation of the private sphere from its public 
function. Notably, and as I will return to later, these subsequent, exclusive, concepts of 
public and private spheres, while further dissociated from their original relationship in 
direct democracy, were also mediated by the increasing force of capitalism, a force that 
simultaneously occludes and distinguishes private and public ethics. 
III. Prescriptive Ethics in the University Curriculum 
Aristotle's community-based moral education, in its emphasis on linking the 
political and ethical, foregrounds the theoretical foundation of the liberal arts curriculum 
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in American colleges. As David Russell observes in Writing in the Academic Disciplines 
1870-1990, until the mid-nineteenth century, American colleges adopted an approach of 
"mental discipline" (36), not unlike Aristotle's concept of educating habits of virtue and 
ethical behavior, that required training "through drill and exercise, the various 'faculties' 
of the mind, memory, judgment, will and so on" (36). Rhetoric remained an integral part 
of the liberal arts curriculum in the production of predominantly oral compositions. In 
addition to the four-year course in rhetoric, mathematics, Greek, and Latin, many 
schools included a course in "moral philosophy, a course that went by a variety of 
names and included an even wider variety of subject matter . .. but [the] goal was 
almost always to affirm the truths of Protestant Christianity against its detractors" 
(37). Rhetoric was bound up with such teaching, for most faculty with training in 
ministry taught rhetoric. Russell finds that even when departments began to be 
recognized in colleges during the 1830s and 1840s, "rhetoric or English was variously 
combined with moral philosophy, history, logic, or metaphysics, as well as with modern 
and classical languages" (41). In practice, the almost interdisciplinary effect of moral 
philosophy found its way into the curriculum through rhetorical demonstrations on lofty, 
value-laden themes that, more often than not, modeled a prescriptive approach to ethics 
(40-42). 
David A. Jolliffe' s work on ethical themes in "The Moral Subject in College 
Composition: A Conceptual Framework and the Case of Harvard, 1865-1900" gives 
Russell's general description of ethical themes in rhetoric of the nineteenth century more 
detailed support. Jolliffe observes a trend in "assignments that direct students to write 
about matters of moral obligation" (164). Moreover, Jolliffe notes, in contrast to Berlin, 
that despite the emphasis on objectivity in prose, including an abandonment "of concern 
for the ethical as it became completely positivisitic in intent," there was a concern for 
ethical themes, as the example of Harvard testifies (Berlin qtd. in Jolliffe 167-68). 
Nevertheless, the ante-bell um university brought with it huge changes in the organization 
and purpose of the university, and with it, a new place for ethics in the teaching of 
rhetoric . 
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After the Civil War, Russell observes "the utilitarian chorus" (46) pervaded what 
what was increasingly becoming the new university. Students, business leaders, and 
parents all called for a more practical education, one that would respond to the needs of 
economic expansion (46). Some of these changes involved the rise of an elective 
curriculum and specialization rather than a general liberal arts curriculum. The role of 
rhetoric in its purely oral form was met with an increasing demand for writing. The 
proliferation of new disciplines and their attendant, specialized languages required more 
writing and less rhetoric. By 1872, formal courses in writing emerged, and by 1900, 
Harvard required English A for all of its students, thereby instituting the teaching of 
writing in the modern university. And as writing requirements changed to meet the 
demands of an emerging economy and the new role of the university in producing the 
"captains of industry," so too did the role of ethics in the curriculum. 
Jolliffe provides the most concrete example of the ethical in writing courses. 
Jolliffe observes the promotion of moral obligation in themes ranging from "Respect for 
Women" to the more explicitly ethical, "The Duty of Rich Americans" (168). Harvard 
students followed the assumption that the essay was "an essentially moral form, a genre 
that allowed the writer to observe everyday occurrences and to suggest how those 
occurrences reflected the ethical nature of the entire society" (Besmaia qtd. in Jolliffe 
170). Jolliffe adds that social, cultural, classroom, and institutional contexts all 
contributed to students' belief that "their themes were exercises in cultural criticism and, 
as pieces of art must have a moral dimension" (170). The belletristic tradition further 
fostered this assumption by examining moral themes and ethical dilemmas in the 
literature used to teach writing, what Jolliffe calls the development of a "moral 
aesthetic" in the reading of literature that arrived after, and perhaps in support of, 
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy (170). 
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Notably, Jolliffe also contends that with the rise of post-war markets and 
industry came social and political unrest. In response, Harvard men were echoing 
Arnold's thesis by writing about moral obligation and the ethical imperative to preserve 
culture (171). Perhaps in awareness of their role as an elite group elected to safeguard 
the values of Western culture, Harvard students wrote of their responsibilities to 
mediate and illuminate the conflicts of the period. Despite their dealings with ethical 
themes, Jolliffe's tracing of the ethical in composition pedagogy serves his larger purpose 
of pointing to the conservative strand in composition that survives, as evinced in his 
recent, informal survey of themes used in composition courses. For my purposes, 
Jolliffe's work establishes both the persistence of ethics in writing pedagogy as well as a 
sense of ethics as a conservative, prescriptive field of inquiry that dictates the values 
and beliefs of the elite culture of students at Harvard in the late nineteenth century. The 
subjectivity of the Harvard student was one of inspired revelation--a romantic 
conception of the unfettered mind engaged in the pursuit of Truth. Accompanied by the 
study of literature, the student could then make value judgments and prescriptions for 
an outside world, meeting the anxiety and doubt that accompanied national 
industrialization. 
In contrast, Berlin identifies that later in the period Jolliffe studies, Fred Newton 
Scott's transactional pedagogy stressed an ethical focus but certainly one very far from 
the ethics advocated by Harvard students' themes. "Against extreme individualism 
and class bias of current-traditional rhetoric and the rhetoric of liberal culture, Scott 
posed a rhetoric of public service, a system distinguished by its ethical commitment to 
the public good" (Berlin 49). Berlin goes on to distinguish transactional rhetoric as a 
nascent epistemic rhetoric, one very different from the aims of either current-traditional 
or belletristic rhetorics. For Scott, the transactional paradigm offered "the rhetoric of 
public discourse" (35) in its acknowledgment of the dialogic interplay between 
subjective perception and objective reality in the formation of knowledge and discourse. 
In Berlin's scheme, transactional rhetoric comes closest to epistemic rhetoric in this 
acknowledgment of the social, interactive dimension of language. 
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Although it is never stated explicitly in Rhetoric and Reality, Berlin's description 
of epistemic rhetoric and its democratic foundations establishes this strand as the one 
which connects historically to the field's commitment to ethics. Nevertheless, Jolliffe's 
study gives voice to the consideration of ethical themes that remained consistent in the 
belletristic tradition. The varying applications of ethics in the writing curricula 
mentioned here display an ambivalence toward the approach to ethics taken in the 
classroom. In the case of Harvard, instructors opted for a clearly prescriptive approach 
to ethics in student themes. Further titles from Jolliffe's study substantiate this 
assertion: "Whether Rank, Fame, and Fortune Contribute to Real Happiness" and "May 
we Rightly Indulge in Luxuries While Our Fellow Men Are in Want?" are two other titles 
from his research that clearly assume an ethical position prior to the act of composition, 
one that can be applied to general social questions in the authorizing voices of Harvard 
students, who perhaps saw themselves as carrying on the preservation of liberal culture. 
Moreover, as both Jolliffe's and Berlin's studies demonstrate, the explicit role of 
the ethical in rhetoric and the establishment of composition as a discipline changes with 
the demand for more practical applications of writing. This is not to suggest that ethics 
was abandoned in the early twentieth-century American university; rather, it is to 
suggest that the teaching of writing and rhetoric came increasingly under the sway of 
nationalist and economic goals, and because of this, the ethical was amended to meet 
these needs. At the same time, the ethical gradually, and as is evident in our present 
"discomfort'' with the ethical in composition pedagogy, becomes divorced from its 
relationship with the political. It becomes, like the pre-war economy, increasingly 
privatized. Notably, as early as 1880, the rhetoric of capitalism had "trickled down" 
into student essays. This example from Jolliffe entitled "The Duty of Rich Americans" 
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blends a bit of social Darwinism with the language of capital investment. The result is a 
curious mix of writing for the public sphere with the language of private investment. 
Man's responsibility ... increases in proportion to his 
possessions, whether these consist of life, health, wealth, 
knowledge, power, genius, or any other of the innumerable gifts 
received by him. We may consider this the working capital of 
mankind, for any one or all of which a return is required, 
sufficient to renumerate [sic] the investment. (Cook qtd. in Joliffe 
168) 
IV. From Prescriptive to Critical Ethics 
With the involvement of American forces in WWI and the firm establishment of 
English as a discipline, writing in English courses tended toward the reproduction of the 
values of patriotism and national culture (Berlin 170); literature and language become 
integral to this project of maintaining a national front. As J. Michael Sproule's essay, 
"Whose Ethics in the Classroom? An Historical Survey," outlines, the war marks an 
important curricular response to the ethical problems of propaganda and the news. 
Working out of the field of communication studies, Sproule's essay brings several 
interesting facts to bear on the role of ethics in the curriculum before, during, and after 
the war, as well as a provocative example of how discussions of the ethics of private 
industry in the public sphere were met. In short, he observes how the technology of mass 
communication is mediated by ideological, economic, and political concerns and how the 
subsequent ethical implications of this knowledge affected the curriculum. 
Sproule traces the work of psychology departments in forging a critique of mass 
communication and its unethical practices in the public sphere. This critique is built 
upon several events that, in tum, influenced the pedagogical attention to studying the 
ethics and politics of cultural texts. The first of these theoretical events came from the 
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social sciences; psychology and psychoanalysis revealed that public opinion was not 
autonomous but a product of propaganda and the ideological basis of the news (317). 
Second, because of this "new" knowledge, the assumed objectivity in reportage of 
national events was called into question. Sproule dubs this the emergence of the "ethical 
question in politics" (317). Thus, a concern for ethics in the curriculum is in direct 
correlation with both an academic and public awareness of the ideological filters that 
crafted the assumed rationality and objectivity of communication. 
This trend in communication studies affected the curriculum in several ways: 
Censorship of textbooks that painted any favorable picture of the Germans; the 
formation of the CPI, the Committee on Public Information, a group that developed 
propaganda; and the recruitment of teachers who would create curricula to serve 
national and military goals (319). In response to the threat of unethical communication, 
academics in the field of communication studies, in their awareness of propaganda 
campaigns, developed a theory of "ethical communication as a prerequisite for 
democratic government in the modem industrial world" (319), but Sproule notes that 
"[e]ducators as a whole were eager to get in step with the CPI's view of the Great War 
as a contest between absolute good and absolute evil" (319). Nevertheless, some 
instructors focused on critical reading and analysis of mass communications to combat 
the CPI and propaganda campaigns. Intellectuals spearheaded attacks against the bias 
rooted in all forms of a quickly growing "communication industry" (319). In 1937, the 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis was founded, thus institutionalizing an 
interdisciplinary critique of mass communication. It "was a wide ranging investigation 
that explicitly encouraged students to probe major social institutions of business and 
government, paying particular attention to how various points of view [read, ideologies] 
were presented through the media of radio, film, and newspaper" (320). Moreover, I see 
this move as an explicit turn toward a critical ethics, one that took aim at the ideological 
formation of ethics inspired by a nationalist agenda. 
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The success of the Institute for Propaganda was short-lived, however. With the 
advent of another world war and a strengthening economy, the Institute had to curb the 
politics of its ethics that often came into direct conflict with the goals of advertising and 
propaganda (321). After W.W.II, the Institute came under HUAC investigation, 
partially because it was openly critical of HUAC's methods. As Sproule contends, the 
emphasis on social ethics in communication had come to be seen as an attack on 
American ideals. Furthermore, disciplinary trends made it difficult to continue 
examinations of social ethics; the social-science approach that had come to characterize 
the critique of mass communications came under pressure to align with the methodology 
of the natural sciences. "The rise of statistical-experimentalism in social science 
dampened interest by academicians in social ethics" (322). Moreover, social scientists 
were forging new links with business in war-related analysis of enemy propaganda (my 
emphasis 327). After the late forties, Sproule sees a general decline and then gradual 
reemergence of ethical analysis in social criticism of the 60s, a trend that has remained 
fairly consistent in speech communications (323). 
What Sproule' s analysis provides is a concrete depiction of the changing place of 
ethics in the communications curriculum. His survey fills in the spaces that Berlin's 
history misses in its emphasis on writing curricula. In contrast, Berlin's focus on writing 
curriculum paints a more conservative picture of the place of ethics in the English 
curriculum during the period in which departments of communications and psychology 
were taking risks analyzing propaganda and advertising. Not until after the Depression 
does Berlin see a theoretical shift toward the view of education for social reform, citing 
evidence of this trend in the NCTE policy statement of the 1930s, which renewed its 
commibnent to social responsibility. In the classroom, Aristotelian and public discourse 
models survived and re-emerged as tools for critical citizenship (81-82). Berlin observes 
the mid-late forties as a moment when many universities were adopting a general 
communications course that, among other things, engaged students in recognizing ''bad 
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argument and bias in discourse (especially propaganda)," a focus not unlike that 
adopted earlier in communications studies (97). I think this is significant considering 
that Berlin sees the shift toward a more critical ethics in general communications courses 
later than Sproule does, suggesting, perhaps, that the communications curriculum 
Sproule surveys did influence greatly the ways in which universites later tailored their 
rhetorical and ethical approaches in the classroom. 
The surveys discussed here outline composition's response to historical changes 
in culture, politics, and the curriculum. Ethics, rather than disappearing in response to 
external demands for a more expedient education, survived in communications 
departments in fascinating, productive ways. Moreover, when there was an explicit 
focus on the ethical in writing courses, as in the example of Fred Newton Scott's 
transactional rhetoric, ethics was derived from an Aristotelian concept of public 
discourse, one that linked political life to an espousal and practice of virtuous 
community. Criticism of the exclusions of Aristotelian notions of community aside, 30 
Fred Newton Scott's project is not far from more contemporary adaptations of 
Aristotelian models of public discourse and communitarian-virtue ethics for the 
classroom. Indeed, composition pedagogy often returns to Aristotle for public discourse 
models, because Aristotle provides a comprehensive understanding of the role of 
rhetoric in a political community bound by the force of ethics. Moreover, the derivation 
of ethical norms is not reduced to the force of metanarrative in Aristotelian ethics . 
Nevertheless, I find Aristotle of limited use in the postmodern classroom, 
especially one that attempts to focus more readily on how students are called upon as 
ethical subjects, rather than on generating a battery of virtues to be practiced in daily 
life. In other words, the writing curriculum has yet to provide a critical approach to 
ethics, one that would investigate the selfs relationship to and negotiation of ethical 
norms; the "good" of a political community seems to be an static assumption in 
Aristotelian notions of community and the public sphere. The trend in composition 
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pedagogy has been one whereby students are asked either to draw upon or generate 
existing prescriptive morals or to practice models of public discourse based upon the 
political virtues associated with this sphere. As I have argued, the public sphere of 
ancient Greece bears little resemblance to our contemporary notions of the public sphere. 
More importantly, the Aristotelian public sphere and its purpose of civic discourse 
maintains a very clear connection to status in the private, a unity that we no longer 
assume. 
Sproule' s work shows a commensurate resistance to discussions of ethics in the 
public sphere as industry and mass communications became more privatized. The 
resistance appears to come from an assumption on the part of propaganda industry--
and we can substitute a wartime propaganda industry with a general understanding of 
our contemporary consumer culture and the ideological foundations of capitalism--that 
a critical ethics should be eliminated from the public sphere, especially when such a 
critique involves a perceived attack on American ideals. Such a move pushes ethics 
further into a highly privatized sphere, a move that simultaneously conflates notions of 
the private in a confusing dualism of "private industry" and "private individuals." The 
propaganda industry as a private sector machine aligns itself and its ethical 
responsibilities to "truth" and "objectivity" in reportage with the right of individuals to 
decide upon questions of ethics. The unfettered freedom of capitalism insures private 
industry of maintaining their "private" status to generate jingoist, conservative 
propaganda and advertising. In short, I think we might read the alignment of "private 
industry" with the private sphere as a move that capitalizes and profits from the 
association of the private sphere and ethics. As Sproule' s work testifies, once critical 
ethics went "public" in its attacks on the ideological foundations of private industries 
such as advertising, businesses reacted by targeting academics involved in this work as 
"unAmerican." 
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In many ways, the public discussion of ethics performed by communications 
educators did not draw upon an entrenched Aristotelian model of the private sphere, 
one that had clear connections to state, government, and civic responsibility. Rather, 
they appear to have been working on what I have identified as a Habermasian notion of 
the public sphere--the space developed not in tandem with a state sphere but for the 
purpose of "debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized 
but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor" (my emphasis 27). 
But once the subject of critical ethics and rhetorical responsibility participate in this 
sphere in an effort to adjudicate it, strategic disciplinary and political moves are made 
to (re)align and diffuse ethics as either part of the "soft social sciences" that cannot be 
quantified or to bring it under the wing of emerging industries whose goal it is to build a 
stronger economy and a new Cold War nationalism . In effect, a public discussion of 
ethics constitutes a threat to both ensconced notions of individualism and its 
partnership with an American legacy of entrepreneurship. 
Perhaps as a response to the consistent resistance of those spheres outside of the 
university, ethics, in our field, has been transformed into political pedagogies that, like 
Sproule's study of communications courses, draw from and react to the ideological 
mediation of mass culture by a variety of "isms." The work of the classroom is to 
decode and reread these narrative "isms"; ethics is then transformed into politics. Such 
a model keeps questions of private ethics out of the realm of public discourse, further 
entrenching the reliance on social issues--in terms of their politics rather than their ethics-
-in the classroom. I will return to the relationship between private and public spheres 
and ethics later; for the moment, I want to tum to more current applications of ethics in 
composition studies in an effort to sketch a preliminary outline of what a critical ethics 
needs to consider in its theory and practice. 
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The Subject of Ethics in the Postmodern Classroom 
The field's ongoing encounter with postmodernism and poststructuralism has 
made it even more difficult to reconsider and reconfigure a viable ethics that benefits 
from some of the insights and complications gleaned from an engagement with the 
radical skepticism and anti-foundationalism of postmodern ethics. Nevertheless, as 
ethics and the foundations for thinking them have been entirely ungrounded, ethical and 
political decisions have become simultaneously more difficult and more imperative. In 
many ways, and as I have already suggested, pedagogy has stepped in to maintain an 
ethical anchor of the field by enacting practical applications of politicized pedagogies. 
If, according to Lyotard, we have a "responsibility to respond," then I think it is fair to 
assert that composition's political pedagogies have worked to respond to injustice. 
In the following discussion, I look at how Lester Faigley and Christy Friend 
import postmodern and poststructuralist theories in their respective attempts at 
negotiating these discourses for the postmodern classroom; both yield insights as well as 
potential problems in grappling with a critical ethics that does not replicate the 
historical penchant for normative or prescriptive ethics in the field. Neither, in my view, 
deal explicitly with how notions of private and public spheres mediate discussions of 
ethics; however, both engage with the problem of subjectivity and ethics in the 
postmodern. 
Lester Faigley' s Fragments of Rationality: Postmodernity and the Subject of 
Composition resituates the rational foundations of subjectivity upon which composition 
pedagogy has been based. His historical survey of the subject of composition takes us 
to the present moment when, in the wake of theory, the fragmented subject, who can no 
longer lean on defining narratives of truth, objectivity, and ethics, must negotiate an 
increasingly technological and commodified culture with little to guide her. Fragmens 
thus provides a thorough history of the subject in composition, shifting, in the process, 
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an emphasis on what is taught as a defining marker of composition's history to how 
subjectivity is constructed by the rational assumptions of pedagogies. Most readers are 
by now familiar with Faigley' s project, so I will not labor his argument beyond this 
general summary. What I wish to address in detail, however, is Faigley's less-than-
successful attempt to discuss a specifically postmodern ethics, especially as it confronts 
the lack of viable models both for bringing ethics into the classroom and offering agency 
as a way of mediating a host of unauthorized discursive positions, none of which hold 
any external validity. 
For an encounter with postmodern ethics, Faigley turns to Lyotard's later works, 
Just Gaming and The Differend. He defends that "The Differend can be read as an 
argument for locating ethics in a postmodern pedgagogy" (236 ). After a concise 
explanation of Lyotard's contribution to this project, Faigley determines that the 
proposal of the incommensurability of language games is important for composition 
studies. He looks to L yotard' s use of genres as a way of recognizing this 
incommensurability. Genres are, in a sense, speech contexts that submit phrases to their 
order. For example, argument and narration are genres of discourse between which there 
is the possibility of linkage. Faigley observes that "ethics becomes a matter of 
recognizing the responsibility of linking phrases ... Thus in the choice of genre there is an 
ethical decision" (237). Faigley provides an example of this in James Britton' s 
replacement of transactional rhetoric with more expressivist models in British schools, 
observing, however, that this example highlights the replacement of genres rather than 
the refusal "to accept the denial of conflict within the limits of a single genre" (238). 
Lyotard would have students look not to ethics but to "the implications of their 
linkages" (238). Interestingly, this would have students look at language, and in 
particular, the how of linkages--what we all call rhetoric. Students, in this pedagogical 
paradigm, would be encouraged to link genres, to make of stories and debate, of 
narration and argument, an ethical linkage, rather than simply replacing one with 
another. 
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In a similar way, Lyotard's ethics would not be the application of preexisting 
ethical norms to a given rhetoric but--to keep in line with demarcation between politics 
and ethics with which I began--a study of "the implications of ... linkages [and 
exclusions]" (238) between ethics and politics. In many ways, the incommensurability 
of politics and ethics within composition constitutes a differend; the genre of politics 
appears to have authority over ethics. The ethical responsibility, then, is to link these 
two genres, that are, ironically, intimately related in theoretical antithesis. But as I 
discussed earlier, the linkage between the political and the ethical is a difficult one 
because such rigid boundaries separate the two not only into discursive genres, but also 
into literal, spatial places where they are entrenched as genres appropriate to public and 
private spheres. What needs to be added to Lyotard's formulation is a spatial 
understanding of how genres can be determined not only in discourse but in the places 
and spaces of their circulation, which further determines how they can be linked. I will 
return to this theme in the following section; for now, though, I want to leave the reader 
with an indication of how Lyotard's penchant for narrative might be advanced, and 
perhaps illustrated, within an architecture of the subject and ethics, one that takes a 
closer look at how private and public conceptions of ethics and responsibility are 
already in the process of linking and confusing what Lyotard identifies as genres of 
discourse. 
There is, however, an ad hoc quality to this last chapter of Fragments; that is, I 
had the sense while reading that, despite the helpful discussions of Iris Marion Young 
and Lyotard, the question of the ethical subject had yet to be thoroughly discussed. 
While this appears to have been Faigley's intent--to leave the question open--1 am not 
convinced (and I am not sure Faigley is either) that Lyotard provides the best model of 
ethical subjectivity because he is ultimately discussing in both The Differend and Just 
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Gamingthe impossibility of answering a call for ethics and justice in the postmodern. 
We need only to consider the "laughter" that closes Just Gaming when Thebaud and 
Lyotard have arrived at the "metanorm" of maintaining mircronarratives as the only 
justifiable ethic to guide judgment. In my view, Lyotard is paradoxically both nihilistic 
and idealistic on the possibilities of justice in the postmodern simply by virtue of the 
incommensurablity of his own theories and the genre of composition studies. 
I do not want to suggest that Lyotard is completely useless for composition 
studies; the deauthorization of dominant genres and the local politics of contingent 
judgment are important theoretical models. Furthermore, the differend is a helpful 
descriptor of what happens when justice must be determined and two disputants 
cannot agree on a relevant or dominant rule of justice. However, and as Faigley 
explicitly mentions in this final chapter, Lyotard "does [not] suggest how subjects are to 
be located" (238). Lyotard's discussion remains fairly vague, focusing on narratives 
rather than subjects, and at times, remains too idealistic for the local work of the 
classroom. What Faigley does provide, however, is a foray into other, possible ways of 
thinking ethics and composition, outside the purview of moral prescriptions or the 
creation of certain kinds of student subjects in character education. As I have argued 
throughout this section, most composition pedagogy that has an explicit commitment to 
ethics or ethical themes tends toward textual analyses of professional texts in tandem 
with or as a catalyst for student writing. Faigley makes a move for examining 
subjectivity in our discussions of ethics; unfortunately, Lyotard does not provide the 
most productive model for thinking the ethical subject in composition pedagogy. While 
he is valuable for destabilizing traditional notions of judgment and argument, as well as 
raising the issue of responsibility for linking incommensurate phrases, Lyotard inevitably 
leaves his own call for justice unanswered. 
Christy Friend's "Ethics in the Composition Classroom" is an even more recent 
attempt to integrate ethics and the discourses of postmodernism into a workable 
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framework for the classroom. Friend's attempt to bring ethics into the classroom brings 
her to side with Young's critique of distributive justice. In brief, Young finds that 
concepts of distributional justice, in their emphasis on distributing goods and services to 
eradicate inequality, do little to upset the existing structures responsible for inequity. In 
response, she advocates a nondistributive model, one that would emphasize deep, 
institutional change rather than remedying injustice with the distribution of goods. 
Distributive models consider the consumption of goods and assume that doling out 
equal "portions" of material goods will result in justice. The goal of equity that 
supports a distributive logic relies on an assumption of sameness, ignoring questions of 
difference, as well as how individuals, as part of marginalized groups, are positioned 
differently in relation to what consensus has determined to be a fair allocation of "the 
just." In addition, distributive paradigms focus on "'end-state' theories ... where justice 
is determined by the amount of goods each individual ends up with (Young qtd. in 
Friend 551). A nondistributive approach to justice would look at the structures that 
disallow persons from an active role in reforming and responding to injustice, focusing 
on those "nonmaterial concepts like rights, decision-making, power, and opportunity" 
(551); this new theory of justice would further consider nonmaterial issues of injustice, 
such a "procedures, division of labor, and culture" (Young qtd. in Friend 39). What we 
meet in Friend's work is a new vocabulary for talking about ethics and justice, as well as 
a comprehensive, theoretical inquiry into how a nondistributive paradigm would help to 
restructure ethics in the field. 
Friend begins by asking "How is it possible to negotiate ethical issues 
productively and humanely in the postmodern classroom?" (549). Before presenting 
Young's nondistributional justice as a means toward talking about ethics in the 
classroom, Friend takes issue with Sandra Stotsky, C.H. Knoblauch, and Patricia Bizzell 
for each of their attempts at working ethics into the classroom, finding, in the final 
analysis, that all three in some way rely on foundationalist principles, infractions that 
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violate the cardinal rule of postmodernism. Friend criticizes Knoblauch, for example, 
because he provides a recent example of one major approach in the teaching of ethics in 
composition, but one that does not go far enough to revise distributional paradigms of 
justice and ethics. 
Knoblauch's "Critical Teaching and Dominant Culture" discusses strategies for 
engaging students in critical and ethical consciousness by reading multicultural fiction, 
discussion of issues raised in the reading, and extensive writing; the optimal result of 
these classroom practices is the kairotic production of ethical moments, when students 
glean flashes of insight into the very myths and assumptions that structure their lives. 
While productively focusing on the gradual, and not always successful fragments of 
insight, questions of difference, and interrogations of authorized discourses, Knoblauch 
makes a move toward nondistributional justice; nevertheless, he is faulted for crossing 
the distributional line in the hope that students' reading will perhaps result in the 
education of ethical character and critical consciousness (555). I would also add that 
Knoblauch uses the durable model of the belletristic tradition through the use of texts 
that may possibly extend students' "ethical horizons" (555); students read literature 
that will hopefully reintroduce them to their ethical assumptions and foster the 
conditions for ethical change. 
The import of nondistributive ethics in the classroom, according to Friend, would 
involve more attention to examining and enabling critique of institutional inequities that 
foster injustice in the goal of insuring equality for all. Part of this project is to value 
"diverse perspectives" and indulge "productive conflict" by creating courses that will 
introduce students to different groups (563). To this end, Friend created a course based 
on Young's major tenets of nondistributive justice. She uses a hypertext unit entitled 
"Merit vs. Educational Diversity? An Introduction to Ethics" through which students 
must make ethical decisions from the various perspectives of those involved in college 
admissions process; these roles range from that of minority students applying for 
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admission to an admissions officer under pressure to expand diversity initiatives. 
Students are continually asked to write persuasive arguments to defend and support the 
decisions they render on issues generated from the hypertext application. The ultimate 
goal of this pedagogical project is to revise our distributive language for thinking about 
ethics and social justice to the more workable process of "productive conflict, change, 
and ever-present difference" (566). 
While I support and defend her import of nondistributive justice, in particular, 
her engaging application of it to classroom practice, I find it ironic that, with the aid of 
computer technology, Friend is better able to transcend questions of goods to questions 
of abstract, institutional practices. My point here is not so much with her application 
but with the partial dismissal of distributive justice because of its built-in roadblocks to 
real, institutional change. I think we also need to consider, before adopting 
nondistributive paradigms, the inextricable link between material justice and 
nondistributive concepts of power. How can we talk about the division of labor if not in 
the distributive terms of wages and resources? I think there is a false dichotomy erected, 
albeit a rhetorically necessary one, to highlight the blind spots of distributive justice. For 
example, I find it ironic that the the distributive justice paradigm that underwrites 
student access to computer technology allows for an examination of nondistributive 
ethics. That is to say, the very institutional practices critiqued by a nondistributive 
paradigm are being done so with the material possessions--computers--that characterize 
a distributive logic. Furthermore, and in very pragmatic terms, it is easy to begin musing 
about the inadequacy of distributive justice because it elides any kind of analysis and 
consideration of abstract, institutional practices if you are not waiting or relying on the 
goods that will allow you to survive; I cannot help thinking of those for whom 
"possession" and "consumption" are immediate issues (Friend 566). Of course, 
nondistributive justice is imperative to seeking any kind of real, foundational change in 
society, and it is an excellent model for the writing classroom because it does engage 
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with the concepts Young identifies as outside the purview of distributive justice: 
language, decision-making, and culture (551). Nevertheless, I think the university at 
large specializes in abstraction and philosophical introspection, a nondistributive 
practice of instituting the values of the larger culture. Students need to be acquainted 
with the process of distributive justice initially to critique it. If we bypass it, we neglect 
to open up a way for nondistributive thinking. "Breaking the distributional mold," as 
Friend puts it, should be a stage along the continuum of justice, rather than an 
assumedly better model of justice. Even though the question of goods is but one 
component of distributive justice, I think that it is important and immediate enough that 
we consider some tenets of the basic model that can, in concert with nondistributive 
models, go further in ameliorating injustice. 
A final point I want to make is in regard to what Iris Young's work says about 
bridging the public and the private. Iris Young makes quite clear early on in Justice and 
the Politics of Difference her very public understanding of social justice. "Social justice 
in the sense I intend continues to refer only to institutional conditions, and not to the 
preferences and ways of life of individuals or groups" (36). Young looks only at social 
justice in relation to political groups and institutional practices, rather than at the 
private, even personal, experiences of individuals and groups. Young makes this 
sidestep of the private--the ethical--intentionally, however, to avoid liberalism or liberal 
notions of justice based upon "individual freedom and the consequent plurality of 
definitions of the good" (36). Social justice "concerns [then] the degree to which a 
society supports the institutional conditions necessary to the realization of these values 
[of justice]" (37). Young's avoidance of the private preferences of individuals testifies to 
the entrenched associations of liberal individualism and individual choice that structure 
our society; her neglect of that "plurality" of definitions of the good is an admission of 
this equation. What I have been suggesting throughout, and what Young's critical move 
away from private ethics to social justice makes clear, is that our emphasis on politics is 
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a strategic institutional demand that we not consider ethics and the private experiences 
of individuals as they both influence and reflect social justice. To do so violates liberal 
notions of a private self. In effect, our historical commitment to liberalism and 
individual rights (to privacy, autonomy, and "the good life") often let us and others "off 
the ethical hook" because these longstanding beliefs are preserved, and even insured, 
institutionally as private--not public--concerns. Thus, to "go public," then, is to 
question these rights and choices as they affect a social whole. While I am not suggesting 
that we erase the private or simply make it public, I am interested in how private ethics 
are legislated publicly and how private conceptions of ethics shape public notions of the 
political. 
Ethics in composition pedagogy has historically employed ethics as norms of 
judgment, ways of reading and judging the world that involve the creation of a general 
other--a group, an individual, their social practices and behaviors--who will absorb the 
dictates of ethical codes. What Faigley and Friend bring to the table is a complete shift 
away from normative or prescriptive ethics toward the theoretical and practical 
possibilities of critical ethics, that is, an ethics that is intimately involved in examining 
the ways in which discourses--micro- and meta-narratives--involve the creation of 
ethical subjectivity, either as the disciplinary subject of composition or the ethical 
choices students make when asked to occupy and defend various positions in argument. 
I would like to take the project of building a critical ethics further by advancing its full 
articulation in Foucault, an inquiry that helps to mediate the initial work done already in 
the field to resituate ethics and subjectivity. 
From Politics to Ethics: Foucault's Ethics of the Self 
In The Use of Pleasure Foucault provides a framework for understanding ethics, 
not as the rational generation of ethical norms to which all must submit and not as a 
reflection of a universal human nature, but as the self's relationship to itself. In short, 
Foucault attempts to provide a means of continuing ethical inquiry outside the 
normative framework of traditional ethics. In doing so, he turns the focus on ethics 
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away from moral behavior toward the history of moral subjectivization (Davidson 118). 
As Bernauer and Mahon argue, Foucault's emphasis on the aesthetization of the self 
moves outside of the quest for universality in standards by focusing entirely upon the 
individual and the "private" exercise of making oneself an ethical subject (153). 
Because of this emphasis on ethical subjectivity and the exercise of the self on the self, I 
find in Foucault a working remedy--a critical ethics--for our field's emphasis on 
prescriptive ethics as well as an implicit understanding of the relationship between those 
public and private spheres that situate ethics and the subject in confusing and 
contradictory ways . 
In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault outlines four modes and means of studying how 
one becomes an ethical subject. In doing so, he provides a methodology to study the 
process by which one makes moral choices toward the goal of ethical selfhood. Foucault 
begins by defining traditional morality as "values and rules of action" (25) that 
determine a field within which individuals are to behave. He considers as well "the 
manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the 
prescriptive elements that make up the code" (26). The most helpful distinction 
Foucault makes here, however, is the dual emphasis on not only the active position of 
the individual as ethical agent, but also as an "ethical subject of this action" (26). 
Foucault begins his technology of the ethical subject with "the determination of 
the ethical substance" (26), "the prime material of moral practice" (26). In other words, 
this would involve determining what part of the self is to be judged ethically. The 
second component is the "mode of subjection; that is the way in which the individual 
establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into 
practice" (27). I see this component as the subject's recognition of moral codes and her 
relationship to them based on cultural, familial, and/ or religious identification that help 
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to provide the reasons for adhering to ethical norms. Of import here is the implicit 
social dimension in the reasons for subjection; an individual recognizes this behavior 
working in concert with the behavior of others in an affiliated social group (27). The 
third component is in "the forms of elaboration, of ethical work that one performs on 
oneself, not only in order to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to 
attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behavior" (27). The final 
· component of Foucault's paradigm is the "telos of the ethical subject," (27-28), the 
commitment to more than single ethical acts but to a whole way of being, an ultimate 
goal or model of ethical subjectivity. 
As Foucault distinguishes, ethics involves a heightened relationship and dialogue 
with the self. 
The latter [self s relationship to self] is not simply 'self-
awareness' but self-formation as an 'ethical subject,' a process in 
which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form 
the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to 
the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of 
being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to 
act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform 
himself. (28) 
In short, Foucault's four modes allow for a systematic approach to discussing not only 
ethical codes but the myriad ways in which subjects negotiate these codes as they are 
urged to submit to them. The general rubric of morals is also redefined and repositioned 
to focus almost entirely on the self's relationship to and assimilation of ethical norms. In 
effect, this shift moves away from what Teresa Henning identifies, after Jaqueline 
Martinez, as ethical rhetorics. "That is to say that what is good, right, or of value is 
decided on prior to any rhetorical discussion or inquiry" (3). The underlying 
assumptions of ethical rhetorics are that norms are derived prior to any rhetorical 
1 
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context and serve as transcendent, acontextual constraints. Foucault, by positing the 
source of ethical inquiry in the subject, offers a paradigm that allows for a more 
rhetorical understanding of the contingencies and constructions of ethics and the subject. 
Rather than applying a universal ethics to a range of situations, Foucault would ask: 
How am I being called upon as an ethical subject? What discourses authorize my 
behavior, my "ethical work"? To what end do I offer these acts, behaviors, and 
examinations? Nevertheless, Foucault never directly addresses the role of private and 
public spheres in his critical ethics. He does, however, in the intense focus on the 
formation of ethical subjectivity, assume these practices of self-formation and self-
examination are conducted in private but mediated and directed by the public sphere, a 
relationship that will become more complicated in my discussion of HIV testing. 
With the previous questions in mind, I want to discuss in Chapter Five how 
Foucault's methodology-a four-step process of ethical questioning--might work in 
reading and understanding the construction of AIDS and the rhetorical and ethical 
matrices of HIV testing. In particular, I am interested in how the ethical dimensions of 
home testing, as a metonym of the ethical issues surrounding the discourses on AIDS, 
conflate assumedly separate spheres of public and private ethics, an examination that 
will not work to replace or recover ideal spaces of the public sphere-as in many 
applications of Aristotelian community--but will work to foreground the anxious 
"disunity" between these two spheres and the mediation of ethics. 
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Chapter 5 
Ethics and HIV Testing: Toward a Pedagogical Project 
As I argued in Chapter Four, politicization has been the favored approach in the 
classroom, and one that has received adequate critical response. In my view, a 
postmodern ethics has been the least theorized for what it may offer for the classroom. 
This most definitely has occurred because postmodern theory continually grapples with 
how to conceive of a viable ethics on its own, and as a result, has yet to provide a range 
of models for the local work of the classroom. In addition, we overlook or bypass 
questions of the ethical in the classroom because they have traditionally concerned 
intensely privatized conceptions of morality. Ironically, this careful sidestep of the 
ethical and its associations with the private sphere, have arguably done more to 
entrench the very binaries of private/ public that much critical pedagogy attempts to 
critique and dismantle. For example, feminist composition instructors often ask 
students to examine how gender operates in an economy of the public and private. That 
is, they highlight the complex interaction beteween the social construction of gender and 
the political relationships that symbiotically establish and support private edifications 
of gender hierarchy. In doing so, we have inadvertently helped to maintain the last pillar 
of liberal individualism--not altogether a bad thing--by suggesting that questions of 
ethics come under the purview of an individual's right to choose and decide questions of 
ethical c:onduct apart from social or political concerns. Indeed, to discuss ethics in the 
postmodern is to betray the "foundational" tenets of postmodernism. That is, ethics in 
the postmodern almost seems a contradiction in terms because ethics assumes some 
normative framework. As Patricia Bizzell observes in "Marxist Ideas in Composition 
Studies," 
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to speak of justice and injustice is to define an ethical commitment, ... 
perhaps because our understanding of ideology has given ethical 
commitments a bad name. 
Thus enmeshed in ideologies, we see ethical commitments as just 
another ideological construct, ratified by no transcendent authority or by 
no match with transcendent truth. The scholar who avows ethical 
commitments, then, looks foolishly ignorant of this postmodern 
understanding of ideology. (55) 
Consequently, not only does it make us uncomfortable about the private intrusion into 
individual choices, a discussion of ethics confronts a curious paradox in the possibility 
of even conceiving a postmodern ethics. This "new" ethics would need, then, to 
abandon the prescriptive, normative trappings of "transcendent truth" --a difficult 
prospect both theoretically and practically. 
As I argued in Chapter One, there are possibilities for a postmodern ethics in-
between the either/ or dichotomies of foundationalism and non-foundationalism that 
can provide a tenable ethical and discursive base. I have earlier referred to this as a 
critical ethics. Foucault's later work, in particular, is one example of a critical ethics in-
between. His four modes of subjectivization provide ways of talking about ethics that 
do not fall into the extremes of the either/ or dichotomy and that direct us to an 
examination of subjectivity and ethics, one that can be carried over into the classroom 
in an attempt to "go public" with a discussion of ethics. In short, and for the purposes 
of classroom application, Foucault's modes would ask students to identify: 1) the 
ethical question or dilemma; that is, to identify how this particular issue asks ethical 
questions; 2) how the ethical issue identifies them, or in my terminology, calls upon 
them to respond ethically; 3) the actions, practices, and behaviors that a person must 
perform to be--or not be--ethical; and 4) the ultimate goal of this ethical behavior; that 
is to ask, what model or ideal does the individual strive to achieve or maintain? 
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The issue of HN testing calls upon our most "private" associations and ideas 
about sexuality. HN testing is also a very "public" issue that has a direct affect on 
our conceptions of sexuality, public health, and disease. Within the public sphere, HN 
testing is part of a larger project of managing an epidemic. For the private individual, 
HN testing is bound up with issues of trust, intimacy, and personal relationships. In 
many ways, however, HN testing is an issue that demonstrates how private ethics are 
everywhere legislated publicly; the individual is publicly asked to get tested, to be 
responsible, to act ethically in her private relationships with others. In a sense, HN 
testing threatens to explode this dichotomy in its public education and legislation of 
testing for private information. It also forces us to consider how sexuality and disease 
are constructed as public ethical issues. Because this issue works within an ecomony of 
the public and the private and is surrounded by a host of ethical issues and questions, I 
think it is an important and productive one for "going public" with a discussion of 
ethics. This issue is also rich for enacting a critical ethics in the classroom that 
simultaneously works to problematize strategic uses of the private and public on 
questions of ethics . 
In this chapter, I propose a classroom application of the theoretical concerns 
raised throughout the dissertation, one that serves to bring together the key terms under 
discussion : ethics, the subject, discourse, and the private and public spheres. To this 
end, I have designed a unit for my Writing 101 class that would bring together the 
question of ethics and the construction of AIDS in late twentieth-century American 
culture . In particular, I want to have students examine--via Foucault's four modes of 
ethical subjection--how the call for HN testing positions them as ethical subjects and 
asks them to "take care" of themselves in private to insure the maintenance of public 
health . Furthermore, I want them to investigate their intricate relationship to this larger 
discursive "event'' by probing the implications and "otherings" that have been 
inscribed by the widely-held belief that testing is the best means of "containing" the 
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HIV virus as well as an individual's only recourse for gaining a sense of agency in the 
face of a perceived uncontrollable virus. 
Going Public: The Ethics and Politics of HIV Testing 
Issues of public health are a ripe area for investigating not only how subjects are 
classified, questioned, and constructed to act upon themselves in ethical ways, but also 
to question the entrenched assumptions of the private and public that circulate in 
discussions of ethics. The issue of HIV testing, especially as it is bound up in an 
intricate web of relations between these two spheres, is both a timely foray into 
discussions of ethics and subjectivity, as well as a means to discuss how the discourses 
on AIDS have, even in their relatively brief circulation, constructed the HIV infected 
person as a pathogenic other, a position that is further complicated and entrenched by 
conservative moralism and race/ class/ gender ideologies. Furthermore, the 
uncomfortable tension that suspends the relationship between the assumedly private 
sphere of sexuality and the public management of disease raises questions of responsible 
citizenship, a tension that has periodically resulted in the call for the policing, 
cataloguing, and quarantining of infected persons. 
Much of this discussion will draw upon the work of Cindy Patton's Inventing 
AIDS in which Patton traces the "discovery" of AIDS from the "gay cancer" to its 
current discursive, medical, and political circulation in American culture. Her insights 
are invaluable to understanding how the treatment and reception of HIV/ AIDS is still 
firmly embedded in moral, racist, classist, and sexist assumptions of sexuality and 
disease. For my purposes, Patton continually interrogates the logic of HIV testing as the 
major, if not sole, means of preventing the spread of AIDS, an emphasis that creates a 
particular kind of subject to/ of the discourses of HIV by focusing on what amounts to a 
means of surveillance rather than practical knowledge about preventing transmission. 
Before I pursue the subjectivity created by the the demand for HIV testing, however, I 
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want to re-examine Michael Warner's "The Mass Public and the Mass Subject" in an 
effort to explain and understand the assumptions that support ethics and the public 
sphere, an examination that will help both to contextualize Patton's critique of the 
discursive means of constructing AIDS as an issue of public health and to develop 
further an understanding of how ethics circulates within an "economy" of the public and 
private. 
Warner begins by articulating the rhetorical effect of invoking "the public" on 
"subjects of publicity" (375). 
No matter what particularities of culture, race, and gender, or 
class we bring to bear on public discourse, the moment of 
apprehending something as public is one in which we imagine, 
if imperfectly, indifference to those particularities, to ourselves. 
We adopt the attitude of the public subject, marking to ourselves 
its nonidentity with ourselves. (375) 
Beginning with this "commonplace" of the effect a call to the public sphere has on 
adherents, Warner proceeds to complicate this vision of the public sphere in terms of the 
political purchase derived from the subjectivity created by those discourses and texts 
that are considered to be "publicly sayable" (378). In other words, the latent 
assumption of what he calls publicity, or "publicness," homogenizes a general public 
into a political force or body and is contradicted in late-capitalist societies. In tracing 
the public to the eighteenth-century culture of print and publication, Warner finds the 
"origin" of the relationship between public discourse and the creation of the public 
(381). Because this emerging public sphere created a public persona, "a very special 
rhetoric" developed alongside conceptions of appropriateness and impersonality as a 
certain style of the public sphere (382). In effect, this bourgeois public sphere worked 
off of the "strategy of personal abstraction [that] is both the utopian moment of the 
public sphere and a major source of domination" (382). Through abstraction, the public 
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sphere "claimed to have no relation to body image at all" (382), except the "unmarked 
identities [of] the male, the white, the middle class, the normal" (383). Over time, and 
as is evident in our twentieth-century consumer culture, the former reliance on a 
disembodied public sphere has been replaced with the "display of bodies for a range of 
purposes: admiration, identification, appropriation, scandal, etc." (385). In this way, 
we become the "mass-public subject" who is always already cognizant of our non-
membership in the "they" of the mass public in the awareness of our particular 
difference from this homogenous public (387). Warner identifies this tension as "the 
public subject's self-alienation," one that is overloaded with political meanings (387). 
Thus, mass public and mass identification become transitive terms depending on 
rhetorical and political contexts. In fact, I would go so far as to suggest that the public 
sphere is an essentially rhetorical construction designed and invoked at various 
moments and for changing purposes in its various manipulations and inversions of 
abstraction and embodiment. In the case of AIDS, and as Warner also observes, normal 
embodiment is the standard for the public and public health, while the diseased body is 
"exiled ... by such a discourse" (396) in assumptions and images that edify the public 
sphere. 
If we extend Warner's logic of the public sphere to ethics, it follows that the 
ethic of the body and of normalcy indicative of the public sphere locates ethics, at least 
spatially, in a sphere that has been predicated upon abstraction and transcendence; 
thus, there is "no space" for the assumed particularity of what, by default, is assigned 
to the private sphere. Public ethics are, then , those discourses that authorize the mass 
subject in all of his neutrality and abstraction; circulated within the public sphere, the 
mass subject attempts to create an identification of the public with these "norms," while 
simultaneously alienating the "inadequate particularity of individual bodies" and their 
attendant ethics (397) with the private spheres. In effect, Warner retheorizes the 
existing public/ private ethics dichotomy I have maintained throughout the dissertation. 
-
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What his work adds to this is an historical reading of how late capitalism has mediated 
the public sphere. This historical consideration identifies the problem of 
nonidentification with a mass public as a source of alienation indicative of postmodern 
culture. I turn now to Patton's specific reading of how the discourse of AIDS continues 
to capitalize on the characteristic condition of the contemporary public sphere as one of 
a "double movement of identification and alienation" (397). 
In InventingAIDS, Patton interrogates and destabilizes the medical, pedagogical, 
and cultural construction of AIDS. One of her major contentions is that the articulation 
and prevention of AIDS has focused almost exclusively on identifying groups who carry 
the HIV virus through testing, rather than on a more accurate discussion of a range of 
sexual acts that transmit HIV. The effect of this emphasis has remained throughout the 
medical life of the disease. Patton observes that even in its early stages, AIDS testing of 
blood supplies motivated more attention for surveillance and more accurate testing than 
any movement for "providing a prophylactic treatment" (36) of AIDS. Her point being 
that, from the start, the treatment and prevention of HIV/ AIDS has focused on 
disciplinary measures, policing structures, and viral status, rather than on the ways and 
means of helping to prevent the spread of HIV. She effectively demarcates the problems 
involved with commuting AIDS as an issue of public health, with the public assumed to 
have "health" (108) and dangerous HIV+ persons assumed as belonging to communities 
that are "deviant" and both physically and morally contaminated. In doing so, groups 
and communities associated with infection, as in the case of the gay and IV drug-using 
populations when AIDS was first identified, are more easily appropriated and policed 
by the health industry and media. 31 
AIDS testing, the predominant mode of "educating" about the disease, assumes 
a certain behavioral ethics; the theory behind widespread testing is that seropositive 
results on an HIV test will change an individual's behavior. Public health and its 
attendant moral assumption of the public sphere assume that testing results will modify 
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sexual ethics. Patton counters this assumption with the fact that there is little viable 
evidence that definitively establishes changing sexual behavior after a testing event. 
"There is now general scientific consensus that there is no predictable relationship 
between knowledge of HIV anti-body status and subsequent behavior change, although 
policy makers continue to place testing programs at the center of their education and 
prevention campaigns" (28). Remarkably, the media has overlooked the numerous other 
studies that suggest high-risk behavior changes occur only within communities whose 
members are perceived to be both generating and living a positive behavioral sexual 
ethic. Patton alludes to the example of the San Francisco gay community's strong 
support for eradicating HIV/ AIDS in their politically powerful community; Patton 
quotes a CDC report that establishes the role of community in generating the kinds of 
changes that would, as we now know, reduce the rate of HIV+ persons in the San 
Francisco gay community (30). "The apparent self-evidence of a relationship between 
behavior and knowledge of anti-body status rests on the assumption that drug use and 
sexuality are most importantly individual behaviors, ignoring the social norms and 
symbolic meanings that determine how sex is practiced or drugs are used" (29). Thus an 
educational program that is directed at examining risk behaviors rather than risk groups 
would implicitly work toward displacing the stigma associated with "those groups" 
identified in the media to have a high incidence of HIV+ men and women. The 
relationship between behavioral ethics and community identification will be increasingly 
important in light of the private/ public demarcations that are consistently made on 
questions of ethics. 
The focus on the testing event has created an identity of other for those who are 
infected with HIV. The "people rather than acts" (48) and "testing event" approaches 
to AIDS education only make for the easy identification of those who are assigned social 
blame, who, because they are associated with a certain deviant group, are already 
subject to the moral judgments made about membership or affiliation with these groups. 
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It also paves the way for legislation like the Helms Amendment (1987) "[which] forbids 
AIDS funding to projects which 'promote homosexuality,' which has been construed to 
include any gay-positive material" (40). Patton likens the penchant for testing to a 
sexual colonization by creating an other of the "AIDS world" (108) to be tolerated by 
those "health imperialists" (108) who do not have AIDS. When constructed in this way, 
AIDS education has the ability to "reinscribe ... the sexual, class, and racial ideologies 
that are propped up by moralism and science" (105) by merely replacing these 
categories with greater and lesser values of positive and negative (41). The value 
ascribed to positive and negative persons is thus further criss-crossed with the 
ideological and political constructions of race, class, and gender. In addition, and in 
light of Warner's discussion, serostatus produces the anxiety of knowing one either 
belongs to the public sphere of health, in all of its abstract manifestations, or with the 
alienation and exile of belonging to a colony of others who are, despite their exclusion 
from the public sphere, expected to adhere to a whole range of behavioral ethics, 
beginning with the public event of testing. 
Aside from discussing the construction of HIV/ AIDS in terms of the other, as 
well as the ethical foundation for the continual reinscription of this marginalization, 
Patton looks to the use of media in (mis)educating and edifying the longstanding 
assumptions of sexuality and disease. At the same time, she provides a framework for 
a classroom examination of the various media that situate students as subjects of/ to the 
discourses on AIDS. What I want to take from her work and highlight in my own, is the 
fundamentally ethical assumptions and selves created by, in particular, the advertising 
for home-testing. Patton advocates an examination of the ways in which groups and 
individuals field AIDS information as disseminated through the media. She advocates 
an explicit emphasis on how "group and individual media use and secondary 
discussions" (31) reflect the ways in which the uses of media depend upon perceptions 
of AIDS. Notably, Patton endorses a rhetorical look at the ways in which subjects, as 
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individuals and community members, use information on HIV/ AIDS; she calls this 
emphasis "the individual and group interpretive practices of the people to whom media 
information is directed" (31). She also observes that AIDS education is reaching those 
who need it the least; that is, it is focusing on those who are good learners, not those 
populations and communities that are ravaged by poverty and illiteracy (44). Her 
rhetorical emphasis leads her to ask for solutions to misinformation, or the lack thereof, 
that would cater to the different communities who need AIDS education. For example, 
and keeping in mind her understanding of behavior change occurring within groups who 
have made safe-sex a positive part of the group identity, she argues that different 
groups, especially groups in poor or rural communities, need an educational apparatus 
that speaks to the unique forces that bind them. Finally, I think the way in which Patton 
discusses how individuals and groups are constructed as knowledge consumers assumes 
some of the same ways Foucault envisions the process whereby subjects are called upon 
to act ethically, responsibly, and consciously in line with a whole set of practices 
designed to insure certain types of behaviors, a particular style of life. The problem with 
such an examination is that it yields a multitude of responses, all of which depend upon 
the media's entrenched identification of AIDS with "high risk groups" rather than 
specific sexual acts 
The effect of constructing "deviant" groups has had a detrimental effect on the 
call for the straight population to heed the dangers of HIV transmission through unsafe 
sex. Because AIDS has historically been tied to groups, rather than risky behavior, most 
heterosexuals had and still have a difficult time integrating AIDS into the list of possible 
sexually transmitted diseases to avoid. My predominantly heterosexual students 
generally do not perceive AIDS to be a major concern of theirs. While they espouse safe 
sex in all they do and say, most of them, even against their better judgment and 
knowledge of transmission, are subject to the dominant logic that equates seropositive 
status with a responsibility for safety (100), a move that assumes that the test alone will 
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be responsible for changing an individual's behavior. Patton also observes that "many 
people have difficulty associating transmission promoting acts with the people they love 
and trust" (100). Because of this, safe-sex practices are "adopted or rejected based on 
known or perceived serostatus of the partner or the quality of feelings of trust, rather 
than universal adoption of practices to prevent transmission" (100). To combat 
transmission, safe sexual practices, and not the mere identification of HIV+ persons, 
should be endorsed in AIDS education. 
The testing-event logic of HIV prevention is replicated in the media images 
designed to sell the concept of home testing. Moreover, testing as self-diagnosis is of 
limited value, as HIV-Antibody+ results do not necessarily mean that one has AIDS 
(30). Patton also makes the acute point that "similarly complex illnesses like cancer, 
multiple sclerosis, or arthritis" (30) would never be packaged as a quick home test 
because of the need for interpretation and counseling (30); counseling is offered, 
however, with both home tests I surveyed for this project. What Patton's discursive 
analysis makes clear and what Foucault's four modes provide is both a timely subject 
for an investigation of private and public ethics as well as a means of studying ethics 
and subjectivity critically. 
(Re)Inventing Ethics in the Classroom 
The project I am designing begins by surveying the range of texts within the 
discourses of public health that are made available to students. After initially asking 
students what their perceived risks are of contracting HIV, where they have received this 
perception of risk, and how they have responded to it, I would send them to health 
services to canvass the information available to them. After initially engaging questions 
of transmission, the construction of "high risk" groups, and the ethical issues raised by 
the discourses of AIDS, I would then move the discussion to media representations of 
AIDS through the analysis of commercials and print advertising promoting the home 
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test. These advertisements are effective for most of my students in that they specifically 
address heterosexually-identified populations. The goal here would be to get students 
to reflect self-consciously on their interpretive practices in reading advertising that 
targets a group to which they belong. This starting point reflects Foucault's 
identification of "ethical work," in terms of how these groups are called upon to be 
knowledge consumers and positioned ethically in relationship to the testing event and 
assumed behavioral changes. 
In tandem with an analysis of the various media circulating around AIDS and 
I-IlV testing, students will write a three-part rhetorical analysis in which they present the 
arguments that surround the call for testing. For example, students will examine three 
different groups or voices on the issue: 1) those of public health; 2) consumer media, 
such as commercials, print advertising, school-sponsored literature; and 3) the ethical 
discourses that make testing a question of personal responsibility, drawing on their 
personal experiences and impressions of AIDS as an ethical issue based on religious, 
familial, and social messages about sexuality and sexual ethics. The purpose of such an 
approach is to have students engage critically with these three major positions and 
study their arguments in terms of how audiences are "subjected" to the call for testing 
without actually maintaining a position themselves. Once they have identified three 
major positions, they will then analyze the arguments and presentations made with a 
clear rhetorical focus, identifying strategies used and appeals made to present positions. 
The final component of this project is to have students put together their own 
educational apparatus for teaching about I-IlV and the value of testing, one that targets 
a wide-range of student audiences, and one that I hope will reflect their understanding 
of the misconceptions surrounding testing-as-prevention. 
In many ways, the advertising for home testing inscribes the very constructions of 
health and disease and private and public ethics that Patton describes. In one 
commercial for "Home Access" the "domestic" scene of I-IlV+ status is readily 
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perceived in contrast to notions of public health and "okayness ." As a result, these 
commercials work toward entrenching questions of public and private, shifting the 
responsibility for transmission, not to a public sphere where acts rather than persons 
can be discussed, but to an individual's responsibility to know their HIV status and 
behave accordingly. One of the series of "Home Access" commercials takes place in 
that locus of health, the co-ed gym, where very muscular, "healthy-looking" individuals 
are slowly drawn from their workouts to a television screen in the center of the room. 
The object of their curiosity is the commercial advertising "Home Access." Potential 
consumers are directed to the phone number and the accepted credit cards through 
which to purchase this product; after home testing, they can send in their results, call 
five days later, and receive their results. After this message, the camera focuses on a 
man and a woman who after looking quite introspective about their HIV status, glance 
at each other with knowing looks and nod in assent to the call for testing, assuming their 
positions as ethical subjects to this call. Another in the "Home Access" series focuses 
on a single white female who is persuaded by the voice over that she should be HIV 
tested. We remain with her during her days of wondering what the test results will be, 
when, at the moment she phones for her negative results, she breathlessly says, "I'm 
okay." There is no indication that any behavioral changes will be taken to insure 
continued seronegative status. 
To be infected, then, is to be associated with an undesirable group; public health 
is maintained in the example of the "Home Access" commercial because the single white 
female, as well as the people at the gym, are privately engaged in home testing, the 
results of which will be dealt with in the personal recesses of their own emotional 
support networks. Nevertheless, even though Patton is highly suspect of the goals of 
home testing, I think we might read the proliferation of home tests as a reaction to the 
policing effect that the testing campaign has had on the larger culture. Because HIV test 
results may be reported to insurance companies and the CDC, there is the fear that such 
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testing is never entirely private. Moreover, the arrival of home testing confronts the 
public/ private confusion that HIV testing fundamentally raises. What home testing 
reinscribes is belief that questions of sexuality are for the individual and not associated 
with any social organization of sexuality (Patton). Furthermore, testing is more often 
used as a process of surveillance and disease control rather than an event that marks the 
adoption of safer sexual practices. In light of this, we might consider the sale of another 
home test, Confide-and we could easily re-label this product "confess" --not in terms of 
maintaining an individual's right to privacy but a public policing of the private sphere. 
Combined with conservative moralism about sexuality, the testing event becomes an 
individual's solution to staving off a "public" epidemic that risks exploding the 
association of private the private sphere, sexuality, and individual choice. The 
"panoptic space" (McLaren 67) created by the discourse on AIDS temporarily confuses 
and questions the very demarcation of private and public without actually undermining 
these demarcations. For example, in the case of home-testing we meet the reinscription 
of this demarcation of public and private as these spheres are bound up with 
associative values of health, disease, and deviance . Add to this the commodification of 
HIV home-testing as a "private sector" product and we are again well within the 
confusing dualism of "private industry" and the private sphere, but one that serves to 
edify the entrenched notion of sexuality and individual behavior. As I discussed in an 
earlier example of ethics and private industry, such a move to align the private sphere 
and individual choice not only maintains public/ private dichotomies , but it also helps 
to solidify the home-testing industry in its identification with the private citizen and her 
right to know. 
The call for home testing constructs the ethical subject in a variety of ways. For 
my students, the ethical substance revolves around the question of HIV testing: To test 
or not to test? The question thus posed makes an ethical determination of the subject's 
relationship to knowledge, a knowledge that will further ask him or her to exercise 
certain practices of the self. The mode of subjection would have the heterosexual 
audience see themselves represented in the advertising for testing because they may, 
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after repeated viewing, identify not only with the heterosexual population identified in 
the advertisement, but also with the inscription of public health. Ethical work would 
include those practices that an individual performs--or refuses to perform--in response 
to being called upon as an ethical subject of and to AIDS. The ethical work is perhaps 
the most obvious mode of subjection as the subject works "to bring one's conduct in line 
with a given rule" (The Use of Pleasure 27). But ethical work is not to change behavioral 
ethics, but to answer the call for testing. Finally, the ethical telos would have subjects 
complete the ethical work of testing in the goal of being and remaining HIV-. Once again, 
Patton's contention that the focus on the testing event does more to transmit the virus 
than to prevent it comes full circle in the Foucauldian paradigm. 
This initial mapping of a Foucauldian ethics through the issue of HIV testing is 
still in its early stages. What it does provide already, though, is a way of talking about 
both ethics and politics in the classroom: Our commitment to political pedagogies is 
maintained in the examination of cultural texts that survive on concealed relationships 
of knowledge and power. In terms of ethics, we meet a pedagogy that does not 
replicate prescriptive moralities by asking students to apply unexamined ethical norms 
to random dilemmas requiring ethical decision-making. Rather, they are asked to look 
critically at the ways in which ethical norms act upon them as well as call upon them to 
act as ethical subjects. In short, the critical ethics offered through Foucault provide a 
very specific range of questions to be asked of students who, in turn, can apply these 
questions to the study of the self within the issue of HIV testing; using the self as a site 
for ethical examination moves us away from judging persons and behaviors to a self-
conscious attempt to look at how ethical discourses construct subjectivity in terms of 
health and disease. Finally, the issue of HIV testing alone is suspended in the tenuous 
position between the public and private spheres, a positioning that allows us not to 
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argue for a merging of these spheres in a naive attempt to reconcile this dichotomy, but 
to understand how ethics circulates within a complex economy of the private and 
public. 
Notes 
1 Here the term will be used to demarcate a broadly defined cultural change of the 
postmodern from the historical epoch of modernism. In my usage of postmodernism, I include 
poststructuralism under this rubric; however, I distinguish the latter in its specific address of 
discourse and signification. For the purpose of simplicity and to avoid repetition, I have chosen 
to use only postmodernism to describe both the condition of this historical period as well as the 
body of theory and inquiry that has issued from and about this "movement." I agree, however, 
with Edward Soja's hesitation to see a clean break with or replacement of modernity in the 
postmodern (5). Rather, he observes the postmodern is a "deep and broad restructuring of 
modernity" (5). Indeed, the goal of political transformation and emancipation so crucial to 
Englightenment thought finds its legacy in both critical and postmodern theory . In the work of 
Habermas and Lyotard, we see the renewed and "restructured" goals of the Enlightenment cast 
into foundationally -opposed but theoretically-joined projects. 
2 I observe key distinctions between Foucault 's early work on subjectivity and his later turn 
toward the self in Hellenistic philosophy. What Davidson and Dreyfus and Rabinow make 
clear is the distinction we should make between Foucault's earlier work on subjectivity and his 
later turn to Greek ethics and the self. In other words, the distinctions these critics make 
attempt to explain how Foucault's late work should not be read: we should not read it as the 
development of a theory of subjectivity. To do so would open up the seemingly contradictory 
and inconsistent use of the self as distinct from the subject. In contrast to this warning, this is 
exactly how I will read Foucault's late work--not to point out inconsistencies in his theory, but 
to highlight the fundamental problems of theorizing subjectivity and ethics. I am working, 
then, on the description Gary Gutting gives of Foucault as an "[historian] of the present'' (14). If 
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we agree with this characterization-and I do- then we can draw a conclusion about what 
Foucault was doing in this late work, especially because Gutting qualifies that such histories 
deal with "subject matter [that] corresponds to some contemporary ideas and practices that he 
finds especially dangerous" (14). Foucault's work on ethics attempts to interrogate the moral 
tyranny imposed by humanism, rationality, and normative ethics. However, if Foucault, as an 
historian of the present, was working on locating Greek ethics within a history of the subject, 
then I think it is safe to assume he was equally fascinated and frustrated with a current 
problem of reconciling ethics and the subject-because ethics invariably forces us to talk about 
subjectivity . 
3 I am referring to Thomas Flynn's "Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at the College 
de France" from The Final Foucault. 
4 Algra distinguishes topos as a "space when it is occupied by a body (i.e. place)" (38). 
5 My use of tactic in this and all chapters derives from Michael de Certeau's distinction 
between tactic and strategy discussed in the introduction to The Practice of Everyday Life. De 
Certeau names the structural differences between tactics and strategies, aligning strategies 
with institutional practices of resistance. Since they assume fixed places from which to act, 
strategies are tied to the very locations from which they derive; institutions "serve as the 
basis of generating relations with an exterior distinct from it" (xix). In a sense, strategies are 
like the practices available under the structure-agency model that I discussed earlier, a model 
that has limited use in this discussion as a descriptor of political and social relations. 
Not suprisingly, tactics are spatial, according to de Certeau's concept of space as 
changeable, unstable, and defined by the practices that occur within it; place, on the other 
hand, is a "distinct location" (117) from which strategies are generated. Tactics are 
appropriate for my discussion of Cynic and feminist rhetorics in chapters two and three because , 
like the spatial positions of speakers "in exile," tactics describe a logic of action that have "at 
[their] disposal no base where [they] can capitalize on [their] advantages" (xix). Rhetorical 
tactics are bound to speech contexts; they are "always on the watch for opportunities that must 
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be seized 'on the wing'" (xix), as in the example of Diogenes of Sinope, whose reputation was 
based upon his tactical, and often insurgent responses. Reactionary and disruptive, tactics 
describe the logic of actions used by "the weak" who must plot and seize discursive moments. 
Tactics also do not pretend to any revolutionary goals for "[w]hatever it wins, it does not keep" 
(xix). Distinctly kairotic, tactics are aware of the intersection of time and space : 
Opportunities are "achieved in the propitious moments when they are able to combine 
heterogeneous elements ... ;the intellectual synthesis of these given elements takes the form, 
however, not of a discourse, but of the decision itself, the act and manner in which the 
opportunity is 'seized"' (xix). Thus the logic of decision-making and reaction creates a tactical 
rhetoric, not the discourse itself. Rhetoric is an effect of the discursive constraints and 
"heterogeneous elements" of a given situation. 
6 I am appropriating the conclusions drawn in Peter Sloderdijk's analysis of the ethical shift 
in Cynic philosophy. He sees a distinct shift from norm-driven statements of "ought" and 
"should" to the philosophically transgressive opportunity of "can" when deciding upon ethical 
choices. While Lyotard does share some theoretical similarities with the early Cynics, my 
emphasis here regards the rhetorical possibilities and implications of the shift from 
imperative to choice in Lyotard. 
7 A key distinction between critical theory and postmodernism is how each school approaches 
modernity: Critical Theorists do not acknowledge that the moment of the postmodern is taking 
place; rather, they wish to recupuerate and continue some of goals of the Enlightenment:. 
Postmodernists, such as Lyotard, find that we are living a distinctly different moment, one that 
demands different ways of reading and representing reality. This is, of course, a gross 
oversimplification of the complex distinctions between critical theory and postmodern theory, 
but this demarcation helps to position the project of normativity and justification in 
fundamental terms. 
8 As discussed in Best and Kellner, Adorno and Horkheimer' s Dialectic of Enlightenment 
responds to "the ways that reason turned into its opposite and produced new rationalized forms 
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of social domination" (218). This is an oversimplification of what exactly is going on in this 
text; however, it does give some sense of what Adorno and Horkheimer were responding to. 
Habermas, while remaining within the tradition of critical theory, does not take as stark a 
view of the direction of contemporary culture and advanced capitalism. To this end, Habermas, 
while rejecting technological action and the negative potential of scientific rationality, 
supports the symbolic action of communication and argument (Poster 460-461). In my reading, 
his basis for the "essential" impartiality of the ideal speech situation rests in formal rules of 
logic, a system of reasoning that is quite unlike real speech situations, and one that risks the 
hyper-rationality embedded in advanced technology. 
9 Chaim Perelman in The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. 
offers a similar theory of moral justification as that of Habermas, albeit one derived from a 
different tradition. Unlike Habermas, though, Perelman identifies rationality within the 
realm of empiricism and formal logic. The new rhetoric involves argument as its central model 
while it excludes formal logic; the reasonable as well as the task of finding good reasons is the 
realm of this rhetoric. From this philosophical basis, Perelman goes on to analyze the 
important rhetorical considerations of audience in his theory of argumentation. 
10 A central criticism of Habermas' s Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action is that it 
does not ground the procedure for testing the validity of norms in an historical framework. 
Unlike the very historical and contextual reading of the public sphere in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere. MoralConsciousness offers a very ahistorical procedure 
for communicative ethics. 
11 Kinneavy discusses the importance of continued interpretation and study of kairos. But 
aside from a smattering of articles and the historical insights of Untersteiner, suprisingly little 
has issued from such a rich concept. There is some demonstrated interest in communications 
studies, in particular, work on kairos in religious and evangelistical discourse. 
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12 In their recent article, Kinneavy and Eskin locate an Aristotelian use of kairos. Kairos is 
generally traced back to the Sophists; however, Kinneavy and Eskin attempt to add Aristotle 
to the tradition of kairos. 
13 According to Malherbe, the letters of both Diogenes and Crates were not actually written by 
them, at least not the extant manuscripts. The letters are the product of possibly several 
authors, and some can be dated as late as the second century A.D. This would help to explain 
the increasing assimilation of Cynicism with Christianity. 
14 As I will discuss later in this section, parrhesia shifted during the Hellenistic period from a 
political practice to a philosophical one. In my tracing of its different uses, parrhesia varied in 
meaning from simple impudence to the civil right of freedom of speech. 
15 This polarization is intended to highlight Plato's distrust of democracy and how such 
suspicion might influence his appropriation of parrhesia. For the record, Plato supported the 
abolition of slavery and allowed for some movement between social classes. "Even if such a 
State were capable of realization, it is too unnatural a thing to bring good results. From the 
first Plato saw that no community would voluntarily adopt it, and in his old age substituted a 
more workable political system in one of his latest writings, the Laws. The chief value of the 
Republic lies in its individual suggestions as to educational, social and political reforms" 
(Botsford 440). 
16 I am inverting the hierarchy Relihan constructs in Ancient Menippean Satire. Rather than 
reading Menippean satire as the umbrella for several "sub-genres" of parody, I am using parody 
as the term that houses the Cynic genres, including satire. 
17 Hutter identifies two kinds of pleasures, a primary one "associated with the mere 
movements of being alive" (122), and a secondary one in the pleasure that is gained through the 
"incorporation of objects" (122). In his interpretation, askesis is used as a therapy to secondary 
pleasures. This reading tends to come too closely to a Christian sense of asceticism as a remedy 
for materialism. I am reading the dissonance between Cynic practice and asceticism as a 
strategic contradiction. 
219 
18 I do not want to suggest that the experience of exile is always operative or attractive. This 
would overlook the very real, painful conditions of exile that exist for people all over the 
world. There is also a great difference between self-imposed and forced exile, as well as 
physical and mental exile. I agree with Jane Marcus that there is indeed an "ethic to the study 
of elsewhereness" (275) that must be taken into account as we argue about these issues 
intellectually. My purpose in using exile is only to offer a location that has historically and 
politically held great deal of potential for resistance. 
191n Women in Hellenistic Egypt. Sarah B. Pomeroy distinguishes the citizenship rights 
available to women. "Although women as citizens did not enjoy political rights in a modern 
sense, they did have civic status. According to Aristotle's definitions, citizenship does not 
entail only the right to rule, hold political offices, and administer justice, but it also can 
include upholding the laws made by those in power and submission to being ruled. Greek 
women, as citizens, belonged to the latter category" ( 46-47). 
20 To my knowledge, Susan C. Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds' chapter "The Splitting Image: 
Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of ethos" is the most explicit address of ethics, 
rhetoric, and feminism. They argue that feminist theory can inform a new understanding of 
ethical ethos, one that provides for a viable sense of agency and the subject as well as 
responsibility toward difference. 
21 Nedra Reynolds makes an earlier and similar move in arguing for ethos as location in 
"Ethos as Location: New Sites for Discursive Authority." Diprose, however, develops further 
the concrete connections between ethos and embodiment. 
22 Foss, Sonja K. and Cindy L. Griffin, "A Feminist Perspective on Rhetorical Theory: Toward 
a Clarification of Boundaries, "Westemlournal of Communication 56 (1992): 331-349. 
23 Gearhart, Sally Miller, "The Womanization of Rhetoric," Women's Studies International 
Quarterly 2 (1979): 195-201. 
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24 Flynn, Elizabeth A. "Composition Studies from a Feminist Perspective," The Politics of 
Writing Instruction: Postsecondary, Eds. Richard Bullock and John Trimbur, Portsmouth: 
Heinemann, 1991. 
25 I am referring here to Iris Young's definition of justice which critiques a longstanding 
distributive model. Young contends that thinking justice only in terms of doling out equal goods 
overlooks the need for deep institutional change and makes recipients passive. Her definition 
of justice concerns the commitment to eradicating oppressive conditions. 
26 In women Teaching for Change: Gender, Class & Power, Kathleen Weiler distinguishes 
between critical and feminist pedagogies. Critical pedagogy informed by Antonio Gramsci and 
Paulo Freire seeks to understand schooling as a fundamentally political process shaped by the 
hegemony of powerful ideological and class interests. Weiler' s project seeks to join the insights 
of critical pedagogy with feminist theory. "While critical educational theorists have been 
concerned with the production and reproduction of class through schooling under capitalism, 
feminist theorists have been concerned with the production and reproduction of gender under a 
system of patriarchy" (3). Her work serves as a model for those working within rhetoric and 
composition to build a bridge between critical pedagogy and the concerns of feminist theory. I 
retain an initial distinction between critical and feminist pedagogy here to account for the 
different emphases in various approaches . To avoid unecessary repetition, I will hereafter 
refer to both as politicized pedagogies. 
27 Teresa Henning makes a similar argument in "Resisting Ethical Paralysis: A Postmodern 
Critique of Ethics." She observes a rather unproductive trend in composition studies to 
reproduce the dominant political culture's emphasis on generating normative ethics rather 
than stimulating discussions of ethics. To remedy this, she offers a very general admission of 
Foucault's ethics of the self as a way of shifting dialogue from judgments of right and wrong to 
questioning how the self becomes a moral subject. 
28 Bruce Herzberg, "Community Service and Critical Teaching," College Composition and 
Communication 45 (1994): 307-319. 
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29 Brook Thomas, "Constitutional Literacy: Plessy and Brown in the Writing Class," College 
English 58 (1996): 637-653. 
30 My point here is simply to point to the reality of Aristotelian community, one that included 
only free-born, propertied males. Because of this, I think we need to be skeptical, although not 
dismissive, of Aristotelian models of discourse situated within this assumption of a democratic 
polity. 
31 In "HIV Testing on Campus: The Next Step," Joanna Hayden, Assistant Professor of 
Community Health at William Patterson College, repeats the same health/ disease 
dichotomy that Patton observes. Her report studies the advantages of offering HIV testing on a 
suburban college campus. What is most interesting about the testing project is that students who 
tested positive for HIV were not notified of their results at campus health services, where 
trained counselors were available for all other students who were tested. They had to report to 
the health department to receive their results, even after students were given the option of 
receiving their results on campus or at the health department. Testing protocol, according to 
Hayden, determined that any HIV+ students were to be identified at the health department, 
assumedly even when students requested that they receive their results on campus . Hayden 
attributes the change in initial testing protocol as a decision made, not by the individual who 
tests HIV+, but by personnel and the program coordinator who felt that "[g]iven the emotional 
state of individuals after receiving notification of sero-positivity" (210), students would need 
to be notified by the health department . In effect, such a shift from initial testing procedures, 
as well as the complete overrule of students' choices results in the students' loss of privacy . The 
assumption here is that, by becoming infected, they no longer have the right to privacy given to 
those with HIV- status . However, they are no longer associated with the abstract, universal 
good of "public health." They lose their right to privacy and individual choice, the two 
enduring qualities of the private sphere. Their private behaviors become everywhere 
legislated publicly . 
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